Daily Report

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Yugoslavia

International—UN Under Secretary General Marrack Goulding concluded his visit to Yugoslavia by stating that "more work needed to be done" to resolve the differences in interpretations of the UN peace plan. TANJUG reports that in a meeting with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Goulding stated "that on his return to New York he would inform the UN secretary general about 'certain very positive things' in connection with the UN peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia."

Bosnia-Hercegovina—The Assembly has decided to withdraw all Bosnian officials from federal institutions. Irfan Ajanovic, member of the main committee of the Party of Democratic Action, explained that they will be withdrawn after an agreement is reached with representatives of federal institutions, with the hope of conducting it in the "least painful way."

Bulgaria

BTA reports that the two servicing generating units of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant "caught fire" at 1530 GMT on 29 January. The fire was reported extinguished and the "accident" did not affect the "safety" of the nuclear reactors. Repair work began on the generating units the morning of 30 January. The plant's "normal functioning capacity has not been affected" and the fire caused "no serious consequences," according to Sofia radio.

Czechoslovakia

At a rally in Kosice, East Slovakia, Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky stated that the government would like to "achieve the same sovereignty enjoyed by other European nations." CSTK reports that to Carnogursky an ideal national constitution would represent an "agreement between the Czech and Slovak republics which would express their equal status" and "form a common state."

Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky claims that "inside help" contributed to last year's weapons and ammunition theft from the Czechoslovak Army. CSTK quotes Dobrovsky as saying that "these extensive thefts were carried out by professionals, and everything indicates that persons whose position entitled them to access to the stockpiles of ammunitions and arms also took part in them." Dobrovsky also said there is evidence that the arms have already been taken out of the country.

Poland

The Ministry of Internal Affairs released a "special report" on the "state of security" in Poland, Warsaw radio reports. The report concludes that one of the main security threats is the "progressing disintegration of the former Soviet Union and its impact" on Poland. It also cites the "incoherence of legal regulations" and "corruption on the part of the administrative apparatus" as factors contributing to the "deteriorated" situation, as well as the "radicalization of social and political moods ensuing from the worsening economic situation." According to PAP, the report highlights the "major threat" posed to the country as a result of the "economic breakdown."

CSCE Conference

CSTK reports that at the Prague CSCE session delegates voted to admit the USSR successor states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Only Georgia was not admitted because it has not yet applied for membership.

In addition, Slovenia and Croatia were granted observer status. Responding to this decision, the Yugoslav CSCE delegate "warned of the effects of discrimination in putting the rights of one nation in Yugoslavia above those of others," according to TANJUG.

CSCE Foreign Ministers Hold Session in Prague

SFRY Opposes Croatia, Slovenia Membership

LD2801172992 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1635 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Prague, Jan 28 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav delegation at the meeting of the committee of CSCE high officials in Prague can accept full CSCE membership for the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia only after a comprehensive solution to the Yugoslav crisis has been found, said Ambassador Vladimir Pavicevic who heads the Yugoslav delegation.

Late last night, Slovenia and Croatia were granted observer status in the CSCE forums, but not full membership because the Yugoslav delegation had opposed it on the grounds that it would mean legalizing secession.

Addressing the meeting today, Ambassador Pavicevic warned of the effects of discrimination in putting the rights of one nation in Yugoslavia above those of others.

The fact that Slovenia and Croatia were granted observer status in the CSCE may be seen as a temporary defeat of the European Community's concept to push Yugoslavia as a state out of Europe. Behind this, however, are "silent actions" by the EC diplomacy which have already resulted in the fact that a possibility of a "new Yugoslavia" is being increasingly looked upon unfavourably. Instead, they insist that every concept of any Yugoslav state is unrealistic.

The Yugoslav delegation's right to representation was again contested today.

Former USSR States Gain Membership

LD3001125292 Prague CSTK in English 0922 GMT 30 Jan 92

[Text] Prague Jan 30 (CSTK)—Ten countries today became new members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), under a decision of the CSCE Foreign Ministers' Council made here today at The beginning of their 2nd meeting.

The number of CSCE members has thus increased to 48. The breakaway Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia were granted observer status.

In 1991, the original number of 35 nations (European countries, the United States and Canada) increased to 38 after the merger of two German delegtions into one (following the unification of Germany) and admission of Albania, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The new members are successor states to the former Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Georgia has not yet sent its appliction in view of the complex situation there. Russia took the place of the Soviet Union.

Materials for the council's meeting were worked out by a three-day meeting of the CSCE senior officials in Prague January 27-29.

At the foreign ministers' meeting today, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier takes over CSCE presidency from Germany.

Havel Speech on New CSCE Role

LD3001124392 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 0901 GMT 30 Jan 92

[Speech by CSFR President Vaclav Havel at the CSCE foreign ministers' meeting in the Prague Palace of Culture—live]

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen, dear audience. First of all, allow me to welcome you on behalf of Czechoslovakia to this conference. It is the first time that our country has played host to a conference of this significance, and there is no need for me to emphasize that we regard it as a great honor.

I am especially pleased to welcome here the representatives of the new participant states—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and, of course, the Russian Federation. I also welcome the observers from Croatia and Slovenia. I believe that these two countries will also become members soon. Finally, I would like to welcome the representiatives of all the international organizations that have accepted an invitation to this conference.

The fall of communism and totalitarian regimes in the former Soviet bloc, the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the freeing of all nations who had been directly of indirectly controlled by this empire has brought about a radically new situation on our continent and has had an impact on the whole world. The so-called second world has ceased to exist as a military and political threat to the democratic West and as a focal center of expansion into the third world. The era of bipolar division of the world has ended and the nations of what used to be the Soviet bloc have embarked on the difficult road to democracy, civic society, a market economy, and the fulfilment of their sovereignty.

This is the time of hitherto undreamed of hopes, but also the time when we are all faced with a great many new problems and new dangers. Whether the hopes that are opening up for Europe and the whole world today will be fulfilled or wasted, depends on our conduct in the coming days, months, and years. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, the founder of modern Czechoslovakia, called the historical motion set off by World War I the world revolution. Today, too, we are experiencing events that could be termed the world revolution. The old orders are collapsing, and it is our task to build new ones. What used to be called—not quite accurately—the Yalta arrangement of Europe, has collapsed: and even the Versailles rearrangement has been superseded.

So for the third time this century Europe faces the task of arranging itself in such a way as to exclude not only the danger of a world war rising from its soil, be it hot or cold, but also to exclude fighting on its soil altogether—to become really and permanently a continent of peaceful cooperation of all with all, a continent of real security for all, a continent from which the spirit of expansion and confrontation will not be radiated into the world, but rather the spirit of peace and democracy.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is a political environment which could play a decisive role in this respect. First of all since it associates, or will associate in the nearest future, all European countries. Second, because it interlinks Europe not only with the North American continent, with which Europe is intrinsically bound by its civilization, but also with a large part of Asia which, too, is closely connected to it by important historical, political, and economic bonds and which, by its contemporary present, more authentic than hitherto, brings a radically new and all-round important element into the Helsinki process.

Mainly, however, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is such an environment due to the fact that it has all the basic dimensions that truly peaceful cooperation must have. From care for human rights and democratic institutions, through to interest in economic cooperation, to the military and security dimension. I think that the CSCE could be the highest umbrella over all European integration processes, their basic framework, a context, a solid ground from which they grow. It could become a kind of natural, permanent, and self-evident background of all European activity. I believe that the CSCE has the preconditions to change into such a solid ground relatively soon. And it would be excellent if this year's summit, called Helsinki II, which it is our task to prepare, could be a decisive step forward in this direction.

Were the first Helsinki conference in 1975 the beginning of the first act of CSCE history, then Helsinki in 1992 could be the beginning of act two. That means an act whose aim would be what I have already spoken about. To change this community into a truly solid and functioning system offering effective and reliable guarantees of peaceful cooperation, good coexistence, and a continuously deeper political integration of Europe on a democratic basis.

If Europe changes one day into a confederal system, as many of us have envisaged, then it will most likely happen against the very background of the thus constructed and developed Helsinki system, and stemming from this system.

What needs to be done for the Helsinki process to take this path? Many specific options exist and have been suggested. No doubt the conference will talk about them. Therefore I will mention only some of them here, and only very generally at that, and without regard to whether they are feasible immediately, in the course of time, or only from a long-term perspective.

First, the CSCE documents have up to now been of a political and moral nature only. The states have jointly expressed their good intentions, and promised to each other that they would put them in practice. I think that Helsinki documents should in future have a greater content of legal obligation, they should gather legal momentum and acquire a more pronounced character of international agreements whose observance can be monitored and whose breach would result in sanctions. All member states should simply, in their own interest, gradually transfer certain activities and powers to the CSCE which would to an increasing degree thus assume responsibility for developments in Europe and provide an increasingly greater number of international guarantees and privileges. This basic trend should be followed in all areas of CSCE work. It must necessarily be reflected as a radical change in the way all CSCE work has been done up to now. After the disintegration of the USSR, the conference has changed. It is more complex but also more diverse than up to now.

Second, in conjunction with and following from the above, the CSCE should continue building up and strengthening its bodies and institutions and confer more powers on them. It definitely should not become a mere debating society whose efforts would stop at issuing joint statements. The aim is not to set up and widen a bureaucratic apparatus devoid of power, but to have strong bodies free of a big apparatus. At the same time, CSCE should at least in some areas of its work tailor its consensus principle to today's needs.

Having the backing of some relevant treaty documents the CSCE could for example delegate some operational functions in the security sphere to a smaller organ, similar to that of the UN Security Council to which it could also give some executive powers—for example, in the deployment of peacekeeping forces which in my opinion should be established as part of the CSCE. If the CSCE is to be a guarantee of inviolability of borders, security of member states, and protection of their democratic constitutional systems, then it has to possess certain instruments through which it can carry out this role. This is true not only in the sphere of common security but in all spheres of cooperation. In each of them an apapropriate smaller executive organ could gradually be set up equipped with considerable powers. The CSCE parliamentary assembly should be a counterbalance to this Helsinki executive body.

Third, I consider a clear and functional interlinking of the CSCE with other existing European or Euro-Atlantic structures to be very important. In the security sphere we can hardly imagine future CSCE activity without close ties with the North Atlantic Alliance and the Western European Union, the potential, possibility, and organization of which could lean on and thus exclude the need to build new, costly bodies. I can imagine quite well that NATO becoming—especially if it opens to new members and it if continues to change—one of the instruments of collective defense for all countries of the Helsinki sphere

and an organizer of possible local security interventions where CSCE would consider it necessary.

In the sphere of human rights protection, integration of the legal system, and setting of common standards, the CSCE can establish a closer cooperation with the Council of Europe and make use of its possibilities. It can share certain tasks with it or in some cases delegate them to the Council of Europe directly. It can simply draw it into its work. European communities are no doubt the core of political and economic integration of Europe, its vanguard and its driving force at the same time. Although they too will, as I strongly believe, continue to let in new members, they will hardly include all European countries in the near future. Nevertheless as the core uniting Europe they will probably use the CSCE as a broader base to the extent to which its importance grows. This link should therefore be in both directions and the CSCE as the guarantor of the new all-European order should cooperate closely with bodies of the European Community, make use of them, use their experiences and impulses, and introduce them into the broader CSCE sphere. This is also true of other organizations, including nongovernmental ones.

There are many various international institutions and apparatuses in Europe and rather than building more of them, we should use them as a back up, to get them involved and to make use of them. The importance of various regional associations, such as the Nordic Council or the currently forming cooperative unions in Central Europe, will be growing in the many-faceted European architecture. The CSCE should focus its attention on these formations, too, and lend its backing to them as natural parts, or links of the pan-European cooperation system. The CSCE bodies should naturally maintain political contacts also with other parts of the world, for example with such important economic powers as Japan or with other important international communities like the Organization of American States, for example.

Fourth, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has played an important role and can play an even more important role in the sphere of disarmament treaties and in the monitoring of their execution. The main reasons for the stockpiling of military arsenals, especially of strategic ones, have gone and the opportunity is thus opening up to speed up and facilitate disarmament. The CSCE should clearly be considering how to make various military and armament matters as transparent as possible. It should be considering the most effective ways through which it can regulate the production of arms and monitor the export of arms. It should be considering how to punish breachings of contractual pledges and how to offer massive assistance to the conversion of the armament industry, for this is in the interest of all member countries. Nowadays the states of the former Soviet Union are having major problems with the scrapping, cutting, or redeployment of nuclear potential. I think that it would be in the interest of all of us if the CSCE were to offer its specific assistance in this sphere too.

Esteemed gathering, each war is usually followed by a peace conference that reaches a new settlement in a manner binding for all the postwar conditions. In fact we are also living in a postwar era because the cold war has definitively ended. And today, we are too urgently experiencing a need for some kind of a peace conference that will bring light to the rather chaotic situation left for us by the cold war and that would be conducive to a new stabilization of European conditions.

Those who met in Helsinki for the first time in 1975 had no idea that the community that came into being then would now, 17 years later, be capable of accommodating this need and create, affirm, and guarantee the new European order. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has simply a chance to take up this historical opportunity and to answer the call of our era. In conclusion I would like to assure you that Czechoslovakia, which chairs the CSCE now, will do all in her power to ensure that the Helsinki process continues successfuly, that it acquires a new dynamism, and that it gradually turns into the structure that will become the fundamental and most important creator of the new European order and constitute the main and at the same time watertight guarantee of peaceful development, the objective of which is a united Europe properly interconnected with the western and eastern part of our hemisphere, contributing to a better life on our planet.

Thank you for your attention. I wish success to your talks.

Fire Breaks Out at Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant

Situation 'Under Control'

AU2901200292 Sofia BTA in English 1935 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 29 (BTA)—Today, January 29, 1992, at 17:15 hrs [1530 GMT], the switchboard and the related cables at special section No. 2 servicing generating units 3 and 4 at the Kozloduy Power Plant caught fire. The fire was extinguished in due time by the N-plant fire brigade. The accident is not related to the safety of the reactors. On-field measurements showed no deviation from the normal levels. The fire service and the N-plant management have the situation under control. The causes of the accident are being investigated. All cables in the area are being inspected, reads the announcement of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Committee received at BTA. Unit 3 works to capacity. No power cuts regime is envisaged, the announcement goes.

Repairs Begin

AU3001100792 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 30 Jan 92

[Text] What is the situation at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant after last night's fire in generating units 3 and 4? This is what our correspondent Veselin Angelov reported. This morning repair work began. About 20 cables from the energy supply pumps were affected. The generating units where the fire occurred are working. The 1,000 megawatt generating units 5 and 6 are also operating normally. No one was injured. The plant's normal functioning capacity has not been affected. The fire was not large and there were no serious consequences.

Public Committee Declares People's Court Illegal

AU2901160892 Sofia BTA in English 1418 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 29 (BTA)—The People's Court was a form of political violence, unprecedented in its cruelty, its abolishment is not an acquittal of the culprits but a rejection of this institution, Prof. Markov told a press conference today. Prof. Markov chairs the Public Committee set up at the initiative of the Istina (truth) Union, the Union of Lawyer-Democrats and the Movement for Renewal of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The press conference was held in connection with a bill on the revocation of the statutory ordinance on the trial by a People's Court of the culprits for Bulgaria's involvement in the war against the allied powers and the related crimes. The statutory ordinance was issued in 1944 when the Communists came to power in Bulgaria. The bill on its revocation was submitted to parliament by MP's affiliated to the Union of Democratic Forces.

The main objective of the Istina Union is to denounce political violence, as the nation's elite was practically exterminated by the People's Court. The members of the union who took part in the press conference denied the statements that the People's Court had been established in implementation of Bulgaria's international obligations, as it was set up prior to the signing of the armistice and was used to convict people for the political line they adhered to instead for actual crimes. The participants in the press conference maintained that the People's Court was established in violation of International Law and of this country's Constitution.

Seeking revenge would throw Bulgaria 50 years back, political violence is the shortest but the most expensive way to the goal, the committee's members pointed out. They are against seeking personal responsibility and revenge. They insist that the People's Court be condemned as a crime against humanity.

Government To Give Up Monopoly of Radio, TV

AU3001085592 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 24 Jan 92 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Stefan Sofiyanski, chairman of the Communications Committee, by Spasiana Kirilova; place and date not given: "National Air Waves Will Escape From State Monopoly"]

[Text] Stefan Sofiyanski, chairman of the Communications Committee, wants to bring the Bulgarian communications network more into line with European standards. Over the last two years practically nothing interesting has happened in the state communications department, apart from the traditional telephone mix-ups and the squabbles over the use of the national air waves with which the committee was not very involved. The first question I put to Mr. Sofiyanski was whether, in his department, the previous management had acted according to the saying, "After me, the deluge."

[Sofiyanski] I would not say that I found everything in a mess, despite the fact that there are problems. The previous management had acted quite indecisively when it came to making decisions, but that is a consequence of the previous government's policy.

[Kirilova] Usually the Communications Committee is only concerned with postal and telephone activities. As an institution, what are your other responsibilities?

[Sofiyanski] One of the committee's important roles that has not been sufficiently developed so far is the assigning of the national air waves. Anyone who wants to be allotted frequencies to broadcast private radio and television programs has to apply to us.

[Kirilova] This means that the Communications Committee will no longer handle the state monopoly over the national air waves. What will the sector's new structure be?

[Sofiyanski] The committee will only retain its controlling and regulatory functions. At the moment there is one company, the Bulgarian Post and Long-Distance Communications Limited Liability Company. The new structure envisages the establishment of two companies: TELECOM-Bulgaria (which will deal with economic

activities) and Bulgarian Posts. This in essence is an institutional reform but it is a necessary legislative foundation on which to introduce a more liberal system for operating the communications network and assigning frequencies for private radio and television channels. The old law, which has been in force for more than 20 years, upheld the state monopoly in this field.

A very important factor for us is that the PHARE Program [Economic and Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary Program] allocates us funds to develop projects which, after their implementation, will bring our communications network close to European standards.

[Kirilova] Locations still exist in Bulgaria, and even in Sofia itself, that have been forgotten by the gentlemen of the Communications Committee, where people are still waiting in vain to have telephones installed. Our telephones jam at the slightest increase in traffic or drop of rain, never mind storms. When will this situation be resolved?

[Sofiyanski] Unfortunately our telephone network is outdated. It dates from 1929! At the moment we work on what is termed an analog signal but a changeover to a digital signal is imminent, that is to say a change in the way we transmit the signal. However, the effects of the shortage of telephone exchanges and poor-quality connections will continue to be felt for a long time.

[Kirilova] Over the last two years, the concept known as "telephonegate" has had wide currency. When telephone bugging is spoken about, some of the suspicion falls on the Communications Commission. Are there grounds for such fears?

[Sofiyanski] I do not think that I am the one you should ask about telephone bugging. Technically it is possible for one of our employees to listen in on a particular subscriber. Perhaps in the past such things happened on somebody's orders. Nowadays this could not happen in our department, except on the explicit order of the Prosecutor's Office. To throw light on this subject, you need to look not at our end but the other end of the cable.

Edinstvo on Minister Resignation Request

AU2901160392 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] As Petur Donchev, our trade union reporter, informed us the Edinstvo Peoples' Trade Union has already taken a stance on the request for the resignation of certain cabinet ministers.

Today at noon Ognyan Bonev, the trade union's chairman, handed a letter—or more precisely, a declaration—to Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov on the union's attitude toward the government. The document stresses that the Edinstvo leadership notes with concern that such a step could lead to the unnecessary destabilization of the country. This position is dictated by the conviction that in the near future the government will propose its specific economic program for our country's development.

If this conviction of the cabinet's good intentions turns out to be groundless, we will use our right to take trade union action as envisaged in the law, the declaration of the National Managing Council of the Edinstvo Peoples' Trade Union points out.

Trade Union Declares Trenchev 'Social Threat'

AU3001082692 Sofia BTA in English 2211 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Podkrepa National Trade Union recently set up by trade-unionists that split from the Podkrepa Labour Confederation because they disagreed with the Podkrepa leadership and its president Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, today declared that Mr. Trenchev was "a social threat." Representatives of the Podkrepa National Trade Union accused the leader of the Podkrepa Labour Confederation of having made blunders and of maintaining contacts with the communist nomenklatura and private businessmen. According to the leader of the Podkrepa National Trade Union, Mr. Plamen Darakchiev, Dr. Trenchev was the key figure in the anti-government group organized by the Podkrepa Labour Confederation, the businessman Valentin Mollov and the 168 Chasa News Group which publishes several papers. [passage omitted]

Islamic Students Call For Mufti Resignation

AU2901204092 Sofia BTA in English 1953 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 29 (BTA)—The students of the Islamic College in Sofia called on all Muslims in Bulgaria to back the declaration of Muslim priests from Kurdzhali who demanded the resignation of the Chief Mufti Nedim Hafus Ibrahim Gendzhev. The student' declaration says that the chief mufti is unfit to be the Bulgarian Muslims' spiritual leader.

A declaration of the Social Democrats within the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] says that the attempts of the trade union attacks against Bulgaria's first democratic government are not the best way to lend it support. Considering the complicated character of the political situation, Social Democrats believe that any hasty action would not only hold up, but could even throw back both the economic progress and the country's part in the world integration process.

Carnogursky on Slovakia's Sovereignty Aims

LD2901223692 Prague CSTK in English 2203 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Kosice, East Slovakia, Jan 29 (CSTK)—Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky tonight said the Slovak government wants to achieve the same sovereignty enjoyed by other European nations. Carnogursky told a rally here "We want to take step-by-step action to achieve the same sovereignty enjoyed by other European nations." "These steps must be in accord with internal political unity and economic stability," Carnogursky said.

Referring to problems in the search for an optimum constitutional setup in Czechoslovakia, Carnogursky said an agreement between the Czech and Slovak republics, which would express their equal status and will to form a common state, would be the most convenient solution.

Havel, Calfa Discuss Control of Arms Trade

LD2901213492 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 2100 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] A discussion between President Vaclav Havel and Prime Minister Marian Calfa at Prague Castle today centered first and foremost at the manufacture and export of arms. After the meeting Prime Minister Calfa told journalists that the main topic of the conversation was the possibility of monitoring arms exports and the information leakage in this field. In this connection the prime minister emphasized that it will be necessary to adopt a package of measures to ensure consistent state control over the arms trade.

Minister Charges 'Inside Help' in Weapons Theft

LD2801222492 Prague CSTK in English 1758 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Prague Jan 27 (CSTK)—Those who have stolen weapons and ammunition from the Czechoslovak Army over the last year had inside help, Czechoslovak Defence Minister Lubos Dobrovsky said today.

"These extensive thefts were carried out by professionals, and everything indicates that persons whose position entitled them to access to the stockpiles of ammunition and arms also took part in them", Dobrovsky told journalists.

He said there was evidence that the arms have already been taken out of the country.

The minister was speaking after a special meeting of the commanders' corps of the Czechoslovak Army, called to look into the recent spate of thefts of military equipment.

Deputy chief of the military police of the Czechoslovak Army General Staff, Colonel J. Stetka, told the newspaper "RUDE PRAVO" on January 23 that 6 tank machine guns, 57 automatic submachine guns, and numerous other weapons have been stolen from the Czechoslovak Army since last May.

Dobrovsky said low-quality work of guards and obsolete security systems were the main problems that made the thefts possible.

He dismissed concerns voiced by the chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, Jiri Svoboda, that the stolen weapons could end up in the hands of underground political groups in Czechoslovakia. He said he knew of only one political party who had been armed—the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, "whose successor is the party of Mr Svoboda".

Carnogursky Reviews Slovakia's 1991 Economy

AU3001113892 Prague CSTK in English 1609 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Bratislava Jan 28 (CSTK)—Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky said today Slovakia's economy is in worse shape than expected, with last year's gross domestic product having dropped by about 15 percent and industrial production by 25 percent.

Reviewing the activities of the Slovak Government since the first free parliamentary elections in June 1990, Carnogursky said the purchase of livestock products had declined by 23 percent and crop production by five percent. This was reflected in a rapid increase in unemployment (more than 300,000 at the end of 1991—11.8 percent of the labour force). The rise in unemployment was also due to the loss of markets in former Eastern Bloc countries but was not yet linked with the restructuring of the economy, rationalisation or the closing down of ineffective businesses, Carnogursky said.

He predicted that unemployment could reach as high as 16 percent this year. Carnogursky described as positive the elimination of imbalances in demand on the market, easier access to hard currency, a rise in the number of private businesses, and greater independence of economic organizations. Experts predict the Slovak economy will begin an upward trend at the end of this year and early next year, Carnogursky said. He also said that Slovakia received only five percent of the total volume of foreign loans granted to Czechoslovakia last year on a private, commercial basis. In the nearest future, the Slovak Government's priority will be to stabilize the economy through budgetary, monetary, and financial policies, Carnogursky said.

Parliament Passes Amended Electoral Law

LD2901195892 Prague CSTK in English 1852 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Prague Jan 29 (CSTK)—The Czechoslovak Parliament today approved an amended electoral law, based on a draft submitted by deputies and not on President Vaclav Havel's draft which combined proportional representation and majority systems.

The new law maintains the requirement that a party or movement must receive at least five per cent of the vote. If two or three smaller parties submit one slate of candidates they may enter parliament if they win at least seven per cent of the overall votes cast. Four and more parties on one slate will have to win at least 10 per cent of votes. The law limits the election campaign to 23 days, as against the 40 days of the 1990 campaign. Federal television and radio stations will reserve 21 hours for the campaign (till now it was four hours for eact party).

Political parties will be obliged to announce three days before the end of the election campaign at the latest the result of the screening of their candidates for possible past collaboration with the STB secret police. In contrast to the 1990 elections, convicts serving their sentence will not be allowed to go to the polls. Parties and movements that prove they have at least 10,000 members will be allowed to participate in the elections, while parties represented in parliament 60 days before the date of the June elections will not have to do so.

The parliament also today approved a government bill on the Military Defence Intelligence Service (VOZ), which will be controlled by a group of four Federal Assembly deputies.

Poll Shows Several Groups Have Key Influence

AU3001124392 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 25 Jan 92 p 2

["(res)"-signed report: "Several Interest Groups Prevail"]

[Text] A total of 69 percent of people in the Czech Republic and 82 percent in the Slovak Republic agree with the opinion that only a few interest groups—who are mainly interested in their own benefits—wield decisive influence in our country.

According to the results of a survey conducted by the Group for Independent Social Analysis (AISA) in November and December 1991, 48 percent of the respondents in the Czech Republic believe that leading personalities in our society are honest and frank, while in the Slovak Republic only 19 percent believe that. A total of 6 percent of the respondents in the Czech Republic (in the Slovak Republic, also 6 percent) consider themselves communists; 9 percent consider themselves social democrats (14 percent in the Slovak Republic); 9 percent consider themselves liberals (7 percent in the Slovak Republic); 5 percent consider themselves Christian democrats (11 percent in the Slovak Republic), 5 percent consider themselves conservatives (1 percent in the Slovak Republic); and 65 percent of the respondents in the Czech Republic and 62 percent in the Slovak Republic do not support any political orientation.

Additional data reveal an interesting attitude toward the market economy, which is supported by 52 percent of respondents in the Czech Republic and 33 percent in the Slovak Republic, while 39 percent in the Czech republic and 53 percent in the Slovak Republic favor a mixed economy.

Dukovany Radiation Monitoring System Upgraded

AU3001085392 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 28 Jan 92 p 2

[CSTK report: "Dukovany Safer"]

[Text] Dukovany—As part of the modernization of radiation-measuring systems, the current program of monitoring radiation in the vicinity of the Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant is being expanded. This year will see the completion of the first stage of continuous monitoring linked to the early-warning system that is gradually being implemented. There will be 27 gamma ray detectors placed in the first of the two circuits right next to the power plant compound. The objective of the second circuit is to monitor radiation in all seven villages within a five-kilometer radius of the plant. Readings from these detectors will be transmitted directly to a computerized center for radiation control analysis. Processed information from the radiation control system could also be provided by a direct computer transmission to other state administration bodies and institutions involved in monitoring radiation on the entire territory of the CSFR.

Recognition of Bosnia, Macedonia Postponed

LD2901203192 Budapest MTI in English 1414 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, January 29 (MTI)—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky met his Macedonian counterpart Denko Maleszki in Budapest on Wednesday [29 January] afternoon, a foreign ministry official told MTI. The topics on the agenda included the recognition of the independence of the Yugoslavian Republics.

Hungary, together with the European Community member states, postponed decision-making on the recognition of the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia for a short while. As far as Macedonia is concerned, Greece, a EC member state, was the chief advocate of postponement. Hungary, however, indicated that should the European Community give a favourable response, it would recognize the sovereignty of Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina with no delay.

Results of Opinion Poll on Government Performance

AU2801171892 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 24 Jan 92 p 8

[Report by Guy Lazar: "Great Stability Characterizes the Government Evaluation—Most People Regard the Activity of the Cabinet as Weak"]

[Text] At the request of MAGYAR HIRLAP, the Median Ltd. examined the population's satisfaction with the government performance in four different surveys done in 1991. The latest survey took place between 5 and 10 December 1991, on the basis of a sample of 1,200 people representing the adult population in Hungary. The results show a great stability in the evaluation of the government's performance but we can also see some fluctuations within this stability.

Dissatisfaction is what mainly characterizes the people's attitude about the government performance. The majority of people consider the activity of the government to be weak or very weak, and only a small number of people regard it as good. Between May and September 1991, it seemed that the government started on the road of regaining its popularity; in this period, there was a continuous decrease in the number of people who regarded the government's performance as very weak, and an increase in the number of people who regarded the government performance as good. However, this trend changed and the May situation returned by December.

Party affiliation determined the extent of satisfaction with the government performance the most; more precisely, the most determining factor was whether one is a follower of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] or not. Those who would vote for the largest governing party in parliamentary elections are mostly satisfied with the activity of the current cabinet. However, those who would vote for another coalition party are mostly dissatisfied with the cabinet and are almost as dissatisfied as those who would vote for an opposition party. These results show that both the MDF followers and the followers of other parties regard the Antall government as an MDF government.

As for the educational level of the people in the survey, those with a higher education have a more favorable opinion about the activity of the government. The same applies to those who are very much interested in politics. These trends can probably be explained by the fact that the more educated strata of the population have a better understanding of the difficulties encountered by the government and of the relations between politics and the economy.

There has been only a very slight increase in the number of people who are aware of the government program in the last eight months; in March, 49 percent of the people said that the government had concepts on how to solve the problems facing this country; this number grew to 51 percent in December. Some 33 percent of the people said that the government did not have a program, and 17 percent said "I do not know."

The people's party affiliation, including their relations to the largest governing party, also affect the answers on the government program. The MDF camp as a whole is much more convinced that the government does have a program, and the followers of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] are much more convinced that the government does not have a program. At the same time, this issue is not only an opinion but also works as a point of knowledge. People with higher education and younger people often give a positive answer to this question, and those with lower educational levels and older people often say "I do not know."

No basic changes were registered in 1991 on the issue of this government's future. Most people take one of the middle positions, and they would either like to see a government reshuffle or a broad coalition. This shows that our society is far from being so polarized as our politics. (This difference in the extent of polarization between the two spheres is probably one of the reasons of dissatisfaction with the political parties.)

At the same time, demands for government reshuffle also changed last year, along with the changes in the degree of satisfaction with the government activity: The number of people who desired more radical changes decreased from May to September and increased from September to December. Party affiliation also determines the people's desire to change the government or not. Their degree of satisfaction with the government has a lesser effect on them, but it is a fact that, irrespective of their party affiliation, those less satisfied would desire greater government changes. The same applies to those who are very interested in politics.

New Privatization Minister Discusses Economy

LD2901124492 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 27 Jan 92

[From the "Midday Chronicle" program]

[Text] Hopefully, the government's establishment of a new privatization portfolio will end the continuing power struggle between the State Assets Agency and the Finance Ministry. Minister Tamas Szabo today briefed journalists on his ideas, which, as we know from debates since the systems changed, are decisive for the Hungarian economy's future because privatization continues to remain vital and is handled as such within the government. Peter Szoerenyi reports:

[Szoerenyi] Revenue from privatization this year is likely to be about the same as last year's, around 40-42 billion forints. Privatization Minister Tamas Szabo, among others, briefed journalists on this. They plan to reduce interest on various forms of privatization loans further without dropping below 12.5 percent, the National Bank of Hungary's rate on state debts. The soon-to-be State Ownership Agency [Allami Tulajdonosi Intezet] was also discussed. This would be a profit-oriented limited company and would handle properties which are in state ownership on a long-term basis. They plan for about 20 percent of the economy to, in some form, remain in state hands. Mainly profitable companies would naturally be in state hands in the interest of profit; however, this does not mean that there will be attempts to rescue a few loss-making companies, as well. In Tamas Szabo's words: This would be very wrong. In any case, the budget is not in a position to do so. The new minister without portfolio promised that the processes would start by the end of April, giving parliament time to pass any relevant legislation.

Free Democrat Views Party's 'Liberal Strategy'

AU2801193792 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 27 Jan 92 p 4

[Interview with Miklos Gaspar Tamas, chairman of the National Council of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Attila Farkas; place and date not given: "Liberalism as Opposed to a Vessel State"]

[Excerpts] Miklos Gaspar Tamas was elected to be the chairman of the National Council of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] by a great majority. According to his assessment, the "parliament" of the SZDSZ reflects the political configuration present in the party. In Tamas's view, this body will be suitable to host internal debates to clarify matters and to determine a liberal strategy in opposition to the new state of subordinates. In the coming period, the National Council also wishes to deal with issues that do not interfere with the relatively settled decision-making mechanism of parliamentary politics. [passage omitted]

[Farkas] How do you see the current situation of the SZDSZ? At the news conference, you said that the party was not in a rosy position but the problems were not as great as certain people outside—and sometimes inside—the party appeared to believe.

[Tamas] I would refine this a little. In my view, Hungarian democratic politics is in a terrible situation and the SZDSZ is no exception to this. Certain processes that do not originate from our party are influencing the SZDSZ. Our internal problems also stem from this, namely, mainly from the fact that an economic and political system is being established here which does not at all resemble the Western civic, liberal, and constitutional democracies. Although it is not an irreversible process, the expansion of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] in bureaucratic organizations, the media, state-owned enterprises, business life, various professional and interest protection organizations points toward the establishment of a corporate vessel state which exerts a very easily determined influence on the citizens. Namely, the citizens increasingly realize that they better adjust to the expectations of the government parties if, in the current tight circumstances, they want to keep their jobs, and especially if they want to be promoted or want to become high-ranking persons. This matter puts the opposition parties in a terrible dilemma. A great temptation exists for them to acquire positions, to use the words of [Foreign Affairs Minister] Geza Jeszenszky, to "set up strategic positions" to counterbalance the effects of the MDF. However, this contradicts the liberal politics that we represent. It follows from all this that, more or less instinctively, the fault line in the SZDSZ developed along the various versions of the strategy that opposes the establishment of a vessel state and the various personal, generational, and stylistic conflicts in the SZDSZ are secondary to this. I admit that we ourselves only understood the real political meaning of the internal conflicts with hindsight. Nevertheless, they do have a meaning, and I very much hope that, through high-level intellectual discussions, we will somehow be able to achieve a united view on the new issues. It is a mistake to claim that the system has not changed. It has changed but, compared to the previous one, this is a different kind of bad system. The liberals have to shape their behavior in opposition to this new vessel state.

[Farkas] What are the most important political issues this body wants to deal with in the coming period?

[Tamas] I would very much like if the council dealt with issues that do not interfere in the relatively established decision-making mechanism of parliamentary politics. I believe it is very important that, in the issues of law and order, the party work out its policy on the basis of studying the institutions responsible for the implementation of law. I do not only mean that we should express our opinion on the upcoming bills on the attorney's department and on the police—which we consider unacceptable. I also mean that a liberal party should deal with the situation of detainees, people under arrest, prisoners,

people "stored" in Justice Department mental institutions and in mental welfare homes, and the position of refugees and interned people. In other words, all those legal cases where—not necessarily antagonistically—the maintenance of law and order intersects humanism and liberal and tolerant mentality. The phenomena of racism, hatred of foreigners, and nationalism also belong here. All this approach is connected to the similar phenomena experienced in the international politics of our region. The National Council will have tasks related to these issues, tasks that the parliamentary group cannot fulfill.

Expert Analyzes Developments in Yugoslavia

92BA0422A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jan 92 pp 38-39

[Interview with Dr. Peter Deak, director of Center for Security and Defense Studies in Budapest, by TANJUG correspondent Stanko Sajtinac in January in Budapest: "Who Is Interested in (No) Peace?"—first paragraph is VREME introduction]

[Text] The Hungarian colonel on delicate neighborly relations, border incidents, arms imports, the shooting down of the helicopter, Kadijevic's resignation....

The director of the Center for Security and Defense Studies in Budapest, Dr. Peter Deak, a former colonel in the Hungarian Army, is now considered the number-one military expert in that country. He earned attention when, in May of 1991, on the eve of the Yugoslav civil war, his center drew up a hypothetical prognosis of future events in Yugoslavia, which coincided with reality almost 100 percent. The analysis by this center, which is an independent academic institution that is financed mostly by American sources, foresaw almost everything that happened later in Yugoslavia: from the conflict in Slovenia to the civil war in Croatia, the situation along the Yugoslav-Hungarian border, especially the flyovers by aircraft and the explosion of stray shells. This simulation of events, as well as the present-day occurrences in Yugoslavia seen through the eyes of a competent representative of Hungarian expert thought on the subject of Yugoslavia, served as the reason for our interview with this expert, especially since the analyses of this center are periodically submitted to the competent Hungarian ministries, together with recommendations on how that government should approach the situation.

[Sajtinac] What have been the basic suggestions to the Hungarian Government in terms of policy towards Yugoslavia?

[Deak] In the spring of last year, we concluded that Yugoslavia was on the brink of civil war, that the war in and of itself was not a threat to Hungarian security, but that nevertheless it created a dangerous situation. We recommended a Hungarian policy of neutrality and restraint, while the army should not "swagger" and should undertake only the most basic measures in terms of preparedness. When the war broke out, we conducted a new analysis for the ministries, with the basic recommendation to the government that it remain silent.

[Sajtinac] Has Hungarian policy in fact been neutral and restrained?

[Deak] I think that self-control has been shown. The government has tried to consider the situation in conjunction with Europe, and has not "exaggerated" the issue of the Vojvodina Hungarians. For example, it has been more restrained than was Yugoslav policy towards the Slovene minority in Carinthia during the Tito era. There have also been isolated blunders, but all in all the policy has been appropriate.

[Sajtinac] Is that how you regard last summer's statement by Prime Minister Antall about the future status of Vojvodina in the event of the breakup of Yugoslavia?

[Deak] During intensive political activity, one does not always manage to formulate positions neatly and unambiguously. That was primarily a declaration by one historian, not by the prime minister, but I still think that Antall's statement was not good, because a statement that later requires an explanation is in principle not a good one. Nevertheless, he brought up the historical fact that the peace settlement in which the status of Vojvodina was decided was concluded after World War I with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and not with Serbia.

We also conducted an analysis of the borders in this region, and despite the fact that they are inviolable, they are not also sacrosanct. This is shown by the current situation in Yugoslavia, because Serbia, as we can see, feels that they are not sacrosanct. In Europe, however, it is possible to change them only by force, and I think that Hungary does not want to mess with something like that. Even if it believes that certain peace settlements are unjust, that still does not mean that it wants to forcibly change them.

[Sajtinac] Still, there are numerous charges that Hungary is interfering in the Yugoslav conflict, that it is supplying arms, that Hungarian officers are training Croatian saboteurs. What do you think about that?

[Deak] Those are all fabricated charges. A cease-fire is in the interest of Serbia and Yugoslavia—and I am thinking here of the federal institutions—right now for two reasons. First, Serbia has secured certain positions, while on the other hand a new Yugoslavia is being created, where Serbia is the cohesive force, which we also predicted and deemed to be a favorable outcome. The cease-fire is also in Croatia's interest, regardless of what they have said, because they can work on developing their own statehood only in a relatively peaceful situation, and moreover they have a better chance of resolving territorial issues through peaceful means, and not through war.

Nevertheless, part of the military lobby, which is existentially interested in the survival of Yugoslavia, does not want peace, because as long as there is shooting there

is an army, and as long as there is a Yugoslavia, there is also a JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. We can see from the example of the USSR that as soon as that country ceased to exist, the army too fell apart. It is because of this that manipulative information is appearing, and it is not impossible that the Yugoslav military intelligence service is supplying the state organs with this sort of material. Part of the military has gotten out of hand and is now looking for its place. Nevertheless, I think that the Yugoslav question is not a military one, and that it does not demand of Hungary a regrouping of forces or mobilization, but rather only a heightened level of preparedness. At the end of last October, we conducted a new analysis of the situation and recommended to the government that the adoption of confidence measures be submitted to Hungary. The result was the creation of a neutral air corridor along our common border.

[Sajtinac] There is also controversy surrounding the shooting down of a helicopter from the EC observer mission, whereby Hungary appears to be partially responsible.

[Deak] Naturally, the order to shoot down the helicopter was not issued by a state organ nor by the Yugoslav general staff, but rather by the conservative military lobby. Such a lobby exists in every army, so that in Hungary as well there used to be officers who intended to prevent changes in the system. Perhaps the airplane pilot did not see his target, but the weapons guidance service clearly knew where it was aimed. The helicopter was flying through the established corridor, because there has been an agreement in this regard between Hungary and the EC observer mission ever since last fall.

It is in the interest of certain military factors in Yugoslavia to create the psychosis of a foreign military danger, and the charges against Hungary fit in with this picture. There is no suggestion of the existence of a current military threat, it is not said that anyone wants to attack Yugoslavia, but now and again the "Hungarian card" is played. This is directly related to the 1930's, when Ustashi were trained here, and as we know, there was also the "Kalashnikov affair."

[Sajtinac] Still, Croatia has received arms illegally, perhaps from Hungary as well?

[Deak] I know that Croatia has received arms, just as other sides in the Yugoslav conflict have, but I can state reliably that the official Hungarian government, state institutions, and serious companies have not been involved in that. It is not out of the question, however, that international smugglers have supplied arms through Hungary, as well as through Slovenia, Albania, and from other directions. It is not only the Croats who have procured them illegally, but also the Serbian forces and the JNA, but the Hungarian side has not been concerned with that. Naturally, this does not relate to the "Kalashnikov affair," which in any event taught Hungary an important lesson.

[Sajtinac] One has the impression that an atmosphere of peril is emerging in Hungary due to events in Yugoslavia. Do you think that Hungary is really in danger?

[Deak] There are no intentions whatsoever in Yugoslavia in this regard. Naturally, it is possible that "uncontrolled forces" could enter Hungarian territory, but an organized attack is out of the question. It is not out of the question, however, that even today certain groups could cross over into Hungary and then return, because the border is not hermetically sealed. That happened recently with five Croatian guardists, who went back even though I would not have allowed them to do so.

[Sajtinac] How do you view the possibility of the arrival of "blue helmets" in Yugoslavia?

[Deak] They will certainly come and help keep the war from flaring up, and they will also have a favorable effect on political conditions. Several more weeks will be necessary for a final decision on the arrival of 10,000 soldiers. The decisionmaking process has been clearly delayed by the shooting down of the helicopter, because human life is regarded differently in the West; life there means much more than in East Europe, where it has meant nothing and means nothing to certain forces.

[Sajtinac] Do you also link the resignation of Veljko Kadijevic to this?

[Deak] He realized that events could no longer be controlled, and this probably took him to the breaking point. The fact that Blagoje Adzic was temporarily named to his post is also a natural reflex, because military autarchy is associated with him as well. I believe—and experience proves this—that the military can remain under political control only if the minister of defense is a civilian. It has been proven many times that military figures are poor politicians, because they are unable to lift themselves out of military conservatism.

Olszewski, Parys Discuss Defense Problems

LD2901212192 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Report by unidentified reporter on 29 January session of Military Council, with recorded segments of remarks by Defense Minister Jan Parys and Prime Minister Jan Olszewski—no video available]

[Text] [Announcer] Following the break-up of the eastern alliances, the concept of Polish neutrality is unrealistic. The state's security must be based on cooperation with the West, stated Minister Jan Parys during a meeting of the Military Council, attended by Prime Minister Jan Olszewski.

[Reporter] During the past two years, said Minister Parys, the disproportion between defense potential and the threat to state security has increased. Poland in military terms is increasingly weak, and the probability of local wars in Europe has increased.

[Parys] The army is still in the pre-computer and pre-electronic age. We lack automated command systems, radio-electronic countermeasures, and precision weapons. Previous governments reduced defense outlay at a faster rate than the fall in national income.

[Reporter] Further reduction in outlay on defense must be (?checked) and the military budget adapted to state realities. The arms industry must not be a drag on the Polish economy. It should become a driving force for progress, just as it is throughout the world. Minister Parys also stated that the argument that Poland is threatened in identical terms on all fronts was not true.

[Parys] Such a statement is not supported by the facts and I resolutely reject it. It cannot constitute a premise for defense policy. I see the expansion of German capital and the political activization of the German minority in Poland, but this does not mean that our sovereignty is threatened from the West.

[Reporter] Poland, however, ought to seek strong allies.

[Parys] At the moment, there is one system of security in Europe, apart from which, we do not have much choice. Our ambitions as regards independence in decision-making about the fate of Poland must be linked to the necessity of cooperating with the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.

[Reporter] Following reports from commanders of regions and types of forces, Prime Minister Olszewski took the floor.

[Olszewski] The absolute priority is to maintain the army at a level whereby it can secure at least the elementary security of the state.

[Reporter] The prime minister gave assurances that the government will do everything to ensure that this was the case. The army, however, will have to control its budget in a more rational way. Assessing the state's security from the international angle, the prime minister said:

[Olszewski] We are independent but at the same time isolated. Today we must seek security where it can be guaranteed, and so, within an agency which is efficient, effective and can help us. Today, only NATO is such a point of reference, and that is where we must find support for our interests.

[Reporter] The prime minister gave assurances that it is not the government's intention to conduct purges within the army. There will be no divisions into better or worse within the army.

Military Threat From East Noted

LD2901182292 Warsaw PAP in English 1705 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 29—Prime Minister Jan Olszewski told the Army Council of the Defence Ministry Wednesday [29 January] that the biggest military threat to Poland came from the East.

"The destabilisation which followed the collapse of the USSR is at the moment the biggest source of danger. It is no wonder that our eastern border must at this moment be an object of especial care", he told newsmen after the council meeting.

The prime minister stressed that maintaining the combat readiness of the Armed Forces so that they could ensure "the elementary security" of the country, was an "absolute priority". Olszewski said that in present conditions every social group had to make sacrifices and this included the Army. "On the other hand we are not going to adopt the position that savings must above all be made on the Army", he added saying it was possible that financial reserves might be found in the Army.

On the attitude of people towards the Army, Olszewski observed, "the fact that the Army was used to partially crush the aspirations of the nation (under martial law in 1981) has borne fruit—especially in the younger generation—in a breakdown of the authority of the uniform of the Polish soldier". Olszewski stated his conception of Poland's relations with other countries. "In every alliance that we seek we want to play the role of partner. We will not be satellites", he said.

Defence Minister Jan Parys was also present at the meeting reporting on Polands state of security and the situation in the ministry.

Interior Ministry Analyzes 'State of Security'

'Threat' Posed by Former USSR

LD2901165692 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1500 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] An analysis of the state of security of Poland makes us conclude that it has deteriorated decisively in

recent months, according to a special report made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The main threats are: the progressing disintegration of the former Soviet Union and its impact; the crisis of the state; the abysmal state of the economy; scandals, espionage, terrorism, and an increase in organized crime. The situation in the former Soviet Union poses a threat, according to the authors of the report, of an outbreak of civil war with the possibility of shifting the conflict to Polish territory, a mass influx of refugees, a halt in supplies of raw materials, and a rising crime wave.

The crisis of the state is caused by, among other things, incoherence of legal regulations, lack of discipline, and corruption of a part of the administrative apparatus. The lack of new legislation concerning the protection of the state and professional secrets is worrying. The deterioration of the state's security is also influenced by people's level of social awareness. The report points to the radicalization of social and political moods ensuing from the worsening economic situation.

According to the authors of the report, we are dealing with the formation of the economic underground. We have become a laundering ground for dirty money. Laboratories and factories manufacturing drugs are being located in Poland.

The state is threatened with penetration by foreign espionage. Crime is becoming more and more violent.

The report also presents an analysis of our foreign policy and cooperation, within the framework of a triangle, in our relations with Germany. According to EEC experts, the report reads, the signing of an agreement on association [with the EEC] creates beneficial perspectives for our economy. However, foreign investors and businessmen treat Poland as a country of high investment risk.

Economic 'Breakdown' Noted

LD2901164592 Warsaw PAP in English 1559 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 29—Poland's security has deteriorated dramatically, social unrest is likely to erupt shortly, while terrorist attacks are imminent, says a Polish Interior Ministry report disclosed to PAP on Wednesday [29 January]. Also, foreign intelligence structures are being expanded in this country's territory, the document says.

The authors say there is a major threat to the fundamental political and economic interest of the Polish state which is mostly due to progressing disintegration of the state apparatus and the economic breakdown. The report pinpoints lack of discipline among civil servants, incohesion of legal rules, and part of the civil servants being corrupted by domestic and foreign business and political agents as the key reason for concern.

The Polish economy is going through a period of deep recession, mostly due to the dramatic condition of state-run enterprises, the source of about 65 percent of national income. The authors expect the political and economic crisis to deepen further, and warn that social unrest may be brought to a boil even before the end of march.

In addition to that, Poland continues to be the target of penetration by foreign intelligence, and the State Defence Office (UOP) "has proofs of the expansion of resident structures of foreign special agencies" here.

On top of all that, Poland is threatened with terrorism, both domestic and international. The former mostly comes as a result of lack of stability at home, recession and unemployment coupled with the fascination with violence among part of the young generation, the Interior Ministry report says.

Council of Ministers Discusses Economic Policy

AU3001112792 Warsaw PAP in English 2130 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 28—The Council of Ministers which met Tuesday [28 January] to discuss the state of the national economy as well as concepts and directions of the social and economic policy for 1992 and the next two years resolved to postpone the adoption of final conclusions till the next sitting scheduled for February 4.

It was a working meeting and it produced no conclusions that could be regarded as the government's definite stand, Government Spokesman Marcin Gugulski said explaining that the stand would be presented in the draft budget law, the socio-economic policy guidelines and the report on the state of economy to be submitted to the parliament.

Gugulski stressed the government was now faced with a dilemma of choosing between the rigours of stabilization and the risks of anti-recession moves, and said most cabinet members favoured the latter solution. He declined, however, to disclose figures defining the annual rate of inflation or the volume of budget deficit.

According to unofficial sources at the Council of Ministers Office, the "stabilization rigours" variant envisages inflation of about 40-50 per cent and a deficit of about 48 trillion zlotys (about 4.3 billion dollars).

The government spokesman also announced the Council of Ministers ordered the finance minister Tuesday [28 January] to suspend indefinitely the introduction of the decision to increase turnover tax on some foodstuffs. The decision to increase the tax by 5 per cent was adopted by the previous government and was to become effective on February 1.

Russia To Increase Gas, Resume Oil Supplies

LD3001093892 Warsaw PAP in English 1757 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 29—Russia will increase supplies of gas to Poland to a level of 6.6 billion cubic metres a year, by February 3, according to the press spokesman at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

The spokesman provided this information after the meeting between his minister, Andrzej Glapinski, and the chairman of the Russian Committee for Foreign Relations, Piotr Aven.

The Russians also agreed to recommence supplying oil which had been cut off on January 13 and obliged themselves to spend the amounts earned on their exports of oil and gas to Poland on imports of goods and services from this country.

It was agreed that the talks would continue since the aim was to increase the level of gas supplies to 7.1 billion cm.

The ministers agreed that talks to settle the matter of unpaid for goods from the Polish Defence Industry would also be continued. The Russians pledged that they would pay for the food and electricity supplied to the former Soviet Army on Polish territory.

'Mismanagement' by Radio, TV Committee Detailed

LD2901065492 Warsaw PAP in English 1621 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 28—The Supreme Chamber of Inspection (NIK) has announced that the decision on the liquidation of the Radio and Television (PRITV) committee by its chairman last year was incompatible with the law.

The NIK also indicated that the decision to liquidate the committee as a state-run unit was not preceded by such elementary preparatory steps as stock-taking and evaluation of fixed assets.

In the opinion of NIK the present situation in the PRITV committee is the result of mismanagement. During the past 10 years the committee was headed by eight chairmen, four of whom carried out important structural and organizational changes without proper analysis of its costs and effects.

In the first half of 1991 the costs of the activities of the Polish Radio and TV reached the level of 136 per cent of the costs borne in the entire 1990, the NIK found out and stated that the management of the institution failed to achieve planned revenues from such programmes meant to bring profits as, for instance, commercials.

Important irregularities were found in settling accounts between the PRITV and the French company Creapriv which conducted, on commission of the Polish Ministry of Privatization, the advertising campaign of the first privatized enterprises in Poland. Last year the French firm owed the PRITV 5 billion zlotys (some 500,000 U.S. dollars) and yet it was granted an abatment of nearly half a billion zlotys (some 50,000 U.S. dollars).

Fota on Long-Term Trade Protocol With Russia

AU2901203192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1911 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/1/1992—Negotiations at the level of directors general in ministries were held in Moscow over January 21-28 which ended with initialing a protocol on goods exchanges for 1992 between Romania and the Russian Federation. As Constantin Fota, Romanian minister of trade and tourism, stated the protocol was concluded on the basis of the long-term trade agreement between the Governments of Romania and the Russian Federation signed on December 30 1991. He stressed that the goods to be exchanged between the two countries will be worth more that 520 million dollars and in keeping with the new principles of mutual exchanges the payments will be made in convertible currency, through authorized banks at world prices.

The Russian Federation will export to Romania, inter alia, 2.4 million tonnes of energy-producing coal, 120.000 cubic meters of lumber, 40,000 tonnes of asbestos, 30,000 tonnes of pulp, 8,000 tonnes of synthetic rubber. The quantities of natural gas, crude and synthetic rubber can be increased by understandings between the Romanian side and regions of the Russian Federation as part of the export quotas of the respective regions. Romania will deliver caustic soda and soda ash, medicines, consumer goods, machine-tools and others. Constantin Fota said the protocol would be signed in Bucharest soon.

'Positive' Talks Held on Treaty With Hungary

AU2901181192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1708 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/1/1992—Talks were held in Budapest on January 28 and 29 on a basic draft treaty between Romania and Hungary. The Romanian delegation was led by Ion Diaconu, director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The talks passed in a positive, professional atmosphere of calm and collaboration, that evinced mutual political readiness.

Tuesday [28 January] afternoon the Romanian delegation were received by State Secretary Tamas Katona who was handed over a letter from Romanian State Secretary Teodor Melescanu as well as an aide memoire that contains several proposals regarding the development of bilateral ties.

The negotiations at expert level held in Budapest open up an important process in the context of relations between Romania and Hungary. An important as well as difficult process, were we to consider some of the two sides' positions. As is known, the Romanian draft treaty was forwarded to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 11, 1991, while the Hungarian one was sent to the Romanian side on November 15, 1991. Whereas the Hungarian draft treaty has no clause referring to borders, the Romanian text specifies: "The two states declare they have no territorial claims as to one another, and shall never have any of the kind in future."

The positions on the need and usefulness of such a treaty are also different. Recently, the Hungarian foreign minister, Geza Jeszenszky, stated, while referring in an interview to the treaty and considering it as an important, positive factor, that Romania attached it an exaggerated importance. In his opinion, the Hungarian experience proves that, even without a basic treaty, good relations of cooperation can develop between two countries on the basis of international law and of the European principles and documents.

The Romanian side views the treaty as a basis for relations between the two countries on various planes as well as a means to surmount the psychological barriers extant in the ties between Romania and Hungary.

Roman Says FSN To Avoid Election Alliances

AU3001085092 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0756 GMT 30 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 30/1/1992—Referring in a news conference to the recent activities related to "the union of the Romanians on the two banks of the River Prut", Petre Roman, national leader of the National Salvation Front [FSN], pointed out that he was for "the intensification of the actions meant to speed up the accomplishment of this historical and righteous act for the Romanian nation".

In that context, the speaker stressed the necessity of more efforts to annul the baleful effects of the policy of denationalization conducted against the Moldovans for more than half a century by the Soviet occupation, as well as for the collaboration of all political and cultural bodies in the two countries in view of bringing nearer the Bessarabians' integration in the Romanian spirituality.

In connection with the forthcoming local elections, Petre Roman said that the FSN would enter the elections on its own, without getting into alliances with other political formations. The FSN leader also referred to the current divergences inside the Front, to his relations with President Ion Iliescu, to the FSN position vis-a-vis the Stolojan Government and how to implement the economic reform, as well as to the steps taken to ensure fair elections. In connection with the FSN candidacy for the country's presidency in the next general elections, Petre Roman said that the FSN national convention alone, due in March, would decide on the FSN nomination.

Mayoral Candidate Outlines Goals, Solutions

AU2901135292 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 23 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with "Cazimir Ionescu, Candidate for the Office of General Mayor of Bucharest on Behalf of the

National Salvation Front," by Aurora Inoan; place and date not given: "The Key the Town Hall Will Use To Open the Gate to Prosperity Is the Private Sector"]

[Excerpts] [Inoan] I recall an incident two years ago. You rushed into your office at the former National Salvation Front Council and I was amazed and amused to watch you "discipline" your subordinates. [passage omitted] This was proof that you like order. Did it occur to you at that point that you would be suited for the position of mayor?

[Ionescu] No. You know very well that working conditions were different at that time. We were obsessed with suspicion, fears, and insecurity; we were sleeping one or two hours a night, and we saw in each newcomer a potential enemy. [passage omitted] And if you remember, I was the only one not to accept any of the staff of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had its headquarters in that building.

[Inoan] The current election campaign is rife with vain promises, discussions, and ridiculous things. Before asking you what exactly you intend to do for Bucharest residents, I would like you to tell me on what you base your intentions, because—as we know—there is no money available!

[Ionescu] You are perfectly right! [passage omitted] Together with several colleagues, I am currently trying to work out a draft law to ensure the appropriation of a part of legal taxes and fees—which initially were to be exclusively centralized within the republican budget—for local administration purposes. [passage omitted] This will be the only real chance.

[Inoan] Can you tell us specifically how the Town Hall is going to solve the problems of Bucharest residents?

[Ionescu] The Town Hall owns plots of land and it is able to ensure what is needed—water, gas, electricity, as well as operational roads—just by putting them at the disposal of investors. I am sure that only by primarily developing the productive private sector and by making more and more products and services available, can the serious problem of price hikes be solved.

[Inoan] Please do not be offended, but these are also just words. Can you be more specific, please?

[Ionescu] Okay. I have already begun discussions with representatives of certain companies of world repute. I can tell you that they are prepared to come to our country to build and bring along equipment that is absolutely necessary for changing the face of our city. [passage omitted] I will hold a working meeting, so to say, with important businessmen; they are now in Bucharest to conduct a principled dialogue in this respect. [passage omitted]

[Inoan] Few people remember and even fewer are inclined to remember that you are an independent candidate. Most people regard you as a hand of the National Salvation Front [FSN], while the FSN....

[Ionescu] I do not want to disappoint the party's electorate, the people of good faith who, like myself, believe in the FSN, which meant their hope in December 1989. Moreover, I have agreed to run for the office of mayor in the belief that I have a moral obligation to carry this through at a time when I am offered the chance to apply in practice those things that we have just examined and given power of law so far, but the implementation of which did not depend on myself. [passage omitted]

[Inoan] And again, how do you specifically propose to work with the people?

[Ionescu] I will ensure permanent offices for interviews and mailboxes for letters and suggestions. I am sure that we are all are aware of the priorities. Therefore, I will not list them...

[Inoan] You do not want to list them, but I would like you to tell Bucharest residents here and now how you plan to solve the heating problem, for instance.

[Ionescu] How? We will make sure that the micro central-heating system in apartment houses be passed to private entrepreneurs in the shortest time possible. Payments by consumers will make sure that investments are paid off and profits are achieved.

[Inoan] Wonderful, this might be the case if there is any gas in the pipe! And then we should not forget big central-heating systems like those of Grozavesti, South, and other thermal stations...

[Ionescu] That is correct. But in that case the government plays a role. I am talking about granting credits. [passage omitted] And I am also thinking of the repair of housing, roads, and of the city's sanitation system. [passage omitted] What I would like to say from the very beginning is that one of the first measures will be to ensure that substantial wages will prevent local administration workers from material and political temptations. Considering the 10,000-12,000 lei which they earn, it is hardly surprising what is happening now... [passage omitted]

As a matter of fact, an examination of the not too distant past will reveal solutions for the future.

International

Goulding Ends Visit, 'More Work' Required

LD2901233892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2318 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 29 (TANJUG)—UN Under Secretary-General Marrack Goulding today said that the United Nations' peace plan for Yugoslavia guaranteed protection to the people living in the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) and paved the way for political talks.

Speaking after his talk with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today, which he described as primarily informative, Goulding said that the plan was specific on the point that it did not prejudge political solutions.

Goulding said he had received assurances from most partners in his Yugoslav talks that they accepted the UN peace plan. He did not, however, specify what reservations and objections had been voiced, saying that there were different interpretations of the plan and that more work needed to be done on resolving the differences.

Milosevic told Goulding he hoped that the basic criteria applied by all the interested sides in Yugoslavia for an equitable solution to the crisis would be those of peace and that those interests would provide the basis for 'adequate decisions' of the UN. Milosevic received Goulding at the close of the latter's visit to Yugoslavia, says a statement released by President Milosevic's cabinet.

Goulding said after his meeting with Milosevic that on his return to New York he would inform the UN secretary-general about 'certain very positive things' in connection with the UN peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia.

The Serbs formed the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) in areas within Croatia's administrative borders where they are the majority population in response to the decision by the authorities of that breakaway Yugoslav republic on secession from Yugoslavia.

During the visit the UN under secretary-general also met Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, RSK President Milan Babic and Prime Minister of the Serb region of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem (part of the RSK) Goran Hadzic. Goulding also met this evening Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, who is deputizing for the federal defence secretary.

The Sarajevo ceasefire, signed on January 2, is being honoured, and its violations are not of a nature likely to prevent a UN peace-keeping operation, Goulding said. He said that the UN Security Council would probably discuss the peace plan next week and that he could be returning to Yugoslavia soon to continue his mission. Stressing that all conditions laid down for a deployment of a UN force had to be fulfilled before it could be sent to Yugoslavia, Goulding said: 'Nothing could be worse for Yugoslavia or the United Nations than an operation which didn't succeed.'

Bulgaria's Support of Macedonian State Attacked

92BA0386C Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Jan 92 p 42

[Article by Milovan Drecun: "The 'Fraternal' Embrace of Bulgarian Expansionism"]

[Text] Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev recently proposed in NATO headquarters in Brussels the beginning of political talks among Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey on "guaranteeing security and stability in the Balkans." Presentation of the proposal at NATO headquarters, but not in Bulgaria or in any of the neighboring countries, indicates the new political orientation and priorities in the foreign policy of the "new" Bulgaria.

It is obvious that Zhelev's initiative in Brussels was actually a promotion of Bulgaria's "Atlantic orientation"; for months, it has been trying persistently to enter the door of the North Atlantic Alliance, which is ajar, so far in vain. That is why Bulgaria is attempting to create a new Balkan alliance with NATO members—Greece and Turkey—on an anti-Yugoslav basis. In this connection, its outright destructive activity against Yugoslavia serves it as a visa for entering elite "democratic" European society. The rapprochement of Greece and Turkey would make it possible for it to express more openly its claims to Macedonia and southern Serbia and to conclude deals at the expense of those territories of ours.

Bulgaria is obviously trying to finally become an essential and even decisive political factor in the Balkans. The beginning of the first phase of that process is the initiative to build a joint national security system in the Balkans under the auspices of West Europe, above all, NATO. In the background, nevertheless, is the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the list of states with which Bulgaria borders and the attempt to create some kind of regional military alliance directed against Serbia or Yugoslavia. That is why it was proposed that political talks be held that would result in "guaranteeing security and stability" of the Balkans without the participation of Yugoslavia, as the central Balkan state, but also without Romania. The question arises of whether Bulgaria is thereby abandoning the process of Balkan cooperation which was initiated and largely institutionalized.

A few days after he returned from Brussels, the Bulgarian president put relations with neighbors only in fourth place among foreign policy priorities, after relationship with NATO, relations with the European Community, and conclusion of a friendship treaty with the large European countries (above all, Germany, France, and Italy). In third place, was establishment of diplomatic relations with the states of the "former Soviet Union," and in fourth, conclusion of treaties with neighbors. According to Zhelev, Bulgaria's neighbors are Greece,

Turkey, and Romania. Yugoslavia is not even a former neighbor, it no longer exists for official Sofia.

For Bulgaria, Greece is a "traditionally proven friend," and Turkey is somehow a danger that has passed and with which the new "democratic" Bulgaria yet has to find a common language. Relations with Romania are burdened by occasional territorial conflicts over Dobruja. Yugoslavia does not exist as either a good neighbor or a bad neighbor.

In its efforts to move closer to NATO, last October Bulgaria signed a state treaty on cooperation with Greece, and in early December it also "initialed" a military agreement between the two countries, whose content is for the present not known to the public.

In one of his first efforts, Stojan Ganev, the new chief of Bulgarian diplomacy, declared in the Viennese newspaper DIE PRESSE, that his country is an "island of stability" in this part of Europe. Repeating the initiative of his president, Zhelev, that Bulgaria is organizing a "small Balkan conference," the Bulgarian diplomat explained that that miniconference should be a "counterbalance to the restless factor of Serbia."

It is indicative that the "new" Bulgarian Government is maintaining almost no contacts with Yugoslav federal authorities, nor with the official authorities of Serbia. All the news media, all the media in that country are waging a fierce anti-Yugoslav and particularly anti-Serb campaign. Bulgaria's intention is for that "little" of Yugoslavia which still exists to disappear as soon as possible from the political map of Europe, which would create the opportunity for sketching on the map an "expanded Bulgaria." However, Bulgaria is contacting officials of Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia quickly and selectively. And not only officials. What is more, according to the old custom, official statements constantly emphasize "neutrality" and nonintervention in the unraveling of the Yugoslav crisis. The actual moves of the eastern neighbor are completely different.

In the latter half of last year, official Bulgaria cordially received the prime ministers of Macedonia and Croatia—Nikola Kljusev and Franjo Greguric. It was also host to Dimitrije Rupel, Slovenian foreign minister. Everyone has been promised recognition of independence regardless of Yugoslavia's ultimate destiny.

A bit earlier, Sofia officially "received" Dobroslav Paraga, leader of the Croatian Rights Party, as well, and it was there that this well-known Ustasha launched his idea about creating an anti-Serb Balkan coalition, whose seat he chose to place in Bulgaria's capital. The idea fell on fertile Bulgarian soil.

Official Bulgaria is hardly even trying anymore to conceal that the dismemberment of Yugoslavia is its paramount strategic objective. The new Bulgaria certainly prefers to have several smaller states on its western border angrily at odds with one another if possible, than a strong, prestigious, and unified country, as the previous Yugoslavia was.

In the Bulgarian news media, Serbia and the Yugoslav People's Army are accused of being the only ones responsible for the war in Yugoslavia. Along with the accusations, Bulgaria likes to call for "punitive expeditions" to punish those two "culprits." The position of official Bulgaria is frequently advanced in the newspapers, which also express amazement at Europe (to which the Bulgarians so zealously offer themselves) and America for having hesitated so long in applying sanctions against Serbia when "it is completely clear to the entire world that it is the main culprit" in the Yugoslav crisis.

The officials of the "new" Bulgaria believe that with Yugoslavia's disappearance Bulgaria "finally" will become an essential factor in the Balkans and would have an easier time achieving its second strategic objective—rapprochement with Macedonia, all the way to an ultimate and firm "fraternal" embrace. That would be the beginning of realizing the dream of "expanded Bulgaria." That is why Bulgaria rushed to recognize the statehood and sovereignty of that Yugoslav republic on almost the next day after the Macedonian referendum was held on independence and sovereignty, without waiting for the results. In doing so, it recognized the sovereign state, but not the Macedonian nation, which "comprises" that independent state.

The "new" Bulgaria obviously cannot do without an older big brother. There have been the Germans, then the Russians, and now NATO.... Except that now, by contrast, official Bulgaria wants to become the big and older brother for the "nonexistent" Macedonians, at least until they are "reborn" as Bulgarians. It has helpers in such plans even in Macedonia itself, most of all in the top leadership of the Macedonian government. That is presumably why Kiro Gligorov's personal emissary is constantly traveling between Skopje, Sofia, Tirana, and Zagreb.

Federal

Presidency Endorses UN Peace Plan

LD2901214492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1953 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Jan (TANJUG)—A session of the SFRY Presidency, chaired by Vice President Branko Kostic, was held in Belgrade this afternoon. The session was attended by Slobodan Gligorijevic, president of the SFRY Assembly; Petar Gracanin, federal secretary for internal affairs; Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, acting federal secretary for national defense and chief of staff of the Yugoslav armed forces; and Vladimir Sultanovic, undersecretary in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs.

As reported, the Presidency examined and endorsed the report of Boris Jovic, member of the SFRY Presidency and president of the State Committee for Cooperation

with UN Representatives, on his visit to the United Nations and the United States.

The SFRY Presidency confirmed the acceptance of the UN peace plan on this occasion. The Presidency stressed that the implementation of this plan is in everyone's interest and that it insures the essence of the Serbian people's interests in the Krajinas. Members of the Presidency also noted that Marrack Goulding, undersecretary of the UN secretary general, confirmed the present interpretations of the plan by the SFRY Presidency, after which the peace plan was accepted by the competent representatives of the Serbian regions of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, and of Western Slavonia.

The Presidency also drew attention to the fact that not all the difficulties over accepting the peace plan in Kninska Krajina have been overcome. In this respect the SFRY Presidency pointed out the big responsibility for any consequences that could ensue from a possible refusal to accept the UN peace plan. Attention was drawn to the gravity of such a situation. A further program of action was endorsed in order to eliminate the remaining obstacles to the adoption by the UN Security Council of a decision to send peace- keeping forces to Yugoslavia.

Assembly Considers Convention on 'New Yugoslavia'

92BA0384A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jan 92 p 6

[Article by B. Cpajak and B. Radivojsa: "Yesterday in the Assembly of the SFRY: Convention Offered on a New Yugoslavia"—first paragraph is POLITIKA introduction]

[Text] There were representatives of 160 parties in the Great Hall of the Assembly of the SFRY. Two messages from Dr. Branko Kostic: "Let us join finally to establish peace, and do all to reconstruct the Yugoslav national society in the shortest time." Plebescite under the protection of the UN? The Serbian people cannot permit the ruins of Yugoslavia to cover them. Elections for a constitution-framing assembly.

Greeting all present in the name of the Presidency of the SFRY, Dr. Branko Kostic, vice president of the collective leadership of the government, declared:

Let us all join, and through us all the citizens of Yugoslavia that we represent, in finally establishing peace at the beginning of 1992 with the welcome assistance and involvement of the UN and the Security Council, and do all to reconstruct the Yugoslav national society in the shortest time and form a stable country with the organs and institutions that will effectively protect the interests of all the peoples and citizens interested in living in it. Such a national society should not deny the right to a single people or a single republic to leave it at a later time, on the basis of freely expressed will and according to a designated procedure, no matter which people or which republic: that national society should remain open for all, if they later express the wish to join it.

When we achieve those two tasks, let's return—Kostic then pointed out—to the programs of the parties, associations, and movements that we represent, and organize a political battle and multiparty parliamentary elections, endeavoring to provide for the greatest possible number of our representatives in the organs of government and the institutions of the systems of the new Yugoslavia.

The vice president of the Presidency of the SFRY next emphasized that a number of meetings with representatives of a large number of political parties interested in preserving Yugoslavia for those republics and peoples that wish it had been held in recent months in the Presidency of the SFRY. A request for such a meeting had recently been made, he explained, by the Democratic Party of Federalists from Bosnia-Hercegovina in the name of eleven political parties and a group of independent representatives of the Assembly of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The Presidency of the SFRY accepted their initiative with pleasure and organized a meeting on 26 December, at which, as he reminded, the conclusion to call together this convention was made.

In addition to the fact that this kind of massive gathering of the highest-ranking representatives of the political parties and movements sprang from this initiative, Kostic sees the greatest value of the meeting held in the fact that representatives of political parties with very different political viewpoints gathered in one place; but it did not bother them—as he pointed out—to show undivided unity in views about the need for preserving the continuity of the Yugoslav national society in the form of a new or a third Yugoslavia.

Dr. Branko Kostic finished his short presentation with the conviction that those present would contribute to the fulfillment of two basic tasks which he stressed with the words: "Long live our sole homeland of Yugoslavia."

The Serbian People Are Again the "Backbone" for a New Yugoslavia

The second participant in the discussion, Professor Milorad Ekmecic, connected the "temporary fall of Yugoslavia" with a "victory for European clericalism." Until the "corrosion" of this clericalism takes place, it will not be possible for that new Yugoslavia to stand on a firmer foundation, considers Ekmecic, adding that the Serbian people were naturally called upon to fight for Yugoslavia. The Serbian people have fought for Yugoslavia for the past 200 years and they cannot throw that energy and several generations burned in that victory into the water. Thus the Serbian people are again that backbone for the creation of a new Yugoslavia, says the well-known historian, and points out that not a single Serbian government will sleep peacefully if it takes into consideration only what is happening with the Serbs in Nis, and not in other Serbian areas outside Serbia.

Ekmecic spoke particularly about Bosnia-Hercegovina and the leading Muslim party in this republic, which is in a contradiction between creating an Islamic republic and

preserving the common life of the *populations of all* nations. From this contradiction stem the crises that will shake Bosnia-Hercegovina. "Because of this I see one solution in the possibility that a new Yugoslavia-oriented movement is created from the Muslim intelligentsia in Bosnia-Hercegovina," stressed Dr. Ekmecic.

The representative of the League of Communists Movement for Yugoslavia, Dragan Atanasovski, proposed that an amendment be added to the text of the Convention which would make possible a plebiscite of all peoples and citizens about whether they are for life in a joint society. According to this proposal, the plebiscite would be supervised by representatives of the UN. In this way, considers Atanasovski, political propaganda that has been waged during discussions by citizens up to now, on the basis of which they have simply been forced to come out for secession, would be made impossible.

"Preserving Yugoslavia is the duty of all citizens, regardless of national affiliation. Hungarians in Serbia have national rights like nowhere else in Europe," were the first two sentences that, greeted by stormy applause, were uttered by Tibor Halasi. He remarks that the creation of several small, independent states on present Yugoslav territory would significantly hinder the opportunity for communication among populations, and between representatives of the same nation, and that this is sufficient rational reason for preserving the existing society.

Yugoslavia is being destroyed according to the scenario of foreign forces, with the assistance of domestic traitors, believes Drago Pantic, while Blazo Zlopasa says that the "fathers of nations" and the "separatists" are triumphing, because their triumph is in war. And vice versa, the victory of peace and reason will lead to the defeat of all those who led us into this chaos. "If we can't live together," asked Zlopasa, "why have we then permitted ourselves to die together."

Mentioning that he speaks in the name of more than 400,000 Serbs from Bosnia-Hercegovina who live in Serbia, Gojko Djogo said that the question that is being posed at this assembly is crucial for all of them. Because, whether there will be a Yugoslavia "depends on whether their homes, graves, and homeland will find themselves at dawn in another country or not." Djogo says that party differences in this place should give way to the interests of the people. Because, the Serbian people, as he said, cannot permit themselves to be buried in the ruins of Yugoslavia. We haven't defeated it and we cannot permit it to defeat us. And it is our sacred right to live in one society: There can be 30 or 130 types of Serbs, but our society must be one, the famous poet pointed out, adding that he had not forgotten about the interests of other peoples. But their representatives must state these interests. As far as Serbs are concerned, nevertheless, it should be said that they support Yugoslavia, and not their national society, like some other nations in this area.

Against the Isolation of the Muslims

"Let's not push the Muslims into self-isolation, let's show a little bit more understanding for them," said Dzevad Galijasevic. He remarks that the Muslim people have advanced their national self-awareness in Yugoslavia. And breaking up the current state into several small ones would separate the Muslims into four states. Galijasevic called the Islamic faith of Muslims a "nice facade," but he added that the "foundations" must be preserved, and preserving a common society is a foundation.

The president of the Socialist Party of Serbia, Halit Trnavci, spoke about the significant results achieved in the affirmation of the Albanian nationality in Yugoslavia and about the regular assistance sent to Kosovo. "Separatist knights" will not separate Albanians from Yugoslavia, said Trnavci, while Radomir Barjaktarevic, as the representative of the League of Communists Movement for Yugoslavia from Bosnia-Hercegovina, pointed out that only those who want to remain in this society should do so and that no one should fight a battle any more for other peoples to live in such a society.

At this meeting Milan Paroski, president of the National Party, cited a dilemma: Are the representatives of the organs of power of the SFRY for a new or an old Yugoslavia? He requested them to explain this. Paroski offered an amendment according to which "complete Serbian sovereignty would be established" in the new state from Karavanki to Ohrid; this aroused mainly negative reactions in the hall.

Quite the opposite reactions were expressed during a report by the president of the Socialist Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Rabija Subic. She began her speech with a "Dear Yugoslavia" and the opinion that there is not and cannot be opposition in this hall. Today one must see who is loyal here and who is not loyal, said Subic, and asked all those who are not prepared to fight for Yugoslavia to leave the assembly hall. Because, behind the demand for preserving Yugoslavia, there stand more than 15 million patriots who want a life together. As to the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, she said that a one-party system is again on the scene and that the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina has passed a decision on dropping out of Yugoslavia, contrary to the interests of the people of this republic.

Subic asked whether Ejub Ganic was in the hall, and when she was told that he wasn't, she explained that this politician had become a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina, designating himself a "Yugoslav." But today he isn't here, said Rabija Subic, to sign the Convention on Yugoslavia. As to Alija Izetbegovic, he was behaving as if Kurt Waldheim and the Pope were closer to him than Radovan Karadzic.

Dusan Luzajic requested that references not be made to "fascist Croatia," but only to the fascist regime in the ruling party, and not to the Croatian people generally.

At the conclusion of this issue of our newspaper, the meeting had not ended.

[Box, p 6]

The Continuity of Yugoslavia in the New Borders

Many-sided and decisive measures by all government, political, and social entities cannot be delayed any longer in order for the undesirable course of events to be stopped and the conditions created for the democratic development of Yugoslavia and those peoples and republics that have not oriented themselves to seceding from Yugoslavia.

With such a conviction, the Coordinating Body submitted, before the beginning of the work of yesterday's meeting, a Draft Convention on Yugoslavia, in which it is first pointed out that it is the exclusive right of peoples and citizens to decide on their own fate, and so no one has the right to forbid the continuation of a life in common to those peoples and republics that want it in a Yugoslav national society organized in agreement and in harmony with their mutual interests.

According to the proposal, the participants in the meeting were in favor of having those Yugoslav peoples and their republics that had not come out for secession provide for the continuity of Yugoslavia in the new borders and its transformation into a federal national society, and that it act as a sovereign state in international relations. Its territory would be united, its borders inviolable; they would be preserved by the armed forces of Yugoslavia.

In order for this to be achieved, an act should be passed in the Assembly of the SFRY on the all-inclusive resolution of the crisis and the conditions and procedure for realizing the right of the people to self-determination. The organization of a Constitution-Framing Assembly and enactment of a new Yugoslav Constitution were planned, on the basis of which multi-party elections would be held and a multi-party parliament would be constituted. Under the assembly act cited, according to this conception, the criteria and principles would be consolidated for the equitable territorial and material designation of borders between Yugoslavia and those parts of the SFRY whose peoples constitute independent states.

[Box, p 7]

Attendees

In addition to the representatives of about 160 parties, these guests participated in yesterday's assembly for Yugoslavia: Dr. Branko Kostic, vice president of the Presidency of the SFRY; Dr. Borisav Jovic, Sejdo Bajramovic, and Jugoslav Kostic (members of the Presidency of the SFRY); Dr. Slobodan Grigorijevic, president of the Assembly of the SFRY; some members of the Federal Executive Council, led by Aleksandar Mitrovic, vice president; Aleksandar Bakocevic, president of the Assembly of Serbia and presiding officer of the Serbian delegation in Vienna for republics and provinces of the Assembly of the SFRY....

Representing their parties were also Dr. Radovan Karadzic, Vojislav Seselj, Milan Paroski, Hasan Delic, Dragan Jovanovic, Gojko Djogo, Goran Babic, Zvonko Tarle, Mirko Jovic...

Many well-known personalities from the spheres of science, culture, and sport were also present.

[Box, p 7]

Whistling and Approving

Some speakers at yesterday's meeting did not even succeed in finishing what they started out to say. Thus Dr. Dzemal Sokolovic, replying to Milorad Ekmecic, was very critical toward current members of the Presidency of the SFRY, who had contributed significantly, in his opinion, to the disarrangement of the old state and now wish to make a new state. Sokolovic asked whether they have a "moral right" to this and answered: My answer is 100 times—no! In the opinion of Sokolovic, one should disassociate oneself from a great part of the proposed convention. When, next, he said once more that the members of the Presidency "are not legitimate"—whistling and loud denials were heard and—Sokolovic left the rostrum.

Later Dzevad Galijasevic and Radomir Barjaktarevic proposed that Sokolovic again come up to the microphone, but he didn't do it.

Milan Paroski fared similarly to Sokolovic. His ideas were also greeted with whistling, and the presiding officer told him it was not necessary to read the amendment that he was proposing. In addition, his time ran out. Thus Paroski also left the rostrum before he had intended to....

[Box, p 7]

The Majority Recognized Krajina

Mile Pasnalj, president of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, requested those present to recognize Krajina by raising their hands, explaining that this was very important for them.

The majority of those in the hall recognized Krajina (by raising their hands), while members of the Presidency of the SFRY and others who officially represent the SFRY abstained.

Pasnalj also said that Serbian Krajina does not accept the Vensov plan, that the Presidency of the SFRY can represent parts of the country from which it is delegated, and that the Republic of Serbian Krajina can be represented only by its assembly.

A Seven-Member Working Presidency

A working presidency, elected before the beginning of work, presided over yesterday's meeting. It comprised seven luminaries: Salko Alicehic (presiding officer of the working presidency), academic Slavko Leovac, Professor Dr. Gojko Grujevski, Gojko Djogo, Dragica Djortan, Dr. Dragan Djokanovic, and Vaso Djukanovic.

[Box, p 7]

Whose Absence Was Noticed

The absence of some major political parties was noticed at yesterday's meeting. From Serbia, for example, there was no representative of the Democratic Party and the Serbian Renewal Movement; from Montenegro, of the Socialist Party; and from Bosnia-Hercegovina, of the Party of Democratic Action, just as there was no representative of this party from Serbia.

New Deputy Foreign Minister Maksic Interviewed

92BA0404B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 92 p 16

[Interview with Milivoje Maksic, deputy federal secretary for foreign affairs, by Nikola Burzan; place and date not given: "Both Life Together and the Past Have Been Thoughtlessly Cast Away"]

[Text] In spite of all the disputations and denials, more on the domestic than the world political scene, Yugoslav diplomacy still does exist. One might even say—more compact and more Yugoslav than even the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA]! And in spite of all the squabbles—internal and external—our diplomacy is striving with all its strength to piece together the broken threads of Yugoslav policy into some kind of ball of community and to explain to the world (in fact, even convince it) that the "Yugoslav question" has not been definitively "tabled," nor is Yugoslavia dead. How is it succeeding and—is it succeeding?

The subject of our interview is Milivoje Maksic, officially deputy federal secretary for foreign affairs, although in practice he is the chief of the Yugoslav Foreign Service. Because Budimir Loncar, up until now the federal secretary, has "withdrawn," although circumstances are such that there is not even anyone to accept it nor to choose a new minister!

When he recently passed the "baton" to Maksic, Loncar could nevertheless be quite calm and certain that the helm of Yugoslav diplomacy was passing into the right hands. Milivoje Maksic did not obtain this office either through republic or party connections, but on the basis of knowledge and ability: He is a career diplomat, an experienced professional who for more than four decades—in the SSIP [Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs] and in the world, has been defending the colors of Yugoslavia with conviction and devotion, and so, although he qualified for a pension (and on three occasions has applied for it), by force of circumstances is simply not being allowed to leave.

A Synthesis of Common Interests

Because Maksic does not like "conventional interviews," we had a frank conversation with him. We are publishing here only what remained written in the reporter's notebook—without prior authorization. The first question was this: What did Loncar actually give to him in the recent "transfer of authority"?

"This was not a transfer of authority in administrative proceedings. It is simply that the deputy federal secretary—under the provisions of the Constitution and law—replaces the federal secretary in all his duties and rights whenever he is not performing his function in the country, for whatever reason. It is for that reason that the deputy federal secretary is elected in the SFRY Assembly according to the same procedure as the federal secretary himself. Because the federal secretary is often out of the country—which is understandable in our case—his deputy had to be ready to take over all his obligations at any moment.

"Accordingly, under the new conditions following the resignation of the federal secretary the deputy federal secretary is doing what he is required and authorized to do by the Constitution and law, without his status being changed. What is new is that the obligations arising out of the complexity of the situation the country is in are extremely delicate.

"As far as this deputy federal secretary is concerned, this is beyond any doubt the last office he will hold, this office he was given almost three and a half years ago. His term is coming to an end under conditions that have come about against our will and out of our control, when each of us is taking the most serious examination in professional consciousness and ethics. Unless that examination is passed, all the others that have been passed over more than four decades of work in diplomacy are destroyed...."

Who and how, in the situation of "truncated" federal institutions—the Assembly, the Presidency, and the FEC [Federal Executive Council]—is forming our foreign policy and monitoring its conduct?

"Yugoslavia's foreign policy still has the ambition of being a synthesis of the interests of all the nationalities and people of our country regardless of how much anyone contributes to it or detracts from it. That is why it necessarily has a broader—I dare to say—Yugoslav character (sometimes I am not understood and not accepted in many detached centers of power for that reason)," Maksic says.

"That policy is being formed both in the bodies of the Federation and in the republics, and we in the SSIP, still unburdened, but nevertheless weakened by the divisions in the country, have been attempting to get out of the

limiting framework of Balkan squabbles and—relying on the range of our own country and the achievements of others—to find an acceptable synthesis that will be of benefit even to those who in their enthusiasm need not be completely aware of it."

Neither Reconciliation Nor Conformity

Maksic has a ready answer to an interruption about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of all those federal bodies:

"I must admit that I personally, along with many of my colleagues, am not preoccupied with the question of the so-called legitimacy of these federal bodies. However, there are many other questions that might be put in this regard. For instance: Is it legitimate to abandon offices which previously were insisted on? You know to what I am referring.

"Neither I nor my colleagues can nevertheless take over the function of the SFRY Assembly or Constitutional Court and evaluate as arbitrators who is legitimate and who is not. Our profession demands that we place our knowledge and ability to act at the service of the country. So long as we are Yugoslavia, we will treat with respect the supreme bodies of the Federation and take them as they are. Without them, we would be nothing. The nature of our profession requires that we be in contact with all and through our experience further what is called the country's interest.

"Here, I must add on behalf of the complete truth that even under these circumstances I have never anywhere been prevented nor hindered from presenting my views—which as a rule have previously been worked out in the SSIP—regardless of whether they are identical with, close to, or altogether opposite from the initial views of the highest federal bodies. Those initial views have on more than one occasion been modified and adapted to realities after the presentation of our arguments.

"What I mean to say by all this is that there is room, assuming valid arguments, for foreign policy and its orientation in action to be shaped in a process in which arguments can effectively rise above a priorist and emotionally burdened options."

[Burzan] Can there be any question at all of reconciliation of views, not to even mention a joint foreign policy for the country, when the republic diplomatic services are operating ever more independently and conducting their own "foreign policy"? Is there any cooperation at all between the republic and federal diplomatic services?

[Maksic] There is neither coherence nor reconciliation, not even between the diplomatic services—federal and republic—which are in Belgrade from an operational standpoint.

But there is still something known as the common interest, which is what the Yugoslav diplomatic service is concerned with. When it comes to promotion of economic cooperation, regardless of where its domestic participants come from, of protecting the interests of Yugoslav nationals, whatever republic nationality they have, and so on, then the Yugoslav ("federal") diplomatic service still has a role that has not been superseded. We should also add here the representation of the country in the United Nations, the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, and other international organizations, although—to tell the truth—designs aimed at atomizing our country are beginning to penetrate even here at precisely the moment when Europe is becoming unified.

The Conspiratorial Method of Operation

[Burzan] Are we not nevertheless talking about opposed interests?

[Maksic] I personally do not see an essential opposition between the republic diplomatic services expressing and pursuing the specific interests of their communities and something that is the natural common interest. Today, even states which down through history have mainly been each other's adversaries are talking about their common interest. Objective processes in the world are pushing them in that direction. We in the space occupied by Yugoslavia are thoughtlessly casting away our common interest, carried away by ambitions that have not died out and by an ignorance of the objective processes on our continent. Can we get far that way?

[Burzan] The Slovene personnel long ago withdrew from the SSIP, but the Croats have not, in spite of several appeals from Franjo Tudjman that they do so. How do you interpret that, what is happening? What are the prospects for the Yugoslav diplomatic service in general?

[Maksic] You have put the question at the moment when it is most difficult to find a reliable answer.

We reached what I would say is an honest agreement with the Slovene foreign minister on when personnel would withdraw from the SSIP and when from diplomatic and consular missions. That was by and large correctly done, with the exception of ambitious individuals who, if I understand things rightly, wish personally to show more solicitousness toward their republic authorities than the latter are seeking from them.

[Burzan] And what about the Croatian personnel?

[Maksic] We have no agreements whatsoever with the government of Croatia. The Croatian authorities have committed themselves to the conspiratorial method of operation and they issue what they believe to be secret instructions to their various people abroad. But we could have resolved all that by agreement. This way, they have placed the people on whom they are exerting pressure in an unenviable position in which some of them feel they have no choice. Some have acted very crudely and arrogantly, forgetting their obligations to the state which they still represent. Instead of choosing an honorable way out—resignation, they have wanted to realize the diametrically opposite interests of their respective

republic at the expense (including financial) of the Yugoslav state. We have had to act by recalling and suspending them.

I understand that we must part ways—that is something beyond our will and power. But let us do that honorably, not by the method of operating behind the scenes. No one in the SSIP who has chosen to leave has left without a friendly handshake. If destiny has separated us, we need not immediately behave like foreigners, even sometimes like sworn enemies. The time will nevertheless come when we are all closer and more necessary to one another here in the space of Yugoslavia than any of us individually to any third person....

[Burzan] The prospects, then, are clouded?

[Maksic] That will depend on the overall disentanglement of the Yugoslav crisis. However, whatever it is, the diplomatic service—as an instrument to form international connections and protect interests in the world—remains a necessity. What it will look like, that is a question that follows from another question: What will be the international legal status of everything that today constitutes the state of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

[Burzan] Does that mean that the contours of any future SSIP cannot be seen?

[Maksic] It is impossible to talk about a new SSIP without first resolving the question of what the new Yugoslavia will be and how it will look. In any case, the new SSIP must take as its points of departure altogether different conditions and balance of power on the international scene and different conditions and balance of power in its own country. It is almost easier to trace out the contours of the former than of the latter premise.

Confronting a New Beginning

[Burzan] Is the Yugoslav diplomatic service still accepted in the world as legal and legitimate, or are people already beginning to put questions: Who does it represent, if anyone?

[Maksic] You have got it right, that question is already being put in some places. However, the essential question is this: Does the Yugoslav state exist as an entity in international relations?

[Burzan] And does it?

[Maksic] I think that it does as long as we are the vehicles of this state's sovereignty, that is, until the Yugoslav nationalities come together and decide otherwise. It is an axiom of law, including international law, that a decision can be amended in the same way in which it is adopted. We know how the unification in 1918 came about. The same procedure is also necessary for "disassociation." However, we must be aware that political interests even today, as always, predetermine legal interpretations and thereby reduce them to their own instrument. Bismarck's view of this is well-known. It seems that nothing has changed in the meantime.

[Burzan] Can we nevertheless examine where our foreign policy is today: Torn between Europe and the Nonaligned Movement? And also: Where is it going, is its general course perhaps changing?

[Maksic] I have never felt that our policy, as you put it, is torn between Europe and the Nonaligned Movement. It is turned toward both the one and the other, because that is our strategic interest. Without the Nonaligned Movement and Yugoslavia's role in it, could Yugoslavia have climbed to the level in international relations where it was until recently? And—both at that time and today—the basic developments of bilateral relations were in the direction of Europe. That is an organic whole, not an alternative.

As for the question of where Yugoslavia is going, I am not in a position to offer a complete answer, so my answer will not therefore be satisfactory, because there are still more unknowns—both in our country and outside it—than there are elements for a reliable forecast. But this does not mean that we should avoid the topic....

[Burzan] The changes are large, immense—both in our country and in the world. Where are we in them, where, if it can be put that way, is our place?

[Maksic] Right: It is not only that we have fundamentally changed—we are continuing to change, often unexpectedly and abruptly—but international circumstances have also undergone essential change as the objective context of our international position.

In a short time, the political map and balance of power in Europe have changed completely. Along with the disintegration of the Soviet bloc and disintegration of what up until now has been the USSR, which carried the danger of a conflict between blocs—but were also a factor of equilibrium with advantages for everyone, we have seen a unified Germany rise up to become in many respects the dominant factor in Europe, a factor that because of its strength and arrogance is disturbing even its own allies.

Russia is different, the Ukraine is different from it, Poland is different, Hungary or Bulgaria still more, the balance of power and politics of each of these countries are different. We have the same countries and peoples on our borders, but altogether different neighbors and their policies. In the republics of the former USSR, we have important partners, but with different interests. There have been important changes in the non-European countries as well, those which represent our broad point of support. I would mention the most recent events in Algeria.

Changes are also occurring in those parts of the world which are considered the most stable regions. The European Community also confronts the augmented strength of Germany, which—by its behavior—is disrupting the

earlier balance and harmony. The triumphally announced plans for the unified action of the EC are being postponed from this year to a later date. One would say that everyone is changing and all the earlier analyses, as the basis for shaping policy, are losing their value. Put simply: we are all different and we are in a different world. By this I mean that we face a new beginning.

[Burzan] You say a "new beginning." That is a kind of crossroads, perhaps even a historical crossroads. What are we abandoning thereby, and to what are we going, or, better put, where must we go?

[Maksic] We can no longer rely on the assessments we have had up to now, which were arrived at in a different situation and, carried more by desires than by reality, by the inertia of earlier periods, and proclaim some people "close friends" and others "sworn enemies," because they are also changing, so that the real "use value" of each of them has yet to be ascertained.

We were insulted with good reason by the arrogant behavior of the European institutions and their esteemed representatives. But that does not give us the right to slam the door on Europe, of which we are an integral part in every respect, and to condemn ourselves to the status of a European province. Our efforts toward an appropriate place and treatment in Europe must be our constant preoccupation.

I feel that we face a serious and difficult task of understanding and explaining to ourselves what Europe and the world are today, of detecting the objective processes in them, and then—having previously come to understand ourselves as well—of examining our real place in the international community and in our region, and also of finding the way to reconcile our needs and ambitions with the objective processes on our continent. No one has managed to put himself in an isolated test tube, nor can we—striving to be an integral part of Europe—behave apart from its standards, especially those standards which signify civilization's highest attainment of individual freedom, and, I would add, freedom of peoples and all parts of them. We have something to say and to demonstrate in this regard, but also something to learn.

[Burzan] If everyone is changing, must the Nonaligned Movement also do so?

[Maksic] Certainly: The Nonaligned Movement faces the same task—of understanding and accepting the new real world. It first should understand what is new and free itself in that process of conceptions which quite logically have grown up in the period of the anticolonial revolution and division into blocs. We live in a different era.

We are abandoning the world we had become used to. We must also abandon many of our conceptions, and today also illusions, concerning our position in that world. To the extent that it is new, we must also seek and find for ourselves that new place—and new points of support—that would be more broadly acceptable and thereby also reliable. Without that, we will remain in the sphere of misconceptions and myths, on which it is not possible to build a realistic policy, and no policy that is not realistic can be successful. I see tasks for all of us here, tasks which cannot belong to the diplomatic service alone.

Aspirations for "New Equilibria"

[Burzan] Certainly. Just tell us more concretely: What lies ahead for us in the near and immediate future?

[Maksic] I think that in the immediate future we will have to concern ourselves particularly with our place in this part of Europe. Processes in Yugoslavia and in other countries are leading toward an altered balance of power in our region, toward a revival of earlier ambitions and aspirations to establish certain "new equilibria." In the ambitions and policy of certain countries, we recognize a desire to nullify the results not only of World War II, but even of World War I. Something like that deeply affects our strategic interests, and we will have to direct our energy as soon as possible—instead of toward internal conflicts, toward preserving the vital interests of the country toward the outside world.

[Burzan] And on the domestic front?

[Maksic] I still believe that life together that is well-arranged and democratic in our Yugoslav region is an objective necessity of all our nationalities and people. I believe it is also in Europe's real interest, an interest that arises out of the processes of integration, out of the need to market technology, to lend capital, and so on. We can be an acceptable partner only as an organized governmental community—without entering now into the possible practical arrangements—and as an organized, up-to-date, and attractive market. And there are also other reasons for this position.

Things have taken a different course. But I believe that when emotions are spent, life and its laws will bring us back from the wilderness of disassociation and conflict onto the road of association, harmony, and cooperation. We in this region are still closest to one another. We have achieved a great deal together both in the world and at home. No one has any guarantee that he can repeat that on his own and achieve what we already have.

Throwing stones at the past does not create proof of one's own value. The past requires cold and critical analysis. But, whatever it might be, it offers a valuable point of support to new generations for their own "storming of the heavens" and glorious new moments of the country and the nation. Can this be achieved if we start with burned-out ruins and if we build our own reputation on negating everything that has been done instead of on newer, higher, and truly recognized potential, or at least on their persuasive vision...?

Retired Army General on Kadijevic Resignation

92BA0385E Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11-12 Jan 92 p 4

[Interview with Colonel General Stevan Mirkovic (Ret.) by V. Ilic; place and date not given: "Withdrawal Through a Combination of Circumstances"]

[Text] At a time when it is not possible to extract from official Army circles, neither through regular channels nor with the help of "unofficial sources," a single word more than the official press releases related to removal of the defense minister or the incident near Varazdin, many newsmen resort to "usually well-informed sources." One of them is retired Colonel General Stevan Mirkovic, a man who until a few years ago headed the General Staff of the Yugoslav Armed Forces. As we were bringing this interview to an end, the TV team of SKY NEWS was waiting in line, a newsman from SPIEGEL had announced he was coming, and the telephones were ringing.

[Ilic] How did you interpret and understand Kadijevic's departure, which was said to be on grounds of health and which occurred not long after the incident near Varazdin?

[Mirkovic] People are usually suspicious when illness is given as the reason for a resignation. Kadijevic had another year to go before his regular retirement, and I personally think that health problems really are involved, because one should bear in mind both his age and general mental and physical state in this constant tension.

[Ilic] But there was talk even earlier about his illness, yet there was no suggestion of his departure.

[Mirkovic] The set of circumstances was such that he decided to withdraw.

[Ilic] Do you think that this is related to the downing of the helicopter and the death of five EC observers?

[Mirkovic] No, he had announced he was leaving even before that.

[Ilic] Do you believe that the Army will remain in compliance with the agreements reached as resolution of the Yugoslav crisis continues—in keeping with the assurances which Kadijevic faxed to Cyrus Vance?

[Mirkovic] Certainly. I think that the Army will not change its basic conception—it has ended one phase of the war and committed itself to peace. Kadijevic took the right stance, and those who are replacing him will not change anything in that respect. The recent reorganizations have by and large accomplished everything, and that is a part of the job which Kadijevic in fact completed. So that now the stories are not valid about some softer line being replaced by another harder line. There was no one harder than Kadijevic as a soldier when it came to Yugoslav politics and the determination to defend Yugoslavia. If one looks back, Kadijevic entered upon this war aware of what he was doing, because he could not look on while one fascist and Ustashi policy on the one hand and a Chetnik policy on the other were pushing these nationalities toward disaster. He was equally rigorous, as far as I know, toward both those policies, and it is very important that the Army never bowed toward either of them.

[Ilic] How, then, in that context, is one to explain that the Chetnik volunteers, for instance, placed themselves under the command of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]?

[Mirkovic] Well, you see, in this situation there was infiltration. They all say "we are under the command of the Army, we are volunteers, we are in favor of Yugoslavia"...that is a perfidious policy of Seselj and these others as well, and the purpose is to make use of the Army.

[Ilic] And the Army did not accept that in some cases?

[Mirkovic] Not altogether. The decisions exist to the effect that there could be no other units or insignia aside from the JNA and TO [Territorial Defense], but that was not enforced effectively enough. I warned the government and the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Serbia long ago to arrest while there was time those Chetniks and those bands which tomorrow could come even here to make problems and carry out massacres.

[Ilic] Do you think that there will not be any more changes of personnel and shifts in the Army and around it after all this, including Kadijevic's departure?

[Mirkovic] No, this is the end of it. Now the biggest problem will be how to find a new minister. The profile we have had up to now of one man being both the defense minister and the commander of the Army no longer suits these times. Now it is difficult to find such a person, and those posts need to be separated.

[Ilic] Does that mean that the defense minister may even be a civilian?

[Mirkovic] Why not? It is also possible to look for some younger person, a civilian. Except that that would be far easier in a normal situation, so that now the search is for a person who can maintain the continuity.

[Ilic] How do you look on the future of the Army from the standpoint of this situation that has now come about in Yugoslavia?

[Mirkovic] I think that by and large we have arrived at that new army. In any case, it will again be the spit and image of the state which remains or the one that comes into being. Had there been more Yugoslavs in this Army, it certainly would not have fared as ingloriously as in fact it has concerning certain issues.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Plans To Withdraw Officials From Federal System

LD2901140792 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1220 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 29 Jan (TANJUG)—In the absence of Serbian deputies, the Bosnia-Hercegovina Assembly adopted a decision on the withdrawal of Bosnia-Hercegovina officials from federal institutions, but the date of their return to Bosnia-Hercegovina has not yet been fixed, Irfan Ajanovic, member of the main committee of the Party of Democratic Action, stated at a press conference today. He added that their withdrawal will be carried out after agreement has been obtained from representatives of the federal institutions, so that this is done in the "least painful way".

Ajanovic also explained to journalists that the forthcoming referendum on independence and sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina will be valid if more than 50 percent of citizens cast their vote. He believes that 80 percent of voters will take part.

Asked about the transformation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Irfan Ajanovic replied that first the referendum should be held and only then should the transformation be carried out. Ajanovic also believes that legal and other means and also the presence of international observers will secure the peaceful conduct of the referendum which has been called for 29 February and 1 March.

Izetbegovic's 'New Plan' on Bosnia Expected

92BA0374A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jan 92 p 18

[Article by Muharem Duric: "Bosnia at Crossroads: New Plan, or Poor Outline"—first paragraph is POLITIKA introduction]

[Text] While the public impatiently awaits a new plan from the president of Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H], the future of that republic is also being discussed by former big names on the political scene: Mikulic, Istuk, Kurtovic....

Sarajevo, 6 Jan—The political temperament of Alija Izetbegovic is not fading. This is confirmed by his latest statements made both abroad and inside this country, and especially during the after-dinner talks in Sarajevo with Cyrus Vance, when he announced the launching of a new plan on the fate of Bosnia and Yugoslavia.

That plan, which is unknown to the broader public, is widely anticipated, and this is also being prompted by the news-agency report from the office of Izetbegovic and the B-H Presidency, where he is "first among equals." Presumably this would mean that this is the position of the complete collective leadership of the republic. Or that Izetbegovic is once again inclined towards, or is submitting to, the options that prevail in his Muslim SDA [Party of Democratic Action], with the consent that is implicitly understood on the part of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of B-H.

Izetbegovic is aware of the situation in Bosnia, and of the interspersed nature of the "corn meal and wheat flour," but also of rye flour and others.

When he talks about preserving "some sort of Yugoslav community," Izetbegovic questions whether this is utopian, but with his inborn caution he adds that the future could show that this is not a utopian aspiration.

Emphasizing that a realistic association of independent or sovereign states in this region is "our option," Izetbegovic is once again understated, in keeping with his previously stated mannerisms. Thus, it remains unclear whether this is a Muslim option or a Muslim and Croatian option. Thus far, the positions of the Serbian nation in B-H have not been incorporated into the option offered by Izetbegovic.

There are traffic jams and shifts in the political scene of the central republic. It is possible for all previous assumptions to be swept away over night, even though that night would have to last a long time. The nights are growing shorter, but the date by which Bosnia must devise new solutions is also approaching.

It appears that before long, the land of Bosnia, which was once thought of as "virginal," will be closer to a division than to a unified solution. Because just as it was once "scientifically established" that there were no Bogomils, all sorts of political options are also possible today.

One of the dilemmas emphasized by Izetbegovic is that of an independent Bosnia or of remaining in a Greater Serbia. The Muslim leader thinks that through his policy he is expressing more what he does not want than what he does want. This is why the vision of a future Bosnia, partitioned, with part of it tacked onto Serbia and part of it onto Croatia, appears more uncertain.

Izetbegovic talks about the adventuristic policy of the Serb leadership in Croatia, convinced that the Serbs have drawn certain conclusions from this. As an intelligent, and moreover pious man, certain of his own moves, which could also backfire with the Muslim nation, part of which still expresses confidence in him, Izetbegovic really does not see himself as an adventurist. "A peaceful Bosnia," the old saying, is his slogan too.

The local press deigned to provide, of course, a short and cautious commentary on what Izetbegovic put forth after the dinner with Vance: "Less of a plan and more of an outline."

In the same sentence, it is noted that Izetbegovic will not concern himself with "outlaw moves and outlaw appeals" for the partition of Bosnia. He does not specify who these outlaws are, and there is no mention of guerrillas.

The provincial tone of the Sarajevo press continues to contribute to the lack of understanding among the public

here. The Belgrade Convention is showered with insults and abuse, with greater or less perfidy, and now talks on the fateful question of B-H are announced for this evening, like a partisan (League of Communists) sigh of yearning: What next, and how? Former "big" names will be there: Mikulic, Istuk, and of course Todo Kurtovic.... If they do not explain what and how, then who else will? However, this also marks the arrival of those who are currently engaged in politics, based on the example of the president of the Presidency of B-H, Alija Izetbegovic.

Izetbegovic, Draskovic Plans for 'New Community'

92BA0400A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 92 p 8

[Article by Mladen Mirosavljevic: "Sarajevo 'Government and Opposition' Roundtable: Izetbegovic's Offer of Six States, Draskovic's Offer of Four States"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] As the joint political documents for a new community of former republics, Izetbegovic has proposed the ones already adopted in The Hague and Brussels, as well as those about to be accepted by the European Community commission, while Draskovic talks about a common state, but one without Croatia and Slovenia.

Sarajevo—A great deal of media attention was given to Sunday's holding of the "Government and Opposition" roundtable in Sarajevo, where representatives of the government and opposition from Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina], and Kosovo gathered. In the words of the presiding officer at the meeting, Rasim Kadic, the chairman of the Liberal Party of B-H, which organized the roundtable, the number of participants would have been significantly higher if the Yugoslav transportation system were working. The theme of the round table was "The Possibility of Halting Armed Conflict and Establishing New Forms of Political Communication," while particular attention was given to the presentation by Alija Izetbegovic, who put forth his plan for a possible community in the territory of Yugoslavia, as well as the presentation by the head of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], Vuk Draskovic.

According to Documents From The Hague and Brussels

Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the B-H Presidency, greeted the participants in the meeting on behalf of the president of the Republic of Slovenia, Milan Kucan, who was unable to come to Sarajevo for "logistical" reasons. According to Izetbegovic, a possible name for the future association of states in the territory of Yugoslavia could be the Community of South Slavic States, the Balkan Community, or the Southern European Community. This community would comprise the six republics of the former Yugoslavia, which would join it as independent states and on the basis of their own decision. As the joint political documents with which this community would function, Izetbegovic proposed the documents that have already been adopted in The Hague and Brussels, as well as the projections that are about to be accepted by the European Community's commission for human rights, economic questions, and institutional questions.

Addressing the issue of future borders, Izetbegovic proposed that the new community of states not be able to fence themselves in with "Great Walls of China," thus halting the normal flow of ideas, goods, and people. This is why he proposed that it be proclaimed and established that the future community of states will not have borders with passport and customs controls. Regardless of whether this idea will even be accepted, Izetbegovic said, the republican institutions of B-H will unilaterally propose that the borders of that republic remain open to its neighboring republic-states.

Common Currency

As far as the future currency is concerned, all the states that would comprise the community would have their own currency. However, because of the lack of backing for that currency and the period of stabilization, there would be a phase during which all currencies would be used throughout the entire territory of the future community, after which one common currency would be prescribed that would be linked to the European ECU. According to Izetbegovic, this period could last for three to five years.

With respect to the army, Izetbegovic believes that this question could be resolved without conflict, and that all future states would have their own army, while the only joint structures in the community of states would be the highly sophisticated and expensive branches of the military, which would also have a joint command. The future state armies would be created by transforming the current federal army wherever it is still legally active, and this on the basis of the expressed will of its members, who would declare where they want to continue fulfilling their military service obligation, while surplus military personnel would be assigned to other jobs in accordance with their qualifications.

Proposals for the Army

All the rights acquired thus far by members of the army would continue to be guaranteed, and the European Community would have to provide financial support for its transformation. A treaty concerning nonaggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes would be signed between states that would make up the future community. These states would have to become associate members of the European Community, just as Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have done, and the community of states would be collectively included in the EC security system.

Speaking on the status of B-H, Izetbegovic said that there would have to be a system for unanimous decision-making or decision-making by consensus in the republican assembly, with a veto right for a number of questions that would be defined in a future constitution, while equality could be ensured through the formation of

a chamber of nations. In all other questions, the principle of ethnic affiliation should be curbed in favor of bourgeois democracy, while promoting the principle of individuality and trust.

B-H must have an identical position towards both Serbia and Croatia. As he said, right now we have a very difficult dispute concerning the independence of the republic, which is bringing with it the danger of conflict. On this question, there is no other solution than to decide on the basis of a referendum, that being a civil, national referendum, in which the citizens of this republic would decide on its status.

Concurrence With SPO

SPO leader Vuk Draskovic said that to a certain extent Alija Izetbegovic's ideas coincide with his party's proposals from a month ago. Yugoslavia no longer exists, and we must recognize that with more or less sentimentality or satisfaction. It cannot exist as a rump state, nor as a truncated state, and especially not as a state created by force. However, the disappearance of that state has not meant that its ethnic makeup and other characteristics have also disappeared. The road has in some sense been marked out in Minsk and Alma Ata, Draskovic said. Any forcible resolution of our future, especially in B-H, would mean new Vukovars, with a tendency to spread across the entire Balkans, or even beyond, and we do not want that.

Draskovic presented the idea of forming a future community that would comprise Serbia, Montenegro, B-H, and Macedonia, and which would have no internal borders or passport and customs controls, while these states would have equal status and rights, along with the flow of ideas, goods, and people that would develop in them. They would have to have a unified currency, as well as cultural-intellectual unity throughout their entire territory. Particularly interested in this sort of community are the two leading nations in it, the Serbs and the Muslims.

Vuk and the Community of Four States

The problem of the army would also have to be resolved. Izetbegovic is the first politician in Yugoslavia to put forth a proposal on resolving the fate of the federal army. We may be angry at it, but it does exist, and it continues to have enormous combat strength at its disposal. The thousands of officers cannot be thrown out, and no one has the right to deny them their respect as officers. We cannot close our eyes to this. In the territory of a future community of four states, there would have to be a unified air force, navy, missile units, and all other branches of the military that handle any of the more dangerous weaponry. I am also a supporter of the idea, Draskovic said, that the future states should also have their own state armies, which would not be ethnically based, however. The army must reflect the ethnic balance, because it cannot be 90 percent Serbian, while the degree of association between these states should not fall below the European standard. For this reason, this community of states would have to have a joint parliament, a joint council of ministers, a community of South Slavic states.

Historic Agreements

The most logical choice for the seat of parliament is Sarajevo, while the council of ministers could alternate its seat. Concerning this, it would be necessary to establish a second level of relations through which a customs and economic union would be entered into with Slovenia and Croatia.

According to Draskovic, it would also be necessary to sign historic agreements between Serbs and Muslims, between Serbs and Croats, between Croats and Muslims, and between Serbs and Albanians, which would overcome the current causes of hatred. There cannot be three states in B-H, and this question must be resolved in a different way. It must be a sovereign, independent state with international legitimacy, and internally the principle of regionalization and cantonization must be applied, a principle that must be applied in Serbia as well, meaning in Kosovo and Vojvodina, Draskovic said in his presentation.

Izetbegovic Comments on Roundtable on Yugoslavia

92BA0391C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by M. Lucic: "Izetbegovic's Yugoslavia"]

[Text] Izetbegovic has said that first the question of currencies should be solved so that from the outset all the states would have their own currency, and then in a later phase all the currencies would be used equally in all the states, and in the last phase they would join a currency union using the ECU [European Currency Unit] and would thus become associated with the European Community. According to him, the phases between these stages would last three and five years, respectively.

In his statement, Izetbegovic specifically emphasized that the question of the Army is a most delicate one. He said that all states have their own army, and the air force and missile units would be joint arms, because it is expensive for all to have these arms. In these states, the army would come about through transformation of the present JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], where it is now operating, Izetbegovic said. According to his explanation, military officers and soldiers would be assigned to their own military services, and the surplus should be distributed in the economy, according to qualifications. Izetbegovic said that the European Community could be called upon for special aid in covering the costs of transformation of the Army.

Civil-Ethnic Referendum the Only Way Out

In his statement at yesterday's roundtable discussion of the government and opposition in Yugoslavia, he

pointed out that these states—republics—should sign a treaty on friendship and nonaggression and make public their interests in joining as members of the European Community and that as a community they should canvass for their membership in the collective system of European Security.

Alija Izetbegovic dwelled particularly on Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H]. He mentioned that it would be good to create a Chamber of Nationalities or make decision-making in the Assembly of B-H by unanimous vote, with the right of veto for a number of issues.

On other issues, the principle should be adopted of displacing ethnocracy on behalf of civil democracy. This principle should be displaced except on matters concerning the equality of the nationalities, while civil democracy should be introduced in all other matters, Izetbegovic said.

He also said in conclusion that the principle of an equal relation and openness toward Serbia and Croatia is essential to Bosnia-Hercegovina. Izetbegovic particularly emphasized that there is a dispute in this republic over the independence of B-H, but he hopes that this will be overcome. There is no other way out except making a decision by referendum, Alija Izetbegovic declared, elaborating that he is proposing a civil-ethnic referendum, so as to find out in that way how each nationality has voted.

Izetbegovic was followed by Vuk Draskovic, who explained that the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement], the party which he heads, sees a way out of the Yugoslav crisis. "There is no longer a Yugoslavia, nor can there be, neither truncated nor shortened, nor narrowed, but with the disappearance of Yugoslavia we have not disappeared, nor have we lost our intelligence to create a new community," Draskovic said. He expounded the idea of a community of four independent states—Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Draskovic is also in favor of there being no borders between these states except on the map. We will not consent to anyone searching us and asking for passports at the Drina nor to seeing border guards," Vuk Draskovic said.

In this community, according to him, there would be a unified economic market, there would be no customs duties, but a free flow of people, capital, and goods. The currency should be unified, just as there should be spiritual and cultural unity of all the nationalities living in these four states. Vuk Draskovic believes that the Serbs and Muslims are especially interested in this four-member community.

He is also of the opinion that the problem of the Army must be solved in the new state and that the Carrington plan was deficient in precisely that respect. Vuk Draskovic said that the republics would have their own army, that would reflect the ethnic structure of that state, but it would have a unified air force, navy, and missile units; that is, all branches would have "dangerous" weapons. He proposed that a parliament be formed at the outset of the South Slav community, whose capital would be in Sarajevo, and a council of ministers of the South Slav community.

Three Bosnias Is Physically Impossible

Vuk Draskovic said in his statement that a two-level type of connection should be established within the community, and that means that this four-member community would enter into a customs and economic union with Croatia and Slovenia, and that would be the "Yugoslav Commonwealth." Vuk Draskovic proposed that several historical agreements also be signed between the Serbs and Croats, between the Serbs and Muslims, between the Croats and Muslims, and between the Serbs and Albanians.

He said of Bosnia-Hercegovina that there could not exist three Bosnias in it, that this is physically untenable. According to Draskovic, B-H must be one, sovereign, and independent, with international legitimacy and recognition. He proposes that within Bosnia-Hercegovina the principle of regionalization and cantonization be pursued, and that assemblies be constituted of the Serb, Muslim, and Croatian cantons, which would create the unified Assembly of B-H. He believes that cantonization should also be adopted in Serbia and Vojvodina.

Zlatko Lagumdzija, vice president of the SDP [Socialist Democratic Party], did not agree with Draskovic on ethnic regionalization and cantonization in Bosnia-Hercegovina. He proposed that this roundtable discussion set up a technical group to draw up documentation on war crimes and to hold a Yugoslav "Nuremberg trial" in the presence of international institutions. Lagumdzija proposed that elections also be scheduled in all republics, covered by an international guarantee.

Aleksa Buha, deputy of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] in the B-H Assembly, opposed the statement of Alija Izetbegovic and said of his plan that it was a "nailing down of the position that had caused the split in B-H." He told Izetbegovic directly that his favoring of tariff-free zones signified the road toward independence of B-H, after which he would face the fact that the international public would not recognize that. Buha said that this option would not be accepted by the SDS and the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

According to Aleksa Buha, there cannot be a civil republic of B-H unless it is possible at the level of Yugoslavia, and so far it has not been possible, because different nationalities and ethnic minorities live in it. Buha believes that Izetbegovic favors a civil B-H, because he knows that the Muslim-Croat coalition could make any decision it wanted. Until the collective rights of all three constitutional nationalities are guaranteed, we can be citizens as Serbs, Croats, and Macedonians, Buha said. He said in conclusion that if there is no overall solution for B-H, then let each seek it for himself, and that the Serbs would then exercise their right to remain in the federal state.

The first part of the roundtable discussion was completed late yesterday afternoon, and it will continue for seven days.

[Box, p 3]

Izetbegovic-Buha Debate

The end of the Sarajevo meeting was marked by the debate between Alija Izetbegovic and Aleksa Buha. Izetbegovic rebutted Buha, who reiterated the position of the SDS to the effect that if there is no overall solution for B-H, it should be divided. In words to the effect that no one has ever offered a map on how Bosnia could be divided, Izetbegovic once again declared that Bosnia is indivisible, and if it were divided, both the Serbs and other nationalities would be in the position of a minority. According to Izetbegovic, the strongest option at the moment, according to him, is the "division of Bosnia among bandits, on the principle of all to oneself." Alija Izetbegovic called upon the SDS to present to the public a map for division of this republic if Bosnia is divisible as they say.

Aleksa Buha immediately responded to Izetbegovic with the assertion that in the case of an independent B-H, all the Serbs would be a minority, and so, as Buha put it, the SDS would choose the lesser of the two evils. Buha concluded by saying that the SDS would soon present a map for division of B-H.

[Box, p 3]

Who Came or Did Not Come

Representatives of almost all parties in power and opposition parties of B-H came to the roundtable discussion of governments and opposition in Yugoslavia, and then representatives from opposition parties in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Croatia. It was announced that many parties from Croatia and Slovenia were missing, because their representatives were unable to come because of the transportation blockades. The organizer informed those present that Dragan Veselinov, Nebojsa Popov, and Vesna Pesic did not come because air service had been interrupted. At the beginning of his statement, Alija Izetbegovic announced that Milan Kucan and Miko Tripalo sent greetings to the meeting.

[Box, p 3]

Visits to the "Enemies"

It has been said of me that I am visiting enemies of the Serbian people. When I became minister, I was not given a list of "enemies" of the Serbian people, but it is a long one, so that I would not go anywhere. But wherever I have gone I have constantly met representatives of Serbia, said Haris Silajdzic, foreign minister in the B-H government.

Bosnian Serb's Self-Determination Proposal

92BA0290B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Dec 91 p 14

[Article by M. Lucic: "First Us, Then Everybody"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] Instead of unilateral acts of secession, the realization of peoples' right to self-determination should be initiated and carried out in the Federal Assembly. Then there would be neither a crisis nor a civil war.

"Slovenia and Croatia should not be recognized by anyone before they are recognized by Yugoslavia, from which they want to secede." This was proposed, among other things, by Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] in Bosnia-Hercegovina, in a telegram that he sent two days ago to Slobodan Gligorijevic, the president of the Yugoslav Assembly.

Radovan Karadzic explained to BORBA that the basic problem in Yugoslavia arose because of unilateral acts of secession, and so instead of that, one should initiate, in accordance with constitutional procedure, the realization of people's right to self-determination, and that, naturally, should be carried out in the Federal Assembly, Karadzic stated. He emphasized that then there would be neither a crisis nor a civil war. According to Karadzic, a people's right to self-determination is not in dispute, and the one who resorted to unilateral acts in exercising this undisputed right is responsible for the chaos in Yugoslavia.

"The Federal Assembly should initiate recognition of the Slovene people's right to self-determination and secession, and, naturally, establish a constitutional procedure for this," Radovan Karadzic explained. He claimed that this could be easily done, since there is not dispute about territories, the people have chosen secession, and the only thing left is to perform calculations about the debts. Karadzic commented that at the moment when Yugoslavia recognized Slovenia, according to a democratic agreement, the tension among the international public would also be relaxed.

In his conversation with BORBA, the leader of the Bosnia-Hercegovina SDS for Croatia said that first the same right to self-determination should be given to both Croats and Serbs. When equal rights are made possible for them, it will be worth entering into that procedure for Yugoslavia to recognize Croatia, but also to recognize the rights of the Serbs who would make a choice. Karadzic commented that the same procedure in the Federal Assembly should be observed for all those who wanted to secede, and that the constitutional act that would regulate this should be adopted by the Federal Assembly. Radovan Karadzic commented on the present situation with the following words: "But those gentlemen want the right of self-determination for themselves, and not for anyone else."

At the end, we asked him what would happen if Bosnia-Hercegovina, by some chance, were to seek the kind of independence that Slovenia and Croatia want. Karadzic answered that a consensus among all three peoples would have to be achieved by expressing a position. If there is no consensus, then no one could separate himself without hurting others.

The leader of the Bosnia-Hercegovina SDS believes that his initiative has fallen on fertile ground, because the president of the Federal Assembly, to whom he sent the telegram, can officially submit this to the Assembly for a decision.

Serbian Demoratic Party President Interviewed

92BA0390A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
10 Jan 92 pp 14-17

[Interview with Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina, by Jovan Janjic in Sarajevo; date not given: "All the Masks Are Down"]

[Text] He has been avoiding political office, because he himself was a victim of politics. Of previous communist politics. When the time of new (multiparty) political relations was in the wind, the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H] was able to recognize it and decided on its future leader—Dr. Radovan Karadzic, doctor of medical sciences, psychoanalytical psychotherapist, and analyst at the Dr. Nedo Zec Psychiatric Clinic in Sarajevo (where he works to this day). Also a poet. The author of this interview knows from personal knowledge that Dr. Karadzic avoided for a long time accepting the role of president of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] of Bosnia-Hercegovina. It took a great deal of persuasion for him to accept it. Today, Dr. Karadzic is one of the key figures in the resolution of the Yugoslav drama and one of the most popular figures among the Serbian people.

In recent months, free time has been an unknown concept to Dr. Karadzic. That is why this interview for NIN was done only after midnight in his modest apartment in Sarajevo.

[Janjic] Attention has recently been focused on Bosnia-Hercegovina. Does this republic still exist as a "community of equal nationalities," Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, as its Constitution states?

[Karadzic] Bosnia-Hercegovina exists as a community of equal nationalities and is a part of Yugoslavia. It did not enter Yugoslavia as a republic, but as newly liberated territory whose population was mainly Serbs, that is, Orthodox, and then Muslims and Croats. It is not the existence of Bosnia-Hercegovina that is threatened today, but its status as defined by AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] and ZAVNOBiH [Regional Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Bosnia and Hercegovina], and that is because of the activity of the coalition of the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], which has trampled underfoot, destroyed, and derogated all laws written and unwritten, of God and man, setting itself up as the master of this republic, in which the Serbs are subtenants.

[Janjic] The Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Hercegovina has adopted a decision to form a Serbian republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Was that the only way for the Serbian people in this republic to finally take over the role of deciding its own fate?

[Karadzic] There was no other way. For too long a time, an entire year, to keep peace in the house, we have been tolerating the humiliation of the Serbian people, of its representatives in the government—we have been tolerating systematic violence. When all the masks were down, when the SDA-HDZ coalition called for recognition of independence, the Serbian people challenged that vigorously, announcing creation of its own state.

[Janjic] How do you conceive the operation of the future Serbian republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina?

[Karadzic] Our task, in accordance with the results of the plebiscite of the Serbian people, is to make it possible for the Serbian state to function and its Constitution and laws to be implemented in the areas where the Serbs live. The proportion of the Serbian people in the total population is not an issue for us, because the nature of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina up to now was that of a community of three equal constituent nationalities in which each nationality, regardless of its proportion, has equal rights. We, then, are a constituent nationality, even where we represent only 5 percent, we have the same power as we would if we represented 55 percent of the population; this applies, of course, to subject matter requiring a consensus.

Right at the time when this issue is printed, we in the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Hercegovina will probably be proclaiming our republic. It will come into being in the constitutional vacuum created by the unreasonable acts of the coalition. The decision will certainly place an unconditional obligation on Serbian personnel to implement the Constitution and law wherever they work, but there will also be a provisional clause concerning the completely autonomous functioning of the republic in all domains of life at the moment when the conditions for that come about. And the conditions will be created by the irresponsible acts of the coalition, don't worry about that. That will then be another story, but the percentage is not important to consensus. It is our task to see that this part of Yugoslavia remains Yugoslavia.

[Janjic] What will be the relations of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina with Serbia, Montenegro, and the newly proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina?

[Karadzic] For the present, we have no other point of support except to be a federal unit in the framework of

federal Yugoslavia. If the people, in the manner envisaged by the Constitution and laws, decides otherwise, then that would be different. But I believe that we will nevertheless remain in a federal relationship, because that is the form which suits not only those who are not Serbs and want to live with us, but also the Serbs themselves, who always have wanted a certain degree of autonomy in arranging their own affairs. There is not a single Montenegrin who considers himself a Serb through and through who would not want Montenegro to retain its independent status as an entity within Yugoslavia, nor any Serb who would want Serbia to be lost as it was lost in the unitary monarchy.

[Janjic] At one point, it seemed that the unity of Serbia and Montenegro would disappear like smoke....

[Karadzic] Along with Serbia, Montenegro deserves the greatest credit for the preservation of Yugoslavia, because its participation guarantees the continuity of the Federation. The Serbian people will never forget the Montenegrins for this. Many of our enemies hoped for something like what happened in 1916, when King Nikola, otherwise a great king, gave in at the decisive moment to his dynastic necessities and left Serbia to itself. Great times and great decisions require great men—to make them and to present them. Allow me one prejudice: Even the average Montenegrin is a great enough man, both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, to make the hopes of our enemies about separation of Serbia and Montenegro nothing more than empty dreams.

[Janjic] I must also ask you this: What will be the relation of the Serbian Bosnia-Hercegovina toward the remnants of this republic which do not want Yugoslavia?

[Karadzic] There are not many of those remnants. We were not able to make a decision for those opstinas in which there are no Serbs and in which we did not hold a plebiscite. This is an occasion for me to say that the Serbs and Croats are fairly well set apart from one another in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Moreover, the Croatian opstinas are rather homogeneous. I would not want to prejudice the case by concluding that this was because of genocide. To tell the truth, there are not many Muslims there either. As far as the Serbs and Muslims go, they are very intermingled where they live, in 104 out of the 109 opstinas. This indicates not only that we come from the same ethnic roots, but also that in the course of time in our life together we have not been so intolerant of one another, because if we had, much more homogeneous communities would have been created in Bosnia-Hercegovina—purely Serb and purely Muslim. We can, then, live together, assuming, of course, an authentic democratic, not bolshevik, community, on behalf of which both the Serbs and Muslims have had to renounce much of their culture, religion, and tradition. So, the five or six opstinas in which the Serbs do not live and which did not hold a plebiscite are that region which need not remain in Yugoslavia, although the conditions exist for that. As for the remainder, that is the Yugoslavia for which we propose that the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims find a suitable solution, that these three ethnic communities live with one another to the extent that they decide. That is, that they have in common everything that succeeds better when it is in common, and separately everything that is better when it is separate.

[Janjic] There have been several negotiations of representatives of the three leading ethnic parties concerning issues crucial to Bosnia-Hercegovina. But as soon as one gets the impression that an agreement has been reached, it soon turns out not to be so. Everyone continues to pull his own....

[Karadzic] Our experience with our partners has been disastrous. It is simply a case of bad faith toward a partner and toward mutual agreements, both in carrying out the distribution of power and also in reaching agreement. We agree on one thing, and then some quite different document or program is presented. It turns out that during those lengthy talks they were just keeping us preoccupied to gain time.

[Janjic] The Serbian representatives in the government of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Serbian people have almost regularly been outvoted in this republic. The SDA-HDZ coalition at the expense of the third party (SDS) is obvious. How do you account for that "love" between the Muslims and Croats?

[Karadzic] I do not believe that love is in question. Mr. Letica, personal adviser to Mr. Tudjman, told the German newspapermen that an independent Croatia is essential to Europe as a barrier against primitive Islam and Orthodoxy. Those gentlemen, who are very close to Nazism and racism, show equal hatred and scorn for Serbs and Muslims. Actually, they very much hate the Serbs, and they despise the Muslims. There is abundant proof and numerous documents on this point. In addition, of course, there is also the conversion to Christianity of eight minor members of a Muslim household in Zagreb, at which Mr. Tudjman personally stood up as a sponsor. There have been so many challenges coming from the Croatian side both of Bosnia-Hercegovina and of the Muslims as a nationality that it is a real wonder that the Muslim leaders have remained even now very devoted to Tudjman and his idea of breaking up Yugoslavia.

[Janjic] Tudjman is speaking more and more frequently about partitioning Bosnia-Hercegovina....

[Karadzic] Tudjman's frequent mention of the division of Bosnia, I believe, is less in the sense of a division of B-H and more in the sense of an all-inclusive solution of Serbian-Croatian governmental and political relations. If a comprehensive solution were possible that would resolve this question in the Balkans in a permanent and fair way, an important source of tension in Europe would be eliminated, and the prestige of the Serbs and Croats, and of their states, which now are already separate and demarcated in a fair way, would grow considerably and make it possible for them to be included in Europe.

Finally, some day the Serbian-Croatian question must truly be resolved permanently and fairly. But such solutions usually do not come without bloodshed. And so, unfortunately, we have had bloodshed even now, and who knows how many times this has occurred. I do not know whether there will be the strength, the luck, the maturity, and the intelligence to resolve all the outstanding issues at this particular time. I do know that a significant majority of Serbs have nothing against the Croats rounding out their independent national state. What, then, is in dispute? The dispute is over which stream will be the border. It is a good thing that the extremists have realized that neither will the Serbs take territory all the way to Rijeka, nor will the Croats go all the way to the Drina, nor does either one of them have a need for that, because that would not be fair, permanent, or tenable.

[Janjic] Does that mean that now even the Croats in B-H are more inclined to compromises than earlier?

[Karadzic] The Serbs and Croats in B-H do not have many disagreements, because they are not very much intermingled. Their interests are in conflict in only a few opstinas, and that only if Yugoslavia should be redesigned. But it will be possible to resolve all our disagreements with them in a gentlemanly fashion and without fighting. We believe that they do not want to stay in an independent state of B-H either when its borders and independence are internationally recognized. If that were to happen, neither would the Croats ever see Croatia again nor the Serbs Serbia, and they would become an ethnic minority.

[Janjic] Fine, if the Serbs do not have disagreements with the Croats at this point, or if they have fewer and fewer of them, who is generating the disagreements? The Muslims?

[Karadzic] In spite of the tolerance, even in spite of the closeness in peacetime, which is no wonder, because by blood the Serbs have no one closer than the Muslims, in certain difficult times a substantial number of Muslims have stood against the Serbs. This is now the third time in this century. Splendid examples of unreserved solidarity with the Serbs occurred earlier and they exist even now, but this can serve us only as a consolation and reminder of our common roots. And nothing more. The immense majority is following its leadership, which has threatened even in the parliament that it would sacrifice peace for sovereignty, even though now they are masquerading as peacekeepers.

We have come to the conclusion that the SDA leadership believes that what the Serbs are offering it they can always take, and only when all their European ships have sunk will they conclude an agreement with the Serbs, and that at the highest possible price. But that is not how it will be. We Serbs have had it up to here with begging anyone to live with us. We are turning back upon ourselves and our own needs, and then there is no community life. We will be able to live alongside one another, and we will have to, but that will not be the same as living with one another.

[Janjic] The Serbs, then, know where they stand?

[Karadzic] Our Muslim brothers have betrayed us, they have gone over to the side of the opponents of Yugoslavia and our opponents, and then they used all the impermissible tricks to further their own national state which would include both our territories and our lives, and finally, where they are in the majority, they are showing great intolerance toward the Serbs.

Now, the Serbs really know where they stand, and everything will be done to live as little as possible with others and as much as possible alongside others. Above all, not for anyone's love (much less false love) will we be deprived of our state. We have previously been in foreign states and under foreign statehood, and we know how we have fared. It was the Serbs who began the struggle for their own freedom and homeland (and that of others) with Karadjordje, 200 years ago. We finally achieved that in 1918. And now, after a series of deceptions and Brozisms will this generation scatter and squander all that? Everything that has been done over 200 years? Who are we to spoil two centuries of our people's struggle for freedom and a homeland? This is the end of that struggle.

[Janjic] Was this linkup of the chessboard and the crescent, speaking metaphorically, the reason for establishment of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Hercegovina as a legislative body?

[Karadzic] The immediate occasion for formation of the Serbian Assembly was the derogation of the Constitution of Bosnia-Hercegovina by the SDA-HDZ coalition. In an illegal meeting called by the vice president of the B-H Assembly (which he is not authorized to do), a memorandum, i.e., letter of intent, and a Platform on Sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina, was unlawfully adopted to meet the needs of the Hague Conference. That destroyed the only institution of ethnic equality stated in this republic's Constitution, making it clearly known that the laws are not valid for them.

[Janjic] The SDA and HDZ, that is, their representatives in the Presidency and government of Bosnia-Hercegovina, supported the decision of the European Community to recognize the independence of all Yugoslav republics which desire it. That decision in fact coincides with the unlawful and illegitimate decisions of the B-H Assembly on 15 October that this republic is independent and self-sufficient. How do you view that?

[Karadzic] That request contains the elements of a crime both under the Criminal Code of Yugoslavia and also that of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Neither the Presidency nor the government may engage in such things, that is, come together and meet with those intentions. That is one aspect. The other aspect is political, but also constitutional. They were not free to make a decision without the consent of the Serbian people. By that specific act, they

put to death the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Bosnia-Hercegovina is functioning, peace in it is being maintained, not because of the wisdom of its leaders, who have managed to create a false image of peaceableness, but actually thanks to the wisdom of the people themselves and also thanks to the experiences of the civil war in Croatia, which we look at every evening on television.

[Janjic] The letter which you recently sent to the top political leadership of Slovenia met with a large public response. You say that Slovenia should first be recognized by Yugoslavia, and only then by other countries....

[Karadzic] I wrote to Kucan and then to the Federal Assembly. I repeat once again, this was a petition to the deputies to take the initiative for reexamination of Slovenia's request. Slovenia does not have many disputes with Yugoslavia. There is no disputed territory, and the disputed accounts can be straightened out very quickly. When Slovenia is recognized in the Yugoslav parliament, all the reasons for the civil war in Yugoslavia will disappear. It will then be evident that Croatia is waging a war of conquest for territories which are not Croatian, which do not belong to the Croat people. The war will then have to cease, because the experience from recognition of Slovenia will also be of use in the process of recognition of Croatia, but also of other nationalities which wish to become independent. I should mention that the Slovene people acquired the right to become independent, because they were present when Yugoslavia was created and put their signature on the creation of Yugoslavia. That is their great advantage. The Croats also have that advantage, of course, but the Serbs have the greatest advantage and deserve the greatest credit, regardless of whether they live in Serbia or the former Croatia or in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

[Janjic] Can that formula, by analogy, be also applied in the case of Croatia?

[Karadzic] In the case of the right of the Croatian people to separate from Yugoslavia and to form its own national state, it can. But it cannot apply to disputed territories, to territories where the Serbian people has voted differently.

[Janjic] The Assembly of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina has recognized the Serbian Republic Krajina?

[Karadzic] Yes. I believe that the Assemblies of Serbia and Montenegro will also do that, because there are no reasons whatsoever not to do so. For that matter, they do not even need any international recognition, because this is a matter of internal arrangement of territory under new circumstances. Why did I insist on the recognition of Slovenia in the Yugoslav Assembly? Because all those matters must be completed in the Federal Assembly, and only there can they be completed. Only then can the entire world recognize Slovenia and not commit a breach of international law.

[Janjic] That is, in the spirit of the United Nations Charter and other international conventions?

[Karadzic] Yes. The United Nations are for us the only international authority. All the rest are interest-related groupings of a particular type and are not qualified to discuss anyone who is not a member of the group.

[Janjic] In your opinion, what is the real meaning of the attempt to make Bosnia-Hercegovina independent and self-sufficient within the borders it has had up to now?

[Karadzic] Were it not dangerous, this attempt would be grotesque and comical, to create a state of Muslims. The conditions for that do not exist.

[Janjic] An Islamic republic?

[Karadzic] For the present, it would be the national state of the Muslims, in which the Serbs and Croats would also be constituent nationalities, but it is easy to throw those coconstituent nationalities out of the Constitution. That was made evident in the case of Croatia. That would bring about a state with a majority of one nationality over the others. It will never be clear to me why the Croats advocate the sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina. They probably hope that in that way it would be easier to implant Bosnia-Hercegovina in Croatia. But the Muslims have made it clear to us that after achievement of independence and sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Muslims would enter into a coalition with us against the Croatian efforts to incorporate this republic in an expanded Croatia. So, the Muslim boat is rowed now with one oar and now with the other, in order to arrive at their national state. The Serbs, of course, know that. They will not allow it. And there is no price which they are not ready to pay. That certainly is not the will of its leadership, but the will of the people, which must be carried out in politics.

[Janjic] One gets the impression that the political program of the SDA is actually the political program of Alija Izetbegovic presented in his book *Islamska deklaracija* [*Islamic Declaration*], for which he was at one time sentenced to several years in prison.

[Karadzic] We really have no reason whatsoever not to believe the ideas of Mr. Izetbegovic presented in that book. What is more, we are very grateful for the fact that that book exists. It states that immediately, as soon as the Muslims represent 51 percent of the total population, formation of an Islamic state must be undertaken. And that is one of the reasons why the Serbs are reacting fiercely to any mention of the sovereignty and independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina. When you look at the international activity of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, you must observe with regret that he has above all been meeting the enemies of Yugoslavia, former or present—the German leadership, Waldheim.... And when you look at his trips to the Islamic countries, you see that in that world Mr. Izetbegovic occupies an extreme position. That is, he has given priority to his visits to Libya, Iran, and the Sudan, not Algeria, Tunisia, or Egypt—the secular countries which have fought Islamic fundamentalism victoriously. And that fact says much to us.

[Janjic] Do you believe that it is possible for the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to live together in Bosnia-Hercegovina?

[Karadzic] I believe that is not only possible, but also inevitable. The question only arises of whether that will be a life in which some will force things on others or that life will be arranged so that all three ethnic communities develop their own natural potential without mutual interference and hindrance?

[Janjic] Why did that "historical agreement" of Serbs and Muslims initiated by the Bosnian Muslim Organization [MBO] fall through?

[Karadzic] I think that because of insufficient experience we made a mistake there, because we accepted the agreement and did not recommend to the gentlemen from the MBO that they work on this within the framework of the Muslim people. That was, of course, with the consent of Mr. Izetbegovic, who in this case acted very, very craftily and skillfully, luring Mr. Zulfikarpasic to legitimize himself as the initiator, and then the militant circles of the SDA accused him of being a traitor to the Muslim people. Messrs. Adil Zulfikarpasic and Muhamed Filipovic should have competed with those options to win over the Muslim people, and then come to talk with us when they obtained a majority of that people.

[Janjic] Recently, some kind of alleged fear of the Serbs has been persistently accentuated with the Muslims. Who is it that has wanted to create that kind of hysteria?

[Karadzic] The entire propaganda machine of the SDA-HDZ coalition is actually aimed at making the Muslims afraid of the Serbs, although we do not know of any case when the Serbs have ever attacked the Muslims. Certain cases in the war, above all, Foca, should, of course, be understood exclusively as a reaction of the Serbian people surviving after the slaughter. But military formations which concealed themselves in Foca also took part in that slaughter.... The Serbs have never attacked anyone, nor did they begin the wars, and the Muslims in particular have no reason whatsoever to fear the Serbs. In that regard, we can offer even firm guarantees.

[Janjic] How do you interpret the demand of the B-H authorities that peacekeeping forces of the United Nations be brought into this republic? Why is there particular insistence that the "blue helmets" be deployed specifically along the Drina?

[Karadzic] I had a very easy task in my meeting with Mr. Cyrus Vance. It was made easier for me by the gentlemen from the SDA and HDZ. They themselves said that they needed the "blue helmets" in order to neutralize the presence of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and in order to frustrate the endeavors of the SDS to keep Bosnia-Hercegovina in Yugoslavia. In that situation, there was nothing left for me but to tell Mr. Vance that the reasons why the gentlemen from the SDA and HDZ favor the "blue helmets" coming to Bosnia-Hercegovina are the same ones behind the Serbian people's opposition to their coming. Mr. Vance's entourage and Vance himself were confused, not to say astounded, by the conception of the SDA-HDZ coalition that the forces of the United Nations confront the JNA and that the "blue helmets" be misused to achieve their political objective—secession of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Serbian people doubt that the "blue helmets" would actually be misused to displace the JNA and other institutions of the federal state from Bosnia-Hercegovina.

[Janjic] The last question: How do you look on the attacks of the opposition in Serbia on the most worthwhile Serbian institutions such as the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Association of Writers?

[Karadzic] We Serbs are a very neglected people. Among us even today you will most easily find individuals who will hack away with an ax at their own Serbian roots, who like Herostratus will assault the highest Serbian values. That uncivilized ferocity of expression of personal views and intolerance toward the institutions which are not according to their liking and design are nothing other than a remnant of the bolshevik mentality and exclusiveness.

Several institutions saved the Serbian people during the period of the communist dictatorship. They include the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Association of Writers, the Association of Philosophers, and distinguished individuals who are themselves an institution of the Serbian people. And now intolerant and impatient people fighting for personal power have attacked those fundamental institutions of the Serbian people. The struggle for power is the greatest evil that has accompanied the Serbian people down through the centuries. The divisions in the Serbian people are motivated by the struggle for power, but the people have become wise and almost as a rule they do not give power to the one who seeks it, but to the one who defends himself against getting it.

[Box, p 16]

The Chances of a Small Yugoslavia

[Janjic] What was your perception of the meeting in Belgrade, the Convention on Yugoslavia?

[Karadzic] The convention was not well-organized at all, much less was it organized in bolshevik fashion, as is being said in some places. The smaller parties in B-H (until the new elections, we do not know how large the parties are) were actually the initiators, and we joined in without a bit of narcissism, we took part in the proceedings, and we signed the document.

There is something else that is interesting about the convention: There have been so many public and secret summit meetings against Yugoslavia, and all of them together did not evoke so many stormy reactions as this one meeting on behalf of Yugoslavia. It really seems

from that that the chances of a large Yugoslavia are small. However, the chances of a small Yugoslavia are large, and everything here seems to be as in inverse proportion.

For us Serbs from B-H, Yugoslavia is no longer an ideological question at all. We approach preservation of Yugoslavia's continuity quite rationally: That state was created by the Serbs and Montenegrins, who did not fight only for themselves, but also for their brothers in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. We are those brothers of theirs, we and the Serbs in the Serbian Republic Krajina. They liberated us, and we entered into a common state with them which was later redesigned by Broz' tailors. We recognize those changes only insofar as they concern them and their nationalities: All the rest is in our hands. There are sufficient political and legal reasons for us to continue to call the state that remains to us Yugoslavia or for the people to decide differently in a referendum.

[Box, p 17]

What Is Milosevic Like?

[Janjic] Your attitude toward the government in Serbia today and specifically toward President Milosevic.

[Karadzic] At this point, I now know President Milosevic quite well. At the beginning, for almost three months after the party was formed, I did not contact him, because I did not know what I had. When I saw that we had a strong party, I entered into contact with the official authorities of Serbia and also with President Milosevic. I have a very high opinion of his personal attributes. I think that Serbia has the statesman it needs, a man who has the idea of government and personal bravery to fight for that idea and not to give in to pressures. Milosevic has been criticized a great deal for the personnel policy of his party. However, I have seen for myself that in a large number of cases this is not his personnel policy, that he does not interfere with many things. But, nevertheless, I think that he ought to intervene and exert influence so that in the executive bodies in Serbia there are mainly competent people regardless of the party to which they belong. Because he possesses great personal charm, I reproach him for not being in more frequent contact with the media and directly with the people on speaking occasions. Every appearance of his would result in a rapid improvement of his prestige with the people.

[Janjic] How do you look on the accusations of certain opposition leaders that Milosevic is a bolshevik?

[Karadzic] If Milosevic were a bolshevik, the principal weekly, NIN, could not be an opposition paper. We know precisely what bolshevism means. Milosevic is a man of very strong convictions.

You have to struggle a great deal with him and be very persuasive and prepared with a good line of argument if you are to change his opinion. But why, after all, should the president of the Republic of Serbia be an impressionable individual?! I personally propose to anyone who enters into contact with him to do his homework well. I am persuaded that if the arguments are sufficiently strong, Milosevic accepts the other person's line of argument and corrects his opinions.

Bosnia Military Officials on 'Prelude to War'

92BA0406A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 92 p 11

[Article by Branka Mitrovic: "The Bosnian Storm in the Hilly Balkans"]

[Text] It is the assessment in the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], in the SDA [Democratic Action Party], and in the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] as well that the prelude to war has already taken place in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina]. All of Alija Izetbegovic's exertions up to this point, they say in the SDS, have one and only one transparent and impassioned objective—to deny the Serbs what they are entitled to and to create an independent state of B-H, which, in their judgment, could easily result in war. In the HDZ, they also say that war is closer, and that they absolutely will not tolerate an expanded Serbia. Munib Bisic, assistant national defense minister in the B-H government, seems to fear most the institution of martial law in this republic.

The political army, he feels, still does not accept the changes that have been brought by the multiparty system. It has been turning a deaf ear to the demands of the B-H government, but Bisic at the same time optimistically concludes that although martial law has never done anyone any good, it has never lasted long either.

Tomislav Buconja (who is introduced in the SDA as a military expert) feels that if war does come, it would be over quickly. After all, if a conflict occurs in B-H, a Balkan storm would be a necessity.

Everything that the army has done to upset the daily life of B-H he tried to analyze in terms of a new Serbian state which many have called "Operation RAM."

The Atmosphere Is "Ready" Even Now

"Sociology presupposes three essential conditions for civil war to break out: the emergence of ideologically confronted groups, the emergence of suitable figures to be the ideological leaders of those groups, the arming of the population, and the staging of the conflict. We can observe with regret that the top military leadership, acting in concert with Milosevic's satellites, have succeeded in fulfilling all these conditions and that now the beginning of real war is for all practical purposes awaited. The Serbian propaganda machine and the seizure of the repeater facilities of TV Sarajevo on Kozara have essentially influenced the formation of differing ideological groups, and the incursion of the Marticites

and the various terrorist acts committed in B-H have also heated up the atmosphere of fear and insecurity," Buconja says.

He agrees with the assessment that in this republic war would in practice take the form of classic guerrilla warfare. The only place where some kind of front might be established, according to him, is the course of the Neretva River.

"The conception in the RAM Project is a strike against western Hercegovina from two directions at the same time. The attack on this region," Buconja believes, "would be initiated by the Banja Luka and Trebinje Corps, which would meet in the area of Kupres. From that moment on, no one would be able to control the war in Bosnia. Along with the attack on western Hercegovina, there would be lateral strikes of the Bosnian army (although the SDA, Karadzic's followers say, has a projection of a state with its own army, which is nevertheless an 'illusion they would best get rid of') from the direction of Travnik, Vitez, Zenica, Konjic, and Bugojno, which would inevitably be followed by military activities in the Sandzak and Kosovo, but also in Macedonia."

"The test of Army armament on the battlefields in Croatia was not successful, and the T-72 and T-84 tanks did not show up well in the hilly parts of Croatia. The M-57 mortars have been the weapon used most in the war in the neighboring republic; the M-69 and M-74 are not suitable for actions in hilly terrain because of the low scatter pattern of the shrapnel," Buconja believes.

He also added that the MiG-21, MiG-29, and Galeb G-4 aircraft could perform their role only in destroying vital facilities in urban areas, but do not come under consideration as support in guerrilla battles, and their role would then be taken over by helicopters.

"In Bosnia, just as in Croatia, the most practical means of air defense would be the American Stinger missiles and the Strela portable rocket launchers which are being improved in the military plants in Banja Luka, but because of the poor results from light artillery weapons, the Army has recently been intensively engaged in practicing airborne landings in order to drop its people as deep as possible into the rear in a possible war and break resistance. However," Buconja says, "aggression against B-H would quite certainly be fiercely condemned by the international public. In the first days of the war, there would be foreign military intervention or intervention of NATO forces, and the American 6th Fleet would certainly be the striking force of those troops."

The "Liechtenstein Model"

People here feel that the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] could withstand a strike by NATO forces only a few days, and that the Yugoslav Navy could in no way resist the entry of the 6th Fleet into the Adriatic, because as a practical matter it possesses not a single weapon with which it could fend off that giant.

Buconja and others concerned with military affairs in the SDA feel that the operation of international forces that would be called Balkan Storm could have similarities with the operation in the Persian Gulf. Strongholds of the JNA in Trebinje, Banja Luka, and Bijeljina could be quickly neutralized, exposed as they would be to constant air attack. They say that the skeleton of the offensive ground forces would be made up of Turkish units, detachments of the French Foreign Legion, certain Italian units, and also military formations of the Benelux countries, and their main strike would be conducted against the Mostar and Bihac military airfields.

"The strikes of the ground units would be particularly fierce in the Sava valley, while the Turkish units would operate from the direction of Bulgaria and Albania, which would prevent new forces from reaching positions in B-H and Croatia, and then inevitably the center of the conflict would be moved to places from which the inspiration has come the whole time—Serbia," Tomislav Buconja concludes.

He adds that the greatest difference between the "Balkan" and Desert Storm would be in the fact that the Iraqi Army had far better military organization and more modern weapons.

The thundering pronouncements of Jerko Doko concerning his own Bosnian army and the performance of military actions of this kind are more a product of fantasy than reality, they say in response to all this in the SDS. All objective analyses indicate that the only chance for B-H, however large it might be and whatever nationalities make it up, is the so-called Liechtenstein Model, that is, only small police forces. Building an army is utopia, and if in the end they do not give up the idea, there will be war.

Croatia

Separovic Notes Differences of Views on UN Plan

LD2901222292 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Report by Gyorgi Orban from Zagreb]

[Excerpts] Croatian Foreign Minister Separovic has confirmed to Hungarian radio that there are differences of views between the Croatian leadership and the UN under secretary general regarding the peacekeeping forces. Gyorgi Orban reports from Zagreb.

[Orban] Speaking about the disagreements, Separovic said that Goulding also has involved the leaders of Western Slavonia and the so-called Serbian Autonomous Territory of Knin in the negotiations on the UN peace plan, who listen to neither Serbian President Milosevic nor the generals.

Following the arrival of the Blue Helmets, Croatia still expects the Yugoslav Army to leave the occupied territories, that the paramilitary organizations will be disarmed, and that Croatia will restore its sovereignty in these districts, including the surroundings of Dubrovnik, Foreign Minister Separovic said. [passage omitted]

Simultaneously with Goulding's arrival [not further specified], Hadzic, the leader of the Serbian Autonomous Territory in Western Slavonia, declared that the area south and east of Osijek will never again be a part of Croatia and that no single UN soldier will enter it with Croatia stamped in his travel document.

Goulding in Talks With Slavonian Leader

LD2901193592 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1808 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Jan (TANJUG)—This afternoon, in the Palace of Federation in Novi Beograd, the UN secretary general's Under Secretary Marrack Goulding had a meeting with a delegation of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Western Slavonia, headed by its Prime Minister Veljko Dzakula and the member of government responsible for foreign affairs, Ilija Sasic.

After half an hour of talks behind closed doors, Goulding did not give a statement to journalists because he was in a hurry for a meeting with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

"The talks were brief, but constructive, and in our opinion very successful," Ilija Sasic said. The government of Western Slavonia, he added, accepted from the beginning the arrival of the peacekeeping forces, as a way to resolve the conflict in Yugoslavia.

Sasic said however that his delegation requested that the blue helmets also be deployed in Podravska Slatina municipality, the eastern part of Virovitica municipality, the western part of Donji Miholjac municipality, the western part of Orahovica municipality, and the western part of Slavonska Pozega municipality; in these areas, he said, Serbs account for 80 percent of the population.

In these areas, which are now not included in the peace plan, so far "about 100 Serbian villages have been totally burned down, pulled down, or demolished" up to now, and especially since the latest cease-fire, Sasic said.

During the talks with Goulding, Sasic said, we requested guarantees that the Serbian population, who have completely fled from these areas, will be able to return to their homes and insured a safe life. These are, as he said, basic preconditions "for even talking about a political resolution of the crisis".

"Mr Goulding promised us and clearly said that the planned zones of coverage are not strict, but established in general terms, and that the detailed deployment of the peacekeeping forces will be agreed when the blue helmets arrive," Sasic stressed.

Serbs Say Federal Army Will Not Leave Krajina

LD2901223992 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Report from Sibenik by Zoltan Kabok]

[Text] Radio Knin has just broadcast the conclusions from the session of the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] of so-called Krajina, in connection with Vance's peace plan. According to these conclusions, the Serbian people on the territory of so-called Krajina will not be disarmed.

The leadership of the SDS does not countenance Vance's peace plan on the grounds that the plan is very biased and prejudiced toward certain political solutions. The blue helmets can be deployed only along the frontline, with a view to separating the two warring sides.

The Central Committee of the SDS, according to today's announcement of Radio Knin, concluded at its session in Metko that the members of the federal army will not leave the territory of Krajina.

Commanders of the federal army participated in this session, which is the best confirmation of Minister Drazen Budisa's statement yesterday, according to which the Knin Corps headed by its commander, General (Vladic), has gone beyond the control of its General Staff and placed itself to the disposition of Milan Babic.

Cease-Fire Violations in Osijek, Dubrovnik Area

LD3001110292 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0905 GMT 30 Jan 92

[Text] Powerful explosions were heard this morning in Osijek, and there have been no reports of shells striking the city itself. Last night enemy forces in Baranja opened

artillery fire on the suburb of Tvrdjavica, and the residential district of Jug-2 was shelled from enemy strongholds east of the city. Two enemy aircraft also overflew the Osijek area at around 1100 last night.

Croatian positions in the Zadar hinterland were subjected to machine gun fire throughout the night. The Yugoslav Air Force was also active with several dozen jets entering Zadar airspace at around 1100 pm. In addition, enemy troop movements were reported around Zamunik Gornji.

Gun fire was reported from Yugoslav Army positions on Bosanka, Zarkovica, and Podbrezje in the Dubrovnik region last night. Tracer rockets were also fired towards Srz Hill several times early this morning. The Gospic region has been quiet since 1100 o'clock last night. Previous to this Croatian positions in Ribnik, Vuksic, Stari Licki Osik, and Budak came under fire. Croatian forces did not respond.

Brigade Sent to Relieve Rijeka Troops

LD3001104592 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0905 GMT 30 Jan 92

[Text] The 119th Croatian Brigade left Pula this morning from Gorski Kotor. The brigade will relieve Rijeka troops who have been on the front for several months. This marks the first organized assignment of a brigade from Istria, and it reportedly went off without any problems.

Manolic Comments on Position, Recent Arrests

92BA0387B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jan 92 pp 19-21

[Interview with Josip Manolic, director of the Office of the President of Croatia for Protection of the Constitutional Order, by Jelena Lovric and Mladen Maloca; place and date not given: "We Can Sleep With the Opposition"]

[Text] The Office for Protection of the Constitutional Order, which is headed by Josip Manolic, who up to now has been President Tudjman's right hand, has recently been at the center of public attention, for a great many reasons. One of them is that by the nature of his job he somehow enters the area of secrecy. In conversation with the person to whom some refer as Croatia's top policeman, we naturally begin with basic clarification.

[Manolic] The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia enacted a year ago still has not been entirely applied. There are institutions that still have not been given their physiognomy. It will take us a certain time to adapt them or, better put, create them according to the new constitutional design. One of these issues is the position of the Office of the President of the Republic for Protection of the Constitutional Order. The Constitution provides that the president can form auxiliary, advisory, and indeed even certain collective bodies. I personally think that the present design of the Office for Protection of the Constitutional Order is temporary and that we will have to do some more work in defining its position.

[DANAS] What is your role in specific terms? Only advisory, or do you also have executive powers?

[Manolic] We are only an advisory body. We do not have any functions of our own except those delegated to us by the president. He grants us certain powers from his constitutional position. That is the difference between us and, say, the police. The police have their own specific function under the law adopted by the Assembly. Our function follows from the functions of the president.

[DANAS] Does this mean that you are not any kind of secret service, which is the usual interpretation given in public?

[Manolic] I think that some of those opinions arise from a misunderstanding and from a public that is not sufficiently well-informed. Which to some extent is perhaps understandable because this is a new institution which never existed before in our governmental and legal system. To be sure, even in the former regime there were certain similar institutions concerned with covering that area which is called protection of the constitutional order. But such services exist in all countries, in all systems, it is just that they are regulated in differing ways depending on the structure of authority defined by the Constitution.

[DANAS] When we talk about power relations, then you, as an extension of the presidential system, would have to have jurisdiction over the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other similar services as well. Does that mean that you are in a superior position? That you are at the level of presidential responsibility?

[Manolic] Yes, at the level of presidential responsibility, or, better put, at the level of assistance to the president so that he can also cover that segment of government administration which is referred to as protection of the constitutional order.

[DANAS] Is it then true that after the president you are the most powerful man in Croatia?

[Manolic] It seems to me that that is idle talk. I do not think much of numbering positions. We know who the first man in the republic is. He is defined by the Constitution. In our Constitution, there is no second person—there is no vice president, no assistant president, no deputy president. Accordingly, there cannot even be any discussion of any second person in the republic. But we can speak of the specific responsibility of individuals and departments performing certain duties within the framework of the present Constitution and law.

[DANAS] How would you comment on the assertions of Ivan Bobetko, chairman of the Assembly Committee for Domestic Policy, that in Croatia there are four secret police organizations?

[Manolic] I think that that is idle talk, in this case quite malicious, certainly not well-intentioned. In a number of departments, there are certain segments which can come under protection of the republic's constitutionality. For

example, all those documents marked "secret" or "strictly confidential" imply that element of protection.

[DANAS] Recently, there has been a great deal of talk in this context about the so-called SIS, the Security Information Service, of the Defense Ministry.

[Manolic] The public is aware that in the latter half of this year we have really begun to build a Croatian army. And it is natural that in that process the SIS should have been created as an integral part of that army. Nothing new or unusual that does not exist in other armies. Each of those armies in other countries has its own information and intelligence service, its military police, its military courts. The SIS is only one of those new departments growing up together with the Croatian army.

[DANAS] However, during the election campaign the promise was made to abolish the UDB [State Security Administration], the political police, it was said that those institutions would be under the strict control of democratic institutions, of the Assembly above all. Now it seems that the old secret police departments that escape democratic oversight are being reduced both in terms of methodology and also in terms of content.

[Manolic] Neither we personally, nor my party, the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], have ever promised anything which we could not achieve now. Perhaps somewhere at some rally someone babbled something of the kind. And only in that respect could there be any misunderstanding. But it is clear to me that so long as there is a state, it must have all of its attributes. There is no state in the world today that does not have its police, which does not have public police, and which does not have its secret police. In that respect, we did not make promises we could not keep. We said that we would not have a political police that would persecute citizens because of their opinion, which is altogether a matter of free choice, and because they belonged to political parties. We said: Neither the secret police nor the public police will be able to be involved in that. We will not try people for political crimes. And, if you remember, after taking power one of the first acts of the Croatian Presidency was to release all political prisoners. Accordingly, we have proven that we are against any kind of political persecution of political thought. Where the misunderstanding occurs now is the dilemma over whether something is a political crime, a crime of thought, or a crime of violence. If we take the specific example of Paraga's case, we did not institute criminal proceedings against him because he is the president of a political party, but because of the violence that was done under his leadership. Recall the order to establish the HOS [Croatian Armed Forces], the commands issued to those forces, taking over the Starcevic Center by force, they have committed dozens and dozens of violent acts, from entering private dwellings to attacks on official government agencies. Paraga must answer for that. That is not a political crime, that is a crime of violence which cannot exist in any civilized or law-governed state.

[DANAS] But Paraga's howitzer stood in front of the Starcevic Center for a month, and yet nothing at all was done about it.

[Manolic] That cannon was aimed against Banski Dvori, although it was turned in another direction. Now, your reproach is why a law-governed state tolerated that for such a long time. We are at war, in the phase of bringing together everyone who wants to fight for this Croatia and for its constitutional system. And it has taken time for us to see who is in favor of defending this law-governed state; it took us two months to sort out that those so-called paramilitary formations are something that do not fit into the system of the country's defense, but, on the contrary, are destroying that defense of ours from within.

[DANAS] When violence is reacted to on one occasion and not reacted to on another occasion, then the public gets the feeling that behavior is not governed by principle.

[Manolic] People must be certain that the government will always react. But certain problems must come to a head. Also, there is both inefficiency and sluggishness in certain agencies, slow reactions, incompetence, a low professional level, negligence, and there is even outright political resistance.

[DANAS] So long as we are talking about Paraga, what is your comment on the fact that the original charge of armed rebellion, which was passed by President Tudjman, has now been reduced to merely illegal bearing of arms?

[Manolic] I think that this is evidence of the great democratic spirit and independence of the institutions of our legal system. After all, the police can express all kinds of grave suspicions on the basis of evidence gathered in advance, but then all of that goes to another level, where the investigating judge must evaluate how much of all that is actually incriminating and how much can be used for that purpose. But that does not mean that Paraga has been released. If the police gather enough relevant evidence, the indictment can even be broadened.

[DANAS] Does that explanation also apply to the case of Dedakovic? What is your comment on the fact that Dedakovic was mistreated in prison?

[Manolic] I know as much about that as you do! Not a bit more! No legal system, including ours, allows mistreatment of prison inmates and those who are in custody. It is a well-known fact, however, that in no country and no prison is it all milk and honey, things are not exactly the way the regulations state. Accordingly, certain breaches are possible when individuals misuse their position.

[DANAS] There is a medical document to the effect that Dedakovic was beaten. Has something been done to ascertain the guilt of those who did that?

[Manolic] As far as I know, a report on the mistreatment of Mr. Dedakovic was requested in a meeting of the government. The investigation is still under way. And when it is completed, we will know whether those who worked on this case misused their position or something

else is involved. That is, one circumstance involved here is that Dedakovic had an automobile accident two days earlier, so it must be ascertained whether the injuries which the doctor found occurred then or by deliberate mistreatment in the prison. But it is certain that we must not make a judgment in advance, but only on the basis of the facts.

[DANAS] Nevertheless, we would say that there is good reason for the public to be confused. Dedakovic was first a hero, he was received and publicly praised by the president of the republic, and a few days later he was first declared a fugitive and then a traitor, and finally a thief.

[Manolic] I think we are dealing here with quite a bit of misinformation, or, better put, disinformation, and then also an intentional highlighting of Dedakovic which he did not deserve. I spent four years in the war and I am not a national hero. And I am now waging war from the beginning and I am not a national hero.

But let someone come from the opposite camp, jump over, and after a month and a half in Vukovar, he becomes a national hero. Is that realistic? Who deserves credit for that? The news media create an irrational outlook in the people, and all of that has its political background. We know who is doing this and why. More will be done to clarify the case of Vukovar, not Dedakovic. Dedakovic should not be linked, much less identified, with the overall case of the defense of Vukovar.

[DANAS] You headed the government commission which analyzed what happened with Vukovar and in Vukovar. What is your comment on the assessments of Ivan Bobetko, who called for formation of an independent commission, saying that your report contains quite a few contradictions?

[Manolic] Ivan Bobetko's remarks are silly, I do not want to talk about them....

[DANAS] But he is chairman of the Assembly Committee for Domestic Policy.

[Manolic] That is your assessment of his weight. He is objecting to the members of the commission. But is it not logical that the president of the republic, as the most responsible man in Croatia, is seeking to ascertain important facts about everything that happened in Vukovar? The president appointed the commission, as is his right, that will be able to offer him those facts, and that commission consists of people who in one way or another took part in all that. The president has taken the view that he needs a commission of precisely that composition that will be able to offer him the most authentic elements which can then be taken as the basis for defining policy.

[DANAS] But in connection with Dedakovic and Paraga the president stated in public that this was a case of conspiracy. In view of what happened afterward, is this a case of carelessness, wrong judgment, or something else?

[Manolic] No, this was neither wrong judgment nor carelessness. At that point, when he collected all the important elements that indicated the fall of Vukovar, from the appearance of the HOS in the streets, the objections to the strengthening of rightwing forces, which he heard even in international meetings, about how their behavior was uncontrolled, about how the law-governed state was not functioning, when, that is, he had collected all that, he naturally came to the conclusion that this was a broad conspiracy against the Republic of Croatia and was meant to bring down its legal bodies of government. All of those strong assaults on the position of the president, on his powers, all the demands to amend the Constitution and restrict his powers—all of that was headed in the same direction. After all, bringing down the president—under wartime conditions that is an attack on the republic, on the state.

[DANAS] But such demands have largely come from the ranks of the HDZ.

[Manolic] The essential thing is not the ranks from which they have come. It is almost a rule that the fiercest blows come from one's own party. Even today I can say that we can sleep peacefully alongside our opposition. We have bigger problems created by malcontents for various reasons within the ranks of our own party. But a statesman dare not ever forget that there are also certain interests on the outside aimed at breaking up the homogeneity of the party itself, which would like to shatter the prestige of the most responsible people, in this case the president of the republic, and to facilitate achievement of hostile objectives, and that is the Third Yugoslavia, even if it be truncated.

[DANAS] When you say conspiracy, that implies that there is coordination among all its participants. Can one speak in this case about some common denominator? The way you interpret it, it turns out that all those diverse forces have come together in order to carry out a coup against Croatia.

[Manolic] From the political viewpoint, yes. After all, various currents, various parties, various powerful figures may bring about the same objective. Their political interests are identical with respect to that objective. One has interest in coming to power, another would like to bring down the present government, because he considers it his greatest adversary. Accordingly, they are the same in that respect. That is my political judgment.

[DANAS] With that kind of relativization, one can easily arrive at the conclusion that any critical thought could be part of a conspiracy.

[Manolic] If you read the report of our commission carefully, you will see that we have avoided rendering judgment on any problem or issue. We spread out the facts, we have left the conclusion as the obligation of those bodies designated to conduct the further investigation, and they will then be used by all those who must render verdicts.

[DANAS] Is your assessment of opposition in the ranks of your own party an explanation of what we might refer to as your disagreement with Bobetko? Is that a conflict between two lines in the HDZ?

[Manolic] There is no personal conflict at all, nor misunderstanding. There have been certain moves, certain political views, certain acts of Bobetko's which are not in keeping either with the interests of the party or with his position. It is not a question of a conflict. One might possibly say that it is a conflict, or, more accurately, of a man in the party who has departed from its program, its bylaws, his party responsibility. This is his conflict with the party, but that still does not mean that there is a disagreement within the party.

[DANAS] In speaking about the formation of the military police, you said that this was the creation of a new service. However, from what we have learned about its operation, not only are the old methods being applied in it, but often it is made up of people inherited from the old system. It has been stated in the Assembly that democratic changes have been aimed above all against the secret police of the former system....

[Manolic] Again, these things were said by people who do not know what they are talking about and who think that the affairs of state can be handled without experts and without teams of certain qualified people. Was it out of altruism that we accepted the entire corps of Croatian officers who until yesterday were in the JA [Yugoslav Army]? No, this was because of the real need of the Croatian state and the Croatian people to include these people in defense of our country. The same thing applies to police personnel.

[DANAS] But they are using the old methods inherited from the last system....

[Manolic] Those are not old methods, they are police methods used by all police in the world. I do not include mistreatment of people, because that is not permitted anywhere. But those are offenses committed by individuals.

[DANAS] But frequent mention is made in public of quite specific names of people who had a bad reputation in the former system precisely for their actions as members of the police.

[Manolic] People whose names are frequently mentioned in public, as those who were previously in the police and are also now in our ranks, are mostly professionals, specialists at their job. But today, they are nevertheless being forced to work in a different way than they did before, they have to obey the democratic laws which we have adopted. As for their political overtone, is it not true that this could be extended even to all other categories, not just police categories? Have we thrown out all the teachers and professors who taught socialism and Marxism? And all the journalists who subscribed to the former policy, and they are practicing their profession now?

[DANAS] You say that you are in favor of a law-governed state. How, then, do you interpret the kidnapping of people virtually at the exit from the prison?

[Manolic] There has been no such kidnapping. There are legal arrests. When the government does that, then this is always legal. Choosing the place where an arrest will be made is another matter, whether that will be at home, in a restaurant, on Jelicic Square, or again will the arrest be made in the prison in order to continue the investigation—that is in the judgment of the agency responsible. So, when this is done by the legal police authorities, when they have jurisdiction, there can be no question of kidnapping.

[DANAS] Sometimes one gets the impression in connection with such cases that there is unequal legal treatment of all citizens. Some people seem to be privileged. For instance, does the Mercep case exist? Some people praise this man as a hero, others say that his actions and the behavior of his people should be subject to criminal prosecution.

[Manolic] I spoke to you about certain problems coming to a head. I am aware that there are a great many accusations that have been lodged against Mercep and against his people. He personally takes the view that there should be prosecution of all the crimes of people with whom he has been connected; he does not stand behind a single criminal act of people in his unit. Are we going to believe him, or will we immediately clap him into prison? We must first have proof. To be sure, reactions have been slow. But you must realize that many ambiguous cases occur in regions of military operations, where at this moment it is very difficult to arrive at the truth.

[DANAS] Does that mean that investigatory proceedings are being conducted in connection with Mercep?

[Manolic] Not in connection with him, but in connection with crimes that have been committed. The point of departure is a specific crime, and then the investigation seeks the perpetrators.

[DANAS] A month ago, Ivan Vekic, the police minister, promised a finding concerning the disappearances of Serbs in Gospic. To this very day, the public still knows nothing about that. The rumor has merely spread that Tihomir Oreskovic, chief of the Crisis Command Center for Lika, has been arrested in that connection.

[Manolic] The situation in Gospic is very serious. There are many dead among both the Croats and the Serbs. We cannot condemn anyone in advance, a thorough investigation is needed. As soon as the situation on the battle front calms down a bit, we will be able to complete it. The investigation has begun, but as yet there is no search for the perpetrators of those crimes. It would not be in the spirit of a law-governed state for anyone, not even Tihomir Oreskovic, to be convicted in advance. So far, investigatory proceedings are still being conducted against perpetrators unknown.

[DANAS] It is said that Oreskovic was released from custody in response to a request from above.

[Manolic] There are two mistakes in your question. First, Oreskovic was not the chief of any command center, nor even its secretary, he was an administrator in the Crisis Command Center for Lika. To be sure, what is written in decrees does not always reflect the actual situation; for example, the actual authority which someone held in a particular area, and no one should be led astray in this respect. Second, it is wrong that he has been released from prison. He was interviewed about what happened in Gospic while he was there, and that was a matter of a few months. He set forth his opinion, he pointed in several directions in which the search should be conducted for the perpetrators....

[DANAS] But what was the mistake?

[Manolic] Criminal proceedings have not been instituted against him.

[DANAS] But he was in prison.

[Manolic] He was interviewed.

[DANAS] Over several days. But let us leave that case to one side. Dedakovic and Bobetko say that they did not receive reports necessary for waging war from the military espionage services. And the reason was that the secret police allegedly are concerned with finding internal enemies.

[Manolic] I have already told you that I give no weight to Bobetko's opinion. After all, a man who is tossing back cognacs in his bunker cannot know what kind of information the intelligence services possess.

[DANAS] You are very critical of Bobetko even though he performs an important parliamentary function. Does this mean that he has lost the confidence of the party?

[Manolic] That question can be covered by the same answer to the effect that problems must come to a head. Certain things have to become concentrated, they must take on a form which will be acceptable to the public. Now that we are talking about this case, I will cite the example of his saying that he went to Slovenia with his woman friend to seek help. A lie out and out. As the chairman of a parliamentary committee, he did not go there either by order of the president or by order of anyone in the legal structures of government. The responsible people in Slovenia have informed us about what he was looking for there.

So, we could immediately have used this highly compromising material against him. We did not want to, and now this is coming back to us like a boomerang, in the form of accusations against us. In the near future, when we present to the public what actually was involved, there will not be anything unclear at all. I think that this problem has come to a head and that we will soon resolve it without causing any split in the party. This will be one of the little problems that the party will simply shake off.

Knin Conflict To Be Resolved at Municipal Level

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[Article by Vlado Rajic: "Knin—The Second Time"]

[Text] Perhaps Point 9 of the proposal for UN peacekeeping operations that have been adopted bothered some people because it specifically refers to the Krajina. Perhaps there were also wrinkled brows concerning the fact that the list of opcinas which that term covers included points on the front where Croatian defenders are right now under cannon fire from Serbian weapons. Be that as it may, the Krajina remains a reference point of Croatian domestic policy toward which the authorities must behave in a politically astute manner, and the police forces must show professional determination.

Babic's Fall

The most recent reports from Knin, which is blocked off for news and everything else, demonstrate that every tightly closed pot, warmed up by the fire of war, must sooner or later explode. And the cook gets burned. We are referring, of course, to the self-styled "president of the republic," Dr. Milan Babic, who actually has never been anything more than a dentist without a practice. From the first moment, reckoning that his political career did not begin with the legal, general, and Croatian elections, but with his involvement in Milosevic's "concern for the Serbs outside Serbia," the dentist Babic has dug a hole for himself. The escalation of the conflict, the log barriers on the roads, the armed bands which have been stopping traffic and searching tourists, these were all the filmy wings of his political ascent. When the disorder turned into war, Babic put on a different pair of glasses. First he lost the support of Zelembaba, Opacic, Tanjga, and others who were elected deputies in the Croatian Assembly in the same elections, and then his party leader Dr. Raskovic took off for Belgrade, and then Knin was isolated and dropped from all of Milosevic's plans like an old rag. The dentist did not realize that it was Belgrade that had exaggerated the drastic nature of the events in Knin so that at the necessary moment, thus exaggerated, it could be cast off as "evidence" of Milosevic's peaceful political credo. After all, the president of Knin Opcina offered protection to Milan Martic, the bandit chief of the police there in the Krajina, he provided facilities for training conducted under the command of "Captain Dragan," international adventurer who has a police record, and the first slaughter of civilians (Kijevo) occurred on the territory of his "state." Babic did not sober up even at the statement of Milosevic himself, who, when asked by European diplomats to exert influence on Babic, answered tersely: "Babic is the president of an independent state, and I cannot alter those decisions." But actually the word "independence" in the leader's vocabulary is another way of saying that he is washing his hands of it.

When matters reached the point of atrocities and when under the pressure of the world political standard and his

boss he came under outright pressure, Babic's downfall became inevitable. In order somehow to redeem himself in the face of the desperate situation in Knin, the dentist pulled out his last "argument": He entered into open conflict with Milosevic, he quarreled with Kostic, and he cursed the "traitors" of Knin. But precisely for that reason, stripped down to what Knin really is—an opcina in Croatia—it should be returned to him in the spirit of the documents passed in the Assembly in the meantime, in the spirit of the international agreements adopted as a peace platform for "all of" Croatia, including Knin.

Out of the Blind Alley

But what now? Knin Krajina, as a term in the peace proposal, rejected all other krajinas and demonstrated that "states" proclaimed by tanks are not a serious construct for anyone. Second, if Knin fails the political examination as the seat of the "krajina," that will demonstrate that the other opcinas right around it are nothing and unconnected except by opcina leaders, some of them submissive, some of them intimidated, and some of them routed, who, each for his own reasons, have accepted the "governmental linkage" with the capital of disaster. And Knin is very close to that downfall. Everything depends on the political astuteness of the Croatian authorities we mentioned. If, regardless of the blue helmets and their police forces, state structures come forth with an offer to Knin for reestablishment, say, of highway traffic, with a demand for safety of trains, with a proposal for preserving long-distance power lines, water supply lines, and other infrastructural facilities, it is possible to avoid the first strike of political disagreements. Incidentally, the Croatian authorities have nothing to discuss with Babic and his remaining followers when it comes to political relations. There is good reason for the Upper City itself to be concerned about preserving the dignity of the election and its results. And that means that Babic can sit down at some table only in a group of opcina presidents. Taking this tack is to approach resolution of the Knin problem indirectly, but it also means facing and dealing with certain facts of the war which, if political talks are conducted first, rush to the foreground, keep Babic at the head of the column, and threaten to keep all of it together in the blind alley where that part of Croatia has in fact been for months now.

And then, regardless of the disagreements between Babic and the deputies in the Assembly, restoring regular mail service makes it possible for them to be sent summons to the sessions, to insist on continuation of the proceedings of their caucus deputies, and, if necessary, to use them as a bridge between Croatia and the Croatia in Knin. That would be a direct test of whether Zelembaba, Opacic, and the rest are serious when they condemn the war or are only fishing for support of the population of Knin in their intention of bringing down Babic and themselves taking over command in the "state."

Steps Toward Integration

Actually, in each of those items it is a question of the necessity of making up for all the oversights committed so far, from the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] helicopters that were stopped to the complete political neglect of this area, because it was dangerous and Serb. Perhaps it is dangerous, but Knin also represents Croatian territory of which the Supreme Command swore it would never give up a foot to anyone. And precisely because it all began in Knin, that is the part of Croatia that must be approached first. And that in specific terms of reference, with specific moves so that that part of the republic is again an integral part of the state after a long time. Not by making a big show of flags, but by plucking the citizens of Knin from the iron embrace of the Army and local political ruffians. After all, Zagreb is the capital of that region as well, and the likely attacks from Belgrade or from Knin itself against the moves of the government no longer have any effect whatsoever. Knin must become fully responsible in and of itself within Croatia, just like Pozega, Krapina, or Porec. It cannot do it alone. At the same time, Knin is at the moment an obstacle to connections between Zagreb and Split, it is like an appendix for all flows of goods and services, a street that is closed to coming and going.

These are all reasons why Zagreb, once again regardless of the arrival of the blue helmets, must simply begin to unravel the threads of the war precisely in Knin. Poisoned by propaganda, but worn out by its "consequences," the people of Knin will be made most clearly aware of the "character" and "intentions" of the Croatian authorities in proceedings which will take place at exactly the same level as talks with representatives of the "Croatian" opcinas.

The Top Leadership in Negotiations

And now that we are talking about the moves of the state, then it is worth a try precisely in Knin to begin with so-called local police, with the republic commissioner, with the process of bringing back those who have been driven out and persecuted, but also with the sensitive job of demilitarization, establishing violations of the laws of the republic. Precisely because the effort in the first phase should be concerned with electricity, water, and transportation connections, not politics, Knin is the area in which confidence is verified most easily.

But if it is to be possible to set up this kind of negotiating mechanism, democratic elections are a necessary precondition even in areas in which the peacekeeping forces of the UN will be deployed. Establishment of the new political structure will make it possible to begin the process of normalizing relations. In that context, the negotiators from Zagreb can be people from the top leadership of the state, administration heads, from Prime Minister Greguric to his deputy prime ministers. On the one hand, this is in fact logical, while on the other they have shown in the jobs they have done up to now that they do not carry victory drums when they go to the

negotiations. Even up to now they have been carrying nothing except a simple sense of responsibility for the affairs of government. Knin is Croatia and it can be approached as such. And it must.

Difficulties in Getting Baranja Back Foreseen

92BA0354A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 31 Dec 91 pp 22-23

[Article by Darko Pavicic: "War for Baranja: Freedom Comes in the Spring"—first paragraph is DANAS headline]

[Text] Are the recent actions of the Croatian army aimed at frightening those who moved into Baranja from Serbia, or is this the beginning of the liberation?

A return to Baranja will certainly be much more difficult than the departure from it was on 22 and 23 August, when columns of Croats and Hungarians left their houses and fled all at once into neighboring Hungary. Nevertheless, Croatian television reported how more almost three months later, on 18 December, the Croatian army freed Kopacevo and is continuing with the liberation of Baranja. Kopacevo, a sparsely populated village on the edge of Baranja, to the right when one looks from the direction of Osijek, is indeed only one visible action of the numerous actions of the Croatian army in this area.

Almost two months ago, raiding groups of the Croatian army crossed the Drava River at Belisic and seized a military watchtower along the Hungarian border at the village of Torjanci, then destroyed scores of enemy bunkers and entrenched strongpoints. At the same time, when the liberation of Kopacevo was reported, it was also said that Croatian raiders were constantly in action in Baranja, so it is easy to conclude how the tactic of returning Baranja to Croatian hands is far more developed than the hasty wish for the quick conquering of suddenly lost territory.

Return of the Croats

The offensive on the whole battlefield, indeed, could not bypass even Baranja, which is perhaps not in first place for liberation to Croatian military strategists, but any other treatment, while western Slavonija, the Sibenik hinterland, Drnis, fighting around Knin, are being cleared out, would be dangerous for the morale of numerous Croatian and Hungarian refugees from Baranja.

The events in Baranja also confirm the Belgrade press; VECERNJE NOVOSTI [Evening News] writes: "Having returned with the rank of Ustashi fighter to Osijek, from which he commands Croatian warriors of all insignia, Branimir Glavas is constantly battering Serbian villages, cities and positions of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the TO [Territorial Defense]" and it is said that this has been done with "tank grenades around Beli Manastir, Mece, Bilje, Kopacevo, and Novi Nevesinj." With the seizure of Kopacevo, a clear tactical advantage has been achieved, because impassable swampy and wooded terrain is involved on which the Yugoslav Army cannot utilize various equipment, so it is forced into fighting at close quarters. More restrained analysts claim that recent actions of the Croatian army in Baranja are aimed at frightening those who are moving to Baranja from Serbia, while the more probable version is that this is a question of the systematic conquering of Baranja territory with a plan of definite liberation. It is also clear that, with the entrance of the Croatian army into Baranja, the intensity of the attacks on Osijek, on which the Yugoslav Army is pouring shells daily from Baranja territory, will diminish considerably.

"The occupiers are now trying to change the demographic map of Baranja, calling on Serbs from various areas to settle there. This process has not gone as expected, since fierce battles are being waged in Baranja, so the invitees have not been been enthusiastic about the move. In fact, because of the military operations, those who have moved in response to the invitations are now fleeing from Baranja. The Operative Zone concluded from several incidents that the occupier is mining the bridge on the Danube between Batina and Bezdan, which they will destroy in the case of a mass flight of Serbs from Baranja, in order to stop the immigration in this way," Marko Kvesic, a representative of the Government of the Republic of Croatia for the Beli Manastir district, reported to us.

That serious consideration is being given in Serbia to Baranja is also indicated by the information that about ten families have already been moved into Croatian houses in Knezevo in December, and about 80 people from the vicinity of Daruvar moved into Baranjsko Petrovo Selo. Some 153 families moved from Grubisno Polje into Kozarac, Knezeve Vinograde, Petlovac, Grabovac and Ceminac, while it is claimed that gypsies from Torjanac were settled in the Croatian villages of Draz, Dubosevica and Topolje. But no one is responsible for those who want to move into Croatian houses in Baranja, so the number of people who are accepting that solution is small. On the other hand, it is being learned that, among the occupiers, there are equally quarrels; this is normal, when one realizes that the government in Baranja is "coalitional," composed of officers of the JA [Yugoslav Army], Baranja Serbs, Seselj and Arkan Chetniks and who knows what groups that have participated in the occupation.

Massacres

"Genocide is also being carried out against the Croats and Hungarians in Baranja," warns Marko Kvesic. After any military operation in which the Croatian army achieves increasingly greater successes, the occupier gets revenge on the civilian population." According to information from Croats who have succeeded in fleeing Baranja, about 260 civilians have been killed so far in nighttime actions by domestic chetniks and Seselj hirelings.

Massacres regularly occur when the occupier withdraws from occupied territories, and Chetnik hordes, after withdrawing from the west Slavonian battlefield near Nova Gradiska and Okucani, left gruesome pictures of massacred people. "Croats in Baranja are ordered to leave their houses, and those who refuse are shot at every night in their homes, traps are set with explosive devices, property is taken, people are physically maltreated. Refugees are arriving in Hungary daily with crushed fingers, broken extremities, or faces deformed by clubs," reports Kvesic.

Chetnik revenge also followed the liberation of Kopacevo and, according to information from that Operative Zone, about ten old and helpless people were killed that same night. An exodus has been taking place in Baranja in recent days according to the "Ilok prescription," and Croats and Hungarians who remained after the occupation are being forced to sign documents "voluntarily" in which they renounce everything that they have, from houses and land to kitchen accessories. They can take away only what fits in one suitcase. The Baranja "government" then "goes to meet" them and takes them to the Hungarian border, recommending that they not return. This is also done with Serbs who do not accept the new regime, and according to some sources Serbs are killed and massacred equally with Croats and Hungarians. A well-to-do Beli Manastir farmer, a Serb, who did not want to give up his sizeable property, was allegedly found hanged more than a month ago.

It is estimated that there are currently about 20 villages in Baranja in which Croats and Hungarians lived that are completely empty. According to information from the Commissariat of the Government of Croatia, "about 35,000 Croats, Hungarians and other non-Serbian people" have been driven out of Baranja, and it is known that the last population census showed there were 25.5 percent Serbs and 43.3 percent Croats in Baranja.

Bridge Between Life and Death

After the occupation of Baranja, its inhabitants became quite panic-stricken that Baranja had been sacrificed and, after some secret agreements, simply abandoned to the Republic of Serbia. An omission in a textbook for the fourth grade of elementary school, in which Baranja was left out of a picture of Croatia, contributed to this for many. The feeling of rejection most likely stemmed from the perception that Baranja was completely unprepared to resist the attacker, as well as the scant attention paid to Baranja by the political leadership. There was panic especially because the Croats had known for months ahead of time what was in store for Baranja and warned Zagreb about it. An accumulation of JA troops and the assignment of Chetniks to homes of Serbian extremists were easily visible. Indeed, the moment when the Croatian police turned the Batinski bridge on the Danube over to the hands of the Army could be taken as the day of the fall of Baranja. New forces were brought in after that to the already strong Beli Manastir garrison, and we ourselves saw tanks as early as July, positioned along the entire Baranja-Osijek and Baranja-Hungarian borders, and numerous reservists who were getting drunk in their free time in Baranja villages. At the time of the overthrow of the civilian government, the longtime commander of the Beli Manastir garrison, Sekaric, who from the beginning talked the army out of going out on the street, was removed from his post.

With the first successfully executed military actions in the area of Baranja, it also became evident that the people of Baranja had consolidated their ranks. "It can be said that, over the past four months, a military force has been created that has sufficient strength and the capability for the final liberation of Baranja. We will do everything to find political solutions in accordance with peacemaking efforts and liberate Baranja by peaceful means, but if this does not happen the occupier will feel the cumulative rage of the Croats from Baranja," warns Kvesic. After the formation of a unit of Baranja fighters and drills in Croatian Zagorje, a motivated and respectable military force, in which there are men whose homes are occupied, has been created. With a strong motive for fighting, this force is really one of the pillars of the organization of Baranja people dispersed all over Hungary and Croatia, who have been capable of military action since the original disintegration and flight. "The Croatian army is stronger every day, better equipped and more capable of carrying out all missions, while on the other side, morale is weakening from one day to the next, desertion, alcoholism and internal clashes and fights are taking place," claims Marko Kvesic.

Liberation of the Junction of Three Borders

Along with military questions, economic questions have been resolved at the same time, of course, in a specific way, especially with the Belje combine, which was thoroughly plundered immediately after the occupation and its property taken away to Serbia. According to the Commissariat, many enterprises from Baranja continued with their work in Osijek, and an account was opened at the Osijek SDK [Public Auditing Service]. "Work is being done at an accelerated pace on recording and assessing war damage so that rebuilding programs can be prepared. Our expectations are that Croatian Baranja will begin rebuilding and development in early spring, free of the Chetnik occupiers," says representative Kvesic.

But, even with the first successes of the Croatian army in Baranja, liberation of the whole territory will certainly not go easily. Powerful Chetnik bases in Jagodnjak, Bolman, and Novi Nevesinj and the well-equipped Yugoarmy will not withdraw without political pressure from the fertile Baranja soil. There is a permanent connection with the bridge between Batina in Croatia and Bezdan in Serbia, over which the majority of enemy forces have been brought. A bridge that will most probably be a key in the liberation of Baranja just as it was in its occupation. And the announcement of its mining is perhaps the key to resolving the further fate of Baranja—whether it's left to the Serbs, meaning that they have decided to stay there at any cost, or whether the Croatian

army conceivably does it, the intention of the definite liberation of the occupied Croatian junction of the three borders among Hungary, the Drava, and the Danube will be shown.

Dedakovic on Vukovar Events, Arrest, Charges

92BA0360A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 31 Dec 91 pp 20-21

[Interview with Mile "Hawk" Dedakovic by Veceslav Kocijan; place and date not given: "Playing Around With Money and Weapons"]

[Text] Mile "Hawk" Dedakovic, at one time the legend of the defense of Vukovar, and then accused of a conspiracy against the constitutional order, of treason, of belonging to the KOS [Counterintelligence Service], of smuggling weapons and stealing money, had no occasion to present his version of events until he was released on bail for the trial.

[Kocijan] When you came to Zagreb, you talked to President Tudjman. That conversation was also attended by Defense Minister Gojko Susak. Did you talk about money and weapons?

[Dedakovic] No, it was not about money, but about artillery shells. In order to defend Vukovar, we needed long-range artillery from Vinkovci. I told the president that we did not have any shells, and at that point Minister Susak pulled out a fax and said: "Here, Mr. President, 2,000 rounds are arriving at 1300 hours." However, they did not arrive. When I called him and told him that, he said that there were problems with transport, because Jansa would not allow our trucks to carry them, and he had none of his own. When I offered to facilitate the transport, he said that he would work it out and that they would arrive during the day. But they did not arrive during the day, and to make a long story short, I never did receive those shells.

I told the president that the information being given me by one and a second and a third minister was not accurate, and that I would tell him the truth.

[Kocijan] What was the reaction?

[Dedakovic] He answered me that he would do everything he could. I said "Mr. President, I can do that much myself—everything I can, but that is not enough, that means nothing to me. We have to have artillery, tanks, an army, and we have to have artillery shells. Tell me how much of that we will get and when. I will take that back with me." But what I took back from Zagreb was only what my lads themselves found, not anything I got from anyone.

[Kocijan] You were praised at the beginning for having managed to unify the defense of Vukovar.

[Dedakovic] There were groups that were fighting only within their own local community; that is, that defense was not unified and connected. There were not enough men, there were not enough weapons, but we also had to regroup forces. We were very weak around Negoslavci and the fairgrounds, so that I installed there the entire Guard which we had, and so on. Companies were formed by local communities and then battalions. Thus, we had six battalions in Vukovar. When the mobilization was carried out, Vukovar never had more than 1,000 men.

[Kocijan] How did the press conference by telephone in Vinkovci come about? It is just about then that your conflict with the authorities began.

[Dedakovic] In conversations with everyone in the Defense Ministry, the Supreme Command, the government, President Tudjman, and others, I realized that that aid nevertheless would not arrive. This was an attempt by desperate people, and I was ready to do anything to save Vukovar. Whether that was justified or not at the moment, let the population of Croatia decide.

[Kocijan] What is the truth about the notorious Vukovar "Indictment," which was immediately proclaimed to be the work of the KOS?

[Dedakovic] I really do not know who wrote the Indictment. It was read to me, it was written by hand, at 0700 hours.

I knew only that we had to try again to save people whose throats would be cut, regardless of politics and the rest. They asked me whether I agreed, and I answered that in principle I did, but let it immediately be sent to Vukovar, and if it agrees, there are no problems. Let Vukovar send a message with its fax machine to the Croatian Assembly, and because there are better connections from Vinkovci, we would send it out to the others.

[Kocijan] After the Indictment came the news about the open season "on the noble birds, the Hawk and the Phoenix," which was never made public over Croatian radio stations and television. Did you become aware at that point that the Supreme Command was attempting to liquidate you?

[Dedakovic] I do not know whether they wanted to liquidate me, but I suspected that I would be arrested. The Chetniks were coming, Martic's special police were also coming, but unfortunately so were the Croats. While the Chetniks were pursuing me, while KOS was pursuing me. The White Falcons, it was easy for me to fight them, they sent 37 of them specifically to kill me, but we killed them. I know that one group of Croats came, but I was untouchable for them and there was no theory about liquidating me or arresting me, and so the action was halted. That is why they waited until I came to Zagreb. I knew that I would be arrested here, but I never was an ostrich, and I won't be now. I have no reason to flee.

[Kocijan] When you were still in Vinkovci, you contacted Governor Cicin-Sain of the National Bank to check the status of the fund for aid to Vukovar.

[Dedakovic] I asked that the status of that fund be ascertained and for us to see where and for what that money was being spent. This was a request of Marin

"Bilog" Vidic, the government liaison. And at that point I obtained the overwhelming information that Petar Bosnjakovic and Bozidar Jukic had taken over the handling of that fund and that there was no control whatsoever either from the Assembly or from the government liaison or anyone.

My intention was to ascertain whether money was missing, so I asked the director of the bank to put a hold on that account. Then I called Bosnjakovic and Jukic, only Jukic responded, and I told him to write instructions to the effect that that account could not be used anymore. And he did write that. There was also an exchange of harsh words. I did not ascertain whether money was missing and how much of it had been withdrawn, because in the meantime I was arrested, and although perhaps I do not have the right to become involved in that, it interested me greatly as an individual.

[Kocijan] Did you receive aid from that fund?

[Dedakovic] No, not a dinar.

[Kocijan] You said that you have evidence that Susak diverted to Hercegovina the weapons for Vukovar?

[Dedakovic] Susak told me personally in front of some other people that Hercegovina must also have help. I said that I had nothing against that, but I asked him who needed help more now, Hercegovina or Vukovar?

On one occasion, I sent eight drivers I trusted to the Supreme Command for supplies, but when they got there, they were told they were not needed, and that they themselves would find drivers. Those eight tractor-trailer rigs never reached either Vinkovci or Vukovar. And then Susak told me that those trucks had gone to Hercegovina, and Vukovar received in return 500 M-48 rifles, from half of which the firing pin had been trimmed. There are documents.

The Finance Ministry allocated $17 million to purchase weapons for Vukovar, and, if necessary, even more. There is a document to that effect which I have seen with my own eyes. Pero Bosnjakovic, a deputy, came to Vinkovci and brought some optical devices. Then he said, "So you see that Mr. Jukic is at work, and now things will work." But that was all I ever got from those $17 million.

[Kocijan] What about the story of the misuse of 2 million dinars of the National Bank?

[Dedakovic] They allocated those 2 million as aid to Vukovar and put it in an account for the reconstruction of Vukovar. That money was needed in Vinkovci for distribution to the fighters who had been breaking through from Vukovar. There was no money, and I had to give the men whatever I had for him and the family. I could not leave him on the street. We gave every fighter 50,000 dinars, and when no more was left, 20,000 dinars. The money did not mean anything to those who were fighting, but it meant something to their families. But let me get back to Cicin-Sain. When I came to Zagreb that time, I told the bank director: "Please, that money needs to be withdrawn and taken urgently to Vinkovci."

I showed Cicin-Sain's letter to her in which he informed me that I had received that money, and she transferred the money to my account, and we immediately withdrew it. In the meantime, Jukic arrived and at my request gave another 600,000, and we turned all that over to Majo to take to the little Hawk in Vinkovci. I told Jukic to ask Minister Martinovic for the 3 million he had promised and which were urgently necessary, but not to give them to me, but to authorize Borkovic, who is in Vinkovci. But "little Hawk" Borkovic did not want to receive that money, so that it was sent back to Zagreb and turned over to the Vukovar Club for distribution when the fighters arrived. There are documents on that.

[Kocijan] What happened when Mercep came to your headquarters in Vinkovci?

[Dedakovic] Mercep came at a time when the breakthrough was being planned, on the 12th and 13th. He interrupted in his particular style and said, "Tomorrow, I will be in Vukovar with my men."

When he told me that, it was clear to me that nothing would come of the breakthrough. I showed him where the artillery guns were, where the tanks were, where everything was, and I proposed to him that he and his people move from the left flank along the Vuka and strike from the flank at Marinci. While another group would strike from the other flank via Djeletovci, and a third head on, and all of this supported by artillery. His group had to pass alongside a minefield, but he said that was out of the question. When I saw that he was going to be arrogant, I told him straight out: "Mr. Mercep, I am the commander here, and what I say goes." However, Mercep said that he would do as he pleased, and he went off to Osijek. In any case, I wrote to the Supreme Command that the breakthrough which we were working on at their command was political rather than military. They sent me one brigade, 800 of whose men arrived, while 400 fled. That was a political breakthrough. But at that time both I and Vukovar were drowning men, and so we tried even that. We had success, but it seems that we lacked the strength, we lacked the ammunition. There is a document about that as well.

In the meantime, Spegelj telephoned me from Osijek and said that people wanted to see me. I told him to come to Vinkovci, but he asked for us to meet in Djakovo. That seemed illogical to me, and I told him that Vukovar and Nijemci were hanging by a thread and that there was no time and it made no sense for us to meet in Djakovo. All he said in answer to that was "Fine." After that, I called General Tus and explained everything to him, and he told me not to go anywhere and that I was needed more in Vinkovci. There is a document on that.

[Kocijan] What was your removal like?

[Dedakovic] Gen. Stipetic came and told me I had to go to Zagreb, but he allowed me to remain at that breakthrough on his responsibility. He did not tell me the reason, but Vesna Bosanac had already told me that I was to be transferred to a higher post in the Supreme Command. I also received a written order on transfer to the new post in Zagreb. We exchanged command on the 15th, I went to Vinkovci on the morning of the 16th, and on the 20th I was arrested.

[Kocijan] What is the truth about the ban on evacuation of civilians from Vukovar?

[Dedakovic] After the enemy had already begun to enter Vukovar and reached the bridge over the Vuka, I personally called upon the president and said that policy and he personally should do everything to save the lives of the population. The president told me that evacuation was out of the question, to which I answered: "I did not even ask that of you. I said to save their lives, but in what manner and how, you are the president, you know."

[Kocijan] How do you interpret the rather reserved statements of the people you fought with such as Vesna Bosanac, Esterajher...?

[Dedakovic] I think that the statements they made were in order; however, it is certain that everyone was frightened. I do not know whether the government is putting on pressure, but those people are all smart enough to say little and at the same time say a lot.

[Kocijan] Do you believe that Vukovar was sold out?

[Dedakovic] I know for certain that Croatia did not do what it could have for Vukovar, and that is the fact. It is not true that no more could have been done. Vukovar would not even have fallen, and the picture on the eastern Slavonian battlefield would have been quite different, and now we would be in the phase of driving them to Sid. Time will show whether games were being played. I have my own opinion, but I am a professional soldier, and I am not going to guess.

[Kocijan] Are people making use of the fact that you passed over to the Croatian side late?

[Dedakovic] I have heard about such statements, even from the president himself, but the truth is that back in July my daughter carried away from the Command of the 5th Army so much valuable data, which she took to the Supreme Command, and on that basis it knew of many actions before they were undertaken. It is true that I turned over everything I knew concerning storage facilities, units, people, and so on, and I spelled it out: "this one you can win over, this one you will have to kill if you want to win him over, this is how you capture this garrison." The notes exist, and that dates back before I came to the Croatian army. I publicly left the Army only after someone in the Labrador Group said in conversation that he knew who I was working for. That was when I left, and I never went back.

[Kocijan] And your ties to Paraga?

[Dedakovic] I had also been in contact with Budisa, I had ties with Vujic and with Tudjman, the Veselicas, with the Canadians, the Australians. I have had contacts with Genscher. We talked through intermediaries about the recognition of Croatia, about weapons.... But no one asked what kind of contacts those were. But at one point a chapter of the HSP [Croatian Rights Party] was formed in Djakovo, and on that occasion, at their request, I received Mr. Paraga, as I did all the other politicians. I did not want to talk about politics, neither did Paraga.

I told him that I was interested in whether he could send me men and weapons, except that I would be their only commander and that he would have no power over them so long as they were under my command. He agreed to that.

[Kocijan] How do you interpret everything that has happened to you this past week?

[Dedakovic] I am not so well informed that I can understand all that, but I know for certain that I as a person was a bother because of certain things. They had to find a scapegoat for all the abominations of Vukovar, and the most painless thing was to blame the Hawk, who along the way had allowed himself to become involved in high-level politics. However, they became entangled in something which no normal state nor normal statesman should have allowed. I am very and sincerely sorry about that.

Croatian Deserters, Draft Dodgers Among Refugees

92P20118A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
14 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Goran Moravcek: "Deserters and Draft Dodgers Blamed for Defeat on Front"]

[Text] Reka, 13 Jan—Among the 650,000 Croatian refugees are many men who should be serving in the Guard. Dr. Mate Granic, vice president of the Croatian government, asserts that at least 5,000 military conscripts from Zagreb are staying in Slovenia. About 800 young men from East Slavonia were recently turned away from the Opatija hotels, where they had sought shelter rather than go to the front in Vukovar or Vinkovci. People finally began to talk openly about a topic that was taboo only a short while ago, i.e., the Croatian deserters who retreated when there were several defeats at the fronts, especially in the Zadar hinterland and Dubrovnik. There are unconfirmed rumors that it is necessary to pay 3,000 German marks to escape from Dubrovnik on one of the three ships operating regularly between Dubrovnik and Reka. It is no secret in Zadar that many boys fled to Italy before war broke out. The defense commander of the Zadar sector, Colonel Josip Tulicic, maintains that the defeats on the front in the Zadar hinterland, particularly at Novigrad, occurred because the inhabitants left their positions without firing a single shot. Something similar happened two and a half months ago when the Serbian army occupied the Maslenica bridge in the village of Krusevo, which had been completely empty for almost four days. However, the Serbs were convinced that the inhabitants were

manning their posts. Cited as a real disgrace is the fall of Drnis, a town in the Sibenik hinterland, which approximately 16,000 people left helter-skelter; there were also many able-bodied young men among those fleeing. At today's news conference in Zagreb, the Zadar city officials publicly made excuses for the military losses in their area, but that did not console the Croatian public, which remained dissatisfied with the defense of certain regions.

Limited Human Rights in Republic Decried

92BA0388A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jan 92 pp 7-10

[Article by Marinko Culic: "Constitution in Wartime Trap"]

[Text] Consistently interpreting the Decree on Internal Affairs, the right to a fair trial is decided by any policeman, who can kill us even for a misdemeanor.

Are the Croats such an unruly and irresponsible people that they must be put kept in line through 30 strict, specially approved decrees? That question will probably be posed by anyone who simply reads through these decrees, to say nothing of those who become the target of any of them. For example, the ones that have already been publicly contested concerning "internal affairs during a state of war or an immediate threat to the independence of a unified Republic of Croatia," in which Article 1 gives official persons "the right to detain without a warrant a person who disturbs or threatens public order and peace, or if necessary for reasons of security for no longer than six days, or for as long as reasons therefor exist."

In practical terms, pretrial detention becomes imprisonment under this decree, and even more than that, because it is known that a prison sentence of, say, two months lasts 60 days and not one day longer, while here it is not over when it is over, but rather when an official person says that it is over.

Nor does it say who enjoys this status of "official person"—whether it is only officials of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] or perhaps those of other armed formations as well, who in any event have all been placed under the wing of that ministry. But this means that practically any uniformed person can stop any other person in civilian attire and "detain" him, in theory, for as long as he pleases. The truth is that one can assume that people in uniform will not behave that arrogantly towards people not in uniform, but this is only an assumption, because nowhere does the decree mention the possibility that official persons might make a mistake and later be held accountable for it.

But There Is No State of War

Thus, they can do whatever they want, as the Croatian opposition—around which the circle of powerlessness to speak out about anything in a timely fashion has been closing for some time now—has discovered with astonishment.

The day after the latest Assembly session, at which the opposition hardly muttered a word against the presidential decrees, the opposition acknowledged this for the first time—but once again with its standard tardiness. It is said that the representatives of the opposition in the Assembly are victims of their own "mental blockade," because they have postponed the burning question of a democratic system, with the excuse that "now is not the right time," for so long that it may already be too late for anything. Croatia is on its way to ending up as a "totalitarian state," it is said, and if the opposition continues to remain silent, then this will happen very quickly. This is why proceedings were announced to establish the constitutionality of the decrees, so that they can be revoked or modified.

Perhaps because of this sluggishness by the opposition, this "return to totalitarianism" has not even been accompanied that much innovativeness in avoiding at least that which until recently was considered stereotypical of autocratic rule. Silvije Degen, the lawyer who defended the Virovitica group before the military court in Zagreb with an argument enthusiastically accepted by everyone at the time—that military courts cannot try civilians—is now throwing up her hands in consternation at the fact that one of the presidential decrees is quietly reviving these courts. To be sure, the setting up of military courts and their jurisdiction over civilians is linked to the existence of a "state of war or immediate threat" to Croatia, but this is also the first weak link through which the opposition can challenge the constitutionality of this and other presidential decrees. Specifically, neither a state of war nor an immediate threat has been officially declared, while all the decrees that have been approved seem to suppose that such an action has been taken.

Naturally, the most important thing is that the consequences are far from being simply legally controversial, because they are also controversial in terms of preserving elementary liberties, since in practical terms such liberties are deprived of the protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

Even Vladimir Seks acknowledged this at last week's session of the Assembly, even though his intentions—at least we assume—were quite the opposite. He told opponents of the decrees that civil liberties can be restricted on the basis of a declaration of war (Article 17 of the Constitution), but since officially there is no state of war, as we have noted, Seks simply revealed that such rights are restricted—contrary to the Constitution.

Jurists know that what seem at first glance to be small flaws in the writing of a law can in practice degenerate into autocracy by those who approve it. At least 10 people from the Croatian state leadership can attest to this from their own experience, because they have ended

up behind bars due to a few lines in the Criminal Code, which were nevertheless effective enough to keep the prisons filled. This relates to the well-known articles of the Criminal Code dealing with the so-called verbal offense and activities against "the foundations of the system," which inspired so much odium that they were practically ignored even by the former government.

Now, however, the famous Article 133 of the Yugoslav Criminal Code has met its match in Article 197 of the Croatian Criminal Code, while the "void" that emerged through the deletion of the provision on protecting the foundations of the system is being filled by presidential decrees. First of all by the one about military courts, and then by the one that, in advance, levels charges against responsible persons based on activities through which "disorder can emerge" in the job where they work.

Under this decree, there are practically no innocent people or, to be more precise, the innocence of every citizen becomes something that must in fact be proven, generally on the basis of criteria unknown to the accused. The aforementioned Article 17 of the Criminal Code applies the force of law to those who spread reports "that are known" to be untrue. But since one knows neither who knows it nor how they know it, an anonymous guardian of the sole truth is introduced into the administration of justice, and one can only guess who that is, although the well-known structure ("it is known") is perhaps an indication of who this is.

Everything Is Actionable

This impersonal nature of judicial power and the absence of clear criteria according to which civil liberties are restricted could also be a potential source of extreme manipulation. During the Gulf war, wartime censorship in the United States was unmistakably rigorous, but people knew the basis on which it was implemented (censored text was presented to the public as such, so that the reader could approach it differently than uncensored text).

In our country, a special body responsible for "the protection of the freedom of public communication" is being introduced through the presidential decree on information, but nowhere does it say whether this signifies a suspension of the authorities of the existing bodies (the Ministry of Information, which is also nothing more than an atavism), nor is it clear whether the adoption of the decree means a suspension of the freedoms guaranteed by the law on information.

The result is that something that was ordinary news until yesterday can be "false information" today, while what used to be commentary is now "libel," because practically everything has become actionable. As Degen says, "only the government is allowed to commit illegal acts."

Degen sees this government arbitrariness in certain situations as a rift between ordinary people and those who hold some sort of state job, even a lowly one. Because "discretionary judgment and the right to a fair trial are decided by the most ordinary policeman according to his own criteria, and he can even kill us for a misdemeanor." (Article 5 of the Decree on Internal Affairs formulates this as follows: "Authorized official persons can use firearms, except in the cases noted in Article 42 of the Law on Internal Affairs, if they are unable to prevent the escape of persons caught in the act of committing a criminal act for which a prison sentence is stipulated, persons who are under arrest, and persons for which an arrest warrant has been issued.") Degen concludes logically that with provisions such as these, the abolition of capital punishment becomes simply words on a piece of paper.

This almost incomprehensible rigidity also permeates parts of the presidential decrees that do not regulate such dangerous situations, so that the Decree on Internal Affairs stipulates that for a "violation of job discipline" the transgressor can be "deprived of his title."

It does not say what kind and how much of a violation is necessary for such a drastic punishment, but even this comes as no surprise since the Decree on Labor Relations stipulates that a worker, even without committing any violation, can be "assigned to another job, or from one job to another." All that is necessary is that his superiors deem that it is in "the interest of the process of labor through which a contribution is made to the defense of the Republic of Croatia," while the fact that the worker may not be in agreement with this sort of moving around does not give him any sort of right to object or complain.

President's Speeches Not Discussed

Is there anything, even the brutal war against Croatia, that can justify this sort of power over human lives? At a coordinating meeting of the opposition parties, Ivica Percan (SDP [Party of Democratic Changes]) agreed that the legal system cannot remain the same under wartime conditions as it is during peacetime, but he says that there are indications that this new system will "be used in the political struggle and to create an authoritarian system during the period after the wartime conditions." Something else can probably be added to this warning, and it is that the system in question has been adopted during a time when there is still no official state of war. In that case, what can we expect if that suddenly comes to pass? Will the spirit of "creeping militarization" lurking behind the present-day decrees break free of all controls and be transformed into an "unbending law" of complete autocracy, about which the opposition and parliament will not even be able to complain, as they can today? When it was noted at the last session of the Assembly that the parts of the decrees that encroach on human liberties must be approved by a two-thirds majority, as stipulated by Article 17 of the Constitution, this point was passed over almost as if nothing had been said.

Through that very action, another decree was added to the list of approved decrees: The Assembly itself was

stripped of some of the rights accorded it by the Constitution. This happened, after all, in part because of the way in which all the other decrees were approved—without the knowledge of the Assembly, and only with subsequent parliamentary confirmation, even though the Constitution provides for such a situation only when the Assembly cannot meet. The Assembly, however, could meet, and moreover did meet, but the decrees were adopted before or after their session, which means that not one of them was debated and voted on in parliament. But even if everything had been in order in terms of form, the fact remains that almost from the outset the Assembly has endured the consequences of a minimalist reading of the Constitution and of the rights that it accords parliament. This was perhaps best seen in the report presented by the president of the republic, when it was said that the Constitution does not provide for debate on speeches by the president. It is true that the Constitution does not provide for debate, but it does not exclude it either, and since it is a basic precept that everything should be allowed that is not explicitly restricted, it is obvious that the Constitution has fallen into the hands of interpreters who are beneath it, at least in the parts in question. If that is how the Constitution is treated, then just how will things stand with application of the decrees, which are lying in ambush with prohibitions and threats from all sides? Some of them—the one on information, for example—have long since been in force, but have not been applied, as far as we know. Do they believe that the mere act of adopting it will act as a sufficient preventative "warning" and ensure that the media will be "like they should be"? Or perhaps they are waiting for a time when it may be necessary to officially declare a state of war? In any event, it is hard to believe that the decrees were adopted just as they are, that the "paper is ink-stained."

After all, even if this is the case, their very adoption seems to have already provoked rather unnecessary excitement here at home. But the reaction from the world, which even without this has issued rather sharp, and in some cases almost insulting, warnings to us, can be surmised without illusions.

[Box, p 8]

Assembly Vice President Vladimir Seks: It's All a Matter of Interpretation

If the Constitution allows for a restriction of freedoms, then how can that be declared unconstitutional?

Concerning the fact that even following the Assembly session, the opposition has stuck to its criticism that the decrees of the president of the republic are unconstitutional, we asked Assembly Vice President Vladimir Seks whether he had anything to add in defense of the decrees that he submitted to the deputies.

[Seks] I can only reiterate that such comments stand up neither in principle nor in terms of details. The entire enigma is solved by Article 17 of the Constitution, which states clearly that in the event of a state of war or an immediate threat to the republic, some rights and liberties can be restricted. This is not some sort of exceptional provision; just look at any constitution of a democratic country, be it Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, or France, to name only a few, and they all have it. The only difference is the term "state of war," which some call a threat to the nation, from other nations, third states, but the essential thing is that all of them allow for the possibility of a temporary restriction of liberties, and no one treats this as a violation of the Constitution. Thus, in our case as well there is no reason whatsoever, if the Constitution itself permits the restriction of liberties, to then declare this unconstitutional. How can the Constitution be in disagreement with itself? The opportunity for this or that sort of decisionmaking about such measures is a different matter.

[DANAS] The opposition contends that the vote should been by a two-thirds majority, as the Constitution in fact demands.

[Seks] True, that provision does exist. However, people are forgetting that that article of the Constitution was based on a standard, Article 4 of the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, which also provides for restrictions, and even the suspension of some rights and liberties under wartime conditions. You have the same thing in the 1950 European Declaration on the Rights and Liberties of Man, which means that we have agreement with two fundamental documents from international law, from which we have then implicitly assumed certain rights that cannot be restricted, even in time of war (the right to life, freedom of conscience and religion, the right to legal individuality; there are prohibitions on torture and inhuman degradation, as well as slavery and situations resembling slavery, and so forth).

[DANAS] You did not mention the two-thirds majority requirement, which remains despite all that.

[Seks] This is obviously a point of disagreement, because the Constitution stipulates that such measures be adopted by the Assembly by a two-thirds majority, or by the president of the republic if the Assembly cannot meet.

[DANAS] Does that mean that the Assembly votes with a two-thirds majority only if it itself is enacting such decisions, but by a simple majority when confirming a decision by the president of the republic?

[Seks] That is arguable. If you read Article 17 of the Constitution, you see that there is one possibility, but also another one. In certain cases, you have situations that must be resolved through established constitutional practices, and perhaps this is one of them.

[DANAS] What do you have to say to criticism that the president should not have issued these decrees because it was possible for the Assembly to meet?

[Seks] Here too people are jumping to conclusions. The Constitution does not say that the president issues decrees

independently whenever the Assembly is physically prevented from meeting, but rather whenever the president judges that at a given moment it is necessary to make such decisions and the Assembly is not convening on that day. It is theoretically possible for the Assembly to convene, but the president deemed it necessary to make some sort of decision like this the day before, because it was not possible to postpone things, even for such a short period of time. Therefore, the opportunity for this sort of presidential assessment is once again a different matter, as is the trust of the Assembly that the president will not exploit these authorities to replace the regular legislative procedure. Finally, if the president of the republic were to misuse this right of his and change the entire legislative corpus, then the Assembly always has the opportunity of meeting and revoking such decisions.

[DANAS] What do you have to say about the charge that these decrees are leading us down the road to totalitarianism?

[Seks] If this were abused and if, say, the president of the republic had mental reservations about all this such that he would misuse his rights, then something like this would be possible. But in order for that to actually happen, there would have to be a halt in the activities of all the other constitutional factors, and that is not the case.

[Box, p 9]

Slobodan Budak, Member of the Presidency of the HNS [Croatian People's Party]: Cornerstone of a Police State

Why did President Tudjman not notify the world about the adoption of decrees that restrict human rights, which was his obligation under international conventions?

In recent months, the president of the republic has already issued around 30 so-called wartime decrees, in order to conform some of the most vital areas of state functioning to wartime needs and conditions. At the same time, a large number, if not the majority, of these decrees concern fundamental human rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, as cited in Articles 14 through 69. I would maintain energetically that this sort of radical intervention in human rights and liberties are not an expression of a necessary increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of a repressive state apparatus, but rather that they constitute the very successful laying of the cornerstone for a totalitarian police state.

Through its Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia, enacted on 25 June 1991 (although this was never proclaimed), the Assembly assumed the obligation to apply all international agreements to which it is a party, or rather those joined by the SFRY—insofar as they conform to the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. With regard to human rights, there are two such crucial pacts: the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights and the International Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, both ratified by the SFRY back in 1971. The contents of these pacts were incorporated into our Constitution.

Article 4 of the aforementioned International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, which Croatia, I repeat, has long observed, provides for the possibility that a signatory may find itself in a state of siege or war, and that it can be forced to suspend or restrict some of the obligations of the pact. But in that event it steadfastly stipulates that the signatory:

- Officially declare the existence of an "extraordinary public danger that threatens the survival of the nation,"
- Limit the restriction of rights and liberties to the needs of the situation,
- Immediately inform the other signatories, by way of the secretary-general of the United Nations, of the provisions that have been suspended and of the reasons for doing so.

Because the Croatian public is not aware of any situation where the Assembly has been unable to meet since the adoption of the new Croatian Constitution at the end of 1990, it follows that only the Assembly could decide on the suspension of or restrictions on human rights and liberties, and not the president (Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia). By issuing decrees in this regard, parts of which affect rights and liberties, President Tudjman has exceeded the authorities held by the president of the republic under the Constitution, usurping the right given to the "two-thirds majority of all deputies" to the Assembly.

Aside from the enactment of "wartime decrees," these (at least in a rule-of-law state) can be applied only if there is a state of war or emergency. This state must be declared, it must begin on a precisely specified date, and it must also end on a specified date. "Wartime decrees" should and can be applied only while this state is in effect, not before or after!

One special question is the scope of the restriction/suspension of human rights through "wartime decrees" and the removal of judicial supervision over the execution of the authorities granted to the police (civilian, military, and "secret") with respect to the population. Especially since we still have no institution of public defenders (which under Article 93 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia would protect the constitutional and legal rights of the citizens), while the Constitutional Court (in terms of the way in which justices run for office and are elected) does not inspire any hope that it could, on its own initiative, avail itself of its authority to initiate proceedings to judge the constitutionality and legality of provisions of the "wartime decrees."

[Box, p 10]

Ivica Racan, Chairman of the SDP: Open Door to Voluntarism

The decree can be applied even to those who are late for meetings.

Yes, we have been very critical of the decrees issued by the president of the republic, especially certain provisions contained in them.

We have pointed out a number of their lackings, concerning the formation and work of military prosecutors and military courts. Since it is unclear who all is considered military personnel, the question emerges of why the military courts must try cases concerning nonmilitary acts, such as slander, libel... We warned about the decree stipulating that military courts can try civilians, reminding everyone that the Croatian government and public have emphasized the civilizational irrelevance of this sort of trial of Croatian patriots by military courts of the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army].

We have pointed out that the Decree on Application of the Criminal Code does not involve its "application," but rather a typical addition to and change in the law. Specifically, new criminal acts and sanctions are introduced. For example, an official or responsible person can be imprisoned for up to 10 years for "unconscientious actions in the performance of his job" or "in the execution of established economic tasks"! A severe sentence, but it is not clearly defined who this "official or responsible person" is, what this "disturbance of the regular functioning of a job" is, and what these "established economic tasks" are, and who defines them. We have warned that these kinds of decrees open up the door to political voluntarism and arbitrariness!

In the halls of the Assembly, one could hear witty remarks to the effect that this sort of decree could also be applied to those among us who are guilty of tardiness in terms of the specified time when our sessions begin.

Finally, we also pointed out all sorts of controversial and unacceptable things in the Decree on the Application of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This relates to the competence of individual judges, to the stipulation of who all can be a defender, to a summary indictment without an inquiry, to arbitrariness concerning the way in which subpoenas are served, to the possibility of only a verbal order to bring someone in, to the length of pretrial detention, to the suspension of the possibility of objecting to an indictment, to the abandonment of the principles of directness in introducing evidence, to the impossibility of appeal to a higher court, etc. I would also point out that decrees like the one that allows officers of the military police to make arrests, i.e., to conduct investigations and prescribe confinement, open up the door to a police state.

The Republic of Croatia must strive to be a rule-of-law state even during war. Thus, we must heed our own Constitution and international documents and standards. In our opinion, these decrees contain provisions that from a legal and political standpoint restrict rights and disturb the legal security of the citizens of the Republic of Croatia, and thus open up the door to repressive and undemocratic actions by the police.

Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia stipulates that individual human liberties and rights guaranteed by the Constitution can be limited during a state of war. Based on this, Assembly Vice President Mr. Vladimir Seks, "on behalf of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]," "defended" these decrees in the Assembly, and simply declared our criticism of some of their provisions to be unfounded.

However, he neglected to quote the provision in the same, aforementioned article of the Constitution, stating that the Assembly shall decide on such restrictions through a two-thirds majority of all deputies, and that the president of the republic can do so only if the Assembly cannot meet.

Nor is it possible to omit the second "argument" in the condemnation, or even disqualification, of our critical remarks concerning the decrees in question. It was said in the Assembly, "on behalf of the HDZ," that these comments of ours cannot be accepted, because one could get the wrong impression that accepting them would mean crushing democracy...!? What kind of understanding of democracy is this if the silence of critics helps laws to be more democratic and acceptable?

The reputation of the Assembly and of democracy in Croatia is not destroyed by criticism of bad acts and policies, on the contrary. This reputation is destroyed by bad legal and political moves and by the absence of critical words about them.

Otherwise, our "young democracy" would be disturbingly young, or rather disturbingly old.

Deputy Economic Minister on Privatization Process

92BA0310C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 17 Dec 91 pp 16-17

[Interview with Jurica Pavelic, the new deputy prime minister for the economy, by Zeljko Ivankovic; place and date not given: "A Fifth Column in Enterprises"]

[Text] If it can be said of any program from the Croatian government that it is a wish list, which was the standard reproach at a time when people dared to reproach the old government for something, then this is true of the program presented in the last session of the Croatian Assembly by Jurica Pavelic, the new deputy prime minister for the economy. Nevertheless, objections from that quarter are the last thing to worry about, for reasons that have to do with the war and which therefore do not need any special explanation. Although his program was drawn up on the assumption that the war would be over by Christmas, it explicitly says that the state of a war

economy will last beyond that date, which means that this program does contain a sense of reality. There has already been talk in the Assembly about price controls; now control of personal wages and salaries with progressive taxation is being announced, certainly not unrelated to the program, and a specific part of Pavelic's presentation was devoted to the attitude toward international financial institutions, the government deficit, incentives for exporters.... Pavelic has a reputation as a business executive in Zagreb, at one time he was director of Eksportdrvo, and for many years he represented that enterprise in the United States. It was when he was chosen deputy prime minister that SLOBODNI TJEDNIK published the information that during his directorship he was purchasing lasers for the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. Whether this was someone's attempt, not necessarily that of SLOBODNI TJEDNIK, to bring down the minister before he even took office is a mere rhetorical question. As far as we know, no one paid any attention to that article, and most probably they did so rightly. After Zdravko Mrsic left the government, Pavelic took over the Agency for Restructuring the Economy. We conducted the interview before he became deputy prime minister, suspecting that this would happen, but in part we concentrated precisely on the problem of privatization of public property, the question of government influence on the economy, on banking, and so forth.

Incidentally, a recent group of business executives in the Economic Chamber confirmed that these are the key issues in spite of the war. Or precisely because of the war. After all, the war can be financed only by a strong economy, and it anticipates a strong thrust that will strengthen it from the transformation of property. We began with a question about how satisfied Pavelic is with the present Law on Transformation.

[Pavelic] It is worth saying that regardless of whether the law is good or bad, we unfortunately still do not have a strategic concept of the economic development of Croatia as a sovereign state, and without that the law itself will not provide answers to all the questions. The advanced countries of the world have been building a certain combination of the government and the market for 100 years now, and in that context an entire number of institutions and codes that afford relatively unhindered development of the market economy as the dominant element, and, of course, rates of growth and prosperity in those countries. So, the transformation of property must by no means consist of cosmetic alterations and all kinds of reforms like those we have had until recently. But unless we have a strategic concept of development, it could therefore happen that that transformation, which differs essentially from privatization, will end up as just another reform without full results.

But I should mention that transformation, which has a time limit of 30 June 1992, differs from privatization, although there is a possibility of conducting privatization at the same time through well-known models. However, the experience of the Eastern countries in which there has not been the devastation of war that there has been in Croatia confirms that the process of privatization is extremely difficult and painful, far from those expectations with which it was initiated.

And the governments of those East European countries are increasingly inclined to a step-by-step process instead of rapid large-scale privatization, anticipating that in this way they will learn something, that in the meantime they will also restructure some portion of the economy that is government-owned, and there will be additional capital to help in the recovery. In any case, that is what is done by the most advanced countries, they give financial aid to threatened segments of their economy because of social welfare problems and unemployment.

I would like to mention, for example, that Great Britain has privatized government property; certainly, there was greater purchasing power, a greater interest, a more highly developed market for capital...and yet it took Mrs. Margaret Thatcher nine years to privatize 10 percent of the government property. And we in Croatia have an obligation, after 10 years of serious crisis, and now with the devastation of the war, to carry out a transformation of ownership, and then, when the war is over, to undertake renewal of a ruined country.

[Ivankovic] You are also director of the Croatian Development Fund, which also has a share in privatization.

[Pavelic] The Croatian fund is a holding company, and that is what it will remain, and in no case will a single dinar from the sale of a share go into the government budget. That is another essential difference from government ownership. Accordingly, there is no doubt whatsoever that regardless of all the criticism, because of the war and the modest purchasing power of those who are interested, public property might automatically end up as property of the Croatian fund. Unfortunately, the chances of something like that happening are very high. But we need not run away from that, because the process of transformation is inevitable. How successful the state and its fund will be is a big question. But it is my opinion that this cannot happen without such institutions: without the old-age insurance fund, the banks, and holding companies that would be a kind of middleman. So, these funds would be the predecessors of those institutions which could control processes in enterprises, monitor their growth and development, monitor the market for capital and see which enterprise to invest in, where to buy an additional share of stock, where to sell in order to protect the capital of their founders.

[Ivankovic] How do you look on the possibility of speeding up the process of privatization by starting up private enterprises, and then having them influence a change in the structure of the Croatian economy?

[Pavelic] According to recent figures, Croatia has 3,619 enterprises in the socialized sector and now more than 14,000 private enterprises. The problem is not in the number of private enterprises, but in their capacity and share in the republic's social product. They are still

under 5 percent of the republic's social product, while socialized enterprises represent 95 percent. And those socialized enterprises are in an extremely difficult position. Not only because of the war, but also because of the change in the system, they are being held captive; yesterday, they had the plan, they had documents, they had the party, and they had the opcina leaders who could give advice; now they no longer have any of that. So, they have been left to themselves. And erosion of the economy has both objective and subjective reasons in this case. You cannot just say that we have changed the system, but we also have to reinforce and build the infrastructure of that system, all those institutional codes and standards so that the economy can do business more or less normally. But when that is built, the problem will have to be solved at the same time of how to restructure those enterprises in terms of capital, technology, and organization, so that they are competitive both on the domestic market and also on the world market.

[Ivankovic] The Agency for Restructuring has the possibility of establishing a management board in enterprises in order to protect socialized capital and carry out the process of privatization. How happy are the enterprises about the introduction of managing boards?

[Pavelic] There are more than 100 of them. In most enterprises, they themselves ask that the managing board be created, and in most cases, in spite of all the difficulties, they are performing their task in some fashion. There are three essential criteria. One is losses, which perhaps could be offset in some other way, the second is illiquidity and insolvency, and the third is disrupted relations. I agree that this third criterion is very flexible and there ought not to be that kind of criterion in a piece of legislation. Nevertheless, it does make a certain amount of sense, because when that law was adopted the signs of the war and of this state of affairs were already there.

[Ivankovic] Does that mean that there was a fifth column in the enterprises?

[Pavelic] Unfortunately, yes.

[Ivankovic] Recently, even the banks have become actively involved in restructuring the economy by buying enterprises which have gone into bankruptcy.

[Pavelic] It is a fact that the banks have already purchased or are purchasing bankrupt enterprises, but that is a specific procedure. Bankruptcy proceedings in the Western world have their own legal and economic content. Bankruptcy is the last measure, but it need not mean liquidation. The banks, as the largest creditors, dictate the condition to other creditors and pay certain bankruptcy claims to them. They become the sole creditor and then they do what amounts to turning their claims as a creditor into a share, a 100-percent share of that enterprise. The question of price is a matter for agreement among creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. In a sense, transformation is carried out in this way. Now that enterprise has an owner. However, the question is whether the bank, which has now become the sole creditor, or, at the second step the exclusive owner, is able to initiate new activity in that enterprise? To choose the right management, to exert influence on a program which will be oriented toward the market, and above all provide fresh money to get new production going.

[Ivankovic] I have gotten the impression from this process and also from certain other things that Croatia is oriented toward protecting the banks.

[Pavelic] The present arrangement has ties to the government. However, it is another matter if you are talking about the problem of restructuring the banks and the economy. Bonds have been issued that will be charged to the government budget and future public debt in order to restore the banks to health, because the banks as creditors have experienced the greatest problem in their balance sheets, because they continue to carry lendings in their assets which actually represented losses in enterprises. And in order to make it possible to overcome those losses, the government issued bonds so that the banks could get rid of those assets of theirs which had been carried over and could change the structure on their balance sheet, because the situation now is that one-third of the assets in Croatian banking must finance all the liabilities, and as a rule they are an outside source. Regardless of whether the banks have really become joint stock companies, but have adapted, that share capital in total sources and liabilities of the banks does not average even 20 percent. All the rest consists of outside sources, either the savings of individuals or credits of other banks and financial institutions, or I do not know what sources abroad. The assets, which are contaminated and are carried as loans are actually a loss, and one-third of the assets, those liquid assets, must finance and pay for the entire sources of funds from outside. It is because of all of this that interest rates are so high in our banks, several times higher than in the advanced countries. It was not possible to wait for some kind of early recovery of these entities and then to prepare the infrastructure, both for banking and finance, for a relatively normal life. The government adopted the only possible measure, patterned after the German model, of restructuring the banks and replacing those contaminated assets with bonds.

[Ivankovic] At one time, there was immense pressure on the development fund, because, after the old socialist custom, it was called upon even to pay wages and salaries of the enterprises.

[Pavelic] That pressure exists even now and actually is still greater because of the reconstruction and the monitoring of projects which were not destroyed and certain development programs. However, the fund has de facto lost all of the sources it had until recently. Both that 0.82 percent of the income paid by socialized enterprises and the 0.4 percent from the social product of socialized enterprises for the agroindustrial complex. Back on 31 December 1990, appropriations ceased for the underdeveloped parts of Croatia. Accordingly, all sources which

up until that time were earmarked for the fund have dried up, and the only remaining source lies in the future portfolio of stocks which the fund as owner must sell on the market and again transform them into development programs either of those same enterprises or other entities, private or with mixed ownership.

Since its foundation, the fund has collected 2.5 billion dinars from the sources it had until that time, but it actually has loaned out most of that. The big question is whether it has gone to the right enterprises, but believe me, at that time, I am not defending my predecessors, when they were facing all these dilemmas we have already been talking about, when the Law on Transformation was being prepared, when the very conception was being developed, when the new government was trying to influence transformation of the political and economic system, at that time those same socialized enterprises were requesting help, sources of funds, no one supposed that war would break out. We anticipated and began to prepare for yet another normal tourist season, and so on. Those enterprises needed working capital, because, as we have said, it was expensive from the banks, inaccessible, and so on; agriculture needed it for planting, and needed it at a particular time, they could get the money later, but that would be late. The fund put out the money in the form of short-term loans which had to be repaid. In the meantime, the development program had to be shaped and the fund had to monitor exclusively those enterprises with a well-known figurehead, small enterprises just starting up that had attractive programs and which individually were not applying for very much money.

So far, the fund has taken applications in an amount exceeding 4.5 billion, and in the meantime it has lent out what it has received. But because of the devastation, because the season never happened, no one is able to repay the money, everyone is requesting postponement. Now there could be a moratorium of a year or six months at least until we see whether the war will end, when it will end, so that those enterprises could first be rebuilt, so that they could produce normally and then begin to repay the debts. In addition, the fund has left a small share of the resources, it does not exceed even 100 million dinars, for final revision of the programs of a certain number of private enterprises. And you can imagine what 100 million amounts to compared to applications amounting to 4.5 billion in these current prices. Of those 4.5 billion, which is the total value of the investment programs, they were seeking 2.5 billion from the fund, but it has 100 million available.

Croatian Bank Governor on Success of New Dinar

92BA0354C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 31 Dec 91 pp 26-28

[Interview with Dr. Ante Cicin-Sain, governor of the National Bank of Croatia, by Ivo Jakovljevic; place and date not given: "The Croatian Dinar Must Succeed"—first paragraph is DANAS headline]

[Text] The governor of the National Bank of Croatia will not print money in unlimited quantities, as the "masters from Topcider" are doing.

Exactly at midmight between 22 and 23 December in the war year 1991, Croatia left the Yugoslav monetary union and the Yugoslav dinar as its currency in order for the Croatian dinar to be born next, formally-legally, in the first seconds of last Monday, as the temporary currency of the politically already independent Republic of Croatia. Several months will pass until the complete monetary independence of Croatia from the former SFRJ, in the course of which lasting peace and Croatia's sovereignty on the whole territory must be established on its soil. At the same time the process of separating must end, with an equitable distribution of federal property, debts, and claims, and full international recognition of the new states on Yugoslav soil must be consolidated on this basis. In accordance with this broad historical transformation of Yugoslavia, not only from a one-party to a multiparty political system and from a nonmarket to a market economy, one open to the world, but also from a monetary and customs union (within the framework of the SFRJ) into an independent economic whole with its own, but a convertible, currency, the Croatian dinar is conceived of as a quite transitional, temporary solution.

Whether the Republic of Croatia will have its Croatian kruna as a permanent convertible currency as early as 1994 or only in 2001 or in one of the years between these anticipated extremes depends on how and when Croatia itself will fulfill all general and special conditions for the promotion of this same Croatian kruna. In general, Croatia must primarily attain full and actual international recognition on this path, and next membership with full rights in the International Monetary Fund and other world and European financial institutions. But, in addition to these conditions, a transition must be made from the war economy and depression to rebuilding and a new developmental cycle, there must be a positive balance of payments with foreign countries for a long series of years (at least five), and appropriate foreign exchange reserves must be created (at least one billion dollars).

Nevertheless, although Croatia is at war and still without the basic conditions for the promotion of its own dinar, the Republic of Croatia entered into this risky operation last Monday, choosing the least among greater evils. The main reasons for abandoning the Yugoslav dinar are reduced to four facts: the complete disintegration of the SFRJ as a national society, the war and the aggression of Serbia and the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] against Croatia, a loss of oversight of the primary issuance of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, which prints the dinar, and threatening hyperinflation because of the enormous printing of money in Belgrade in order to finance the aggression against Croatia. But, Croatia has not decided to transfer, under war conditions, to a so-called war money, or even to a quasi-money, i.e., coupons, as they did in Slovenia, but chose a Croatian dinar as a temporary currency for an unspecified time.

In theory and practice, Croatia had five possible solutions at its disposal for the process of becoming monetarily independent, but did not decide on a single one of them. Therefore, it rejected the variation of fiduciary money (because it does not have great foreign exchange reserves), then the variation of convertible money (because it does not yet fulfill a single one of the basic conditions), and the variation of accepting the German mark as Croatian currency (because of the consequences of the simultaneous implementation of a strict monetary policy by the Bundesbank, expensive money under war circumstances), as well as the establishment of the Monetary Administration, which would engage only in the issuance of banknotes, and not in the other functions of a central bank, whose banknotes would have to have 100-percent coverage in some foreign currency. Finally, the variation of the establishment of a so-called parallel money was also dropped, especially after the Slovenes "hurried with coupons," since many experts wrote it off under such circumstances as "pure adventurism."

Therefore, Croatia decided on its own way to monetary independence, with the aid of the Croatian dinar as a temporary currency, which will have coverage in goods and services produced, and it will also receive strong support in a stingy monetary policy and in realistic-positive interest rates. The degree of restrictiveness on the Croatian printing house for money (on the ledger and in cash) will depend on the duration of the war, but above all on Croatian exports and international humanitarian and financial assistance. Thus the Croatian dinar is conceived of as a currency that will change in a short time from its earlier beginnings to a much more stable currency than the Serbian dinar and the future Slovene tolar. We obtained further assessments about the future of the Croatian dinar in a conversation with the governor of the National Bank of Croatia, Dr. Ante Cicin-Sain, a monetary specialist who participated directly in its design and promotion and is most responsible for its eventual success or failure.

[Jakovljevic] What really happened in Croatia, exactly at midnight, on the transition from 22 to 23 December, that was historical for the monetary plan?

[Cicin-Sain] Formally, the Decree on the National Bank of Croatia, which the Government of the Republic of Croatia passed—in content—as the Law on an Independent National Bank of Croatia back on 8 October, became fully effective at that moment. Actually, the Republic of Croatia obtained its own central bank, its monetary authority, which issues its own money. Under this Decree the Croatian dinar was designated a temporary currency up to the time when the Republic of Croatia will have the Croatian kruna, divided into 100 banicas, as its permanent convertible currency. At the same time it began replacing Yugoslav dinars with Croatian dinars at a ratio of 1:1, a payments exchange with other republics is being organized, and all foreign exchange savings of citizens as of 27 April 1991 are being converted into a public debt of the republic. With this a long chain of historical changes in the monetary plan, which has good chances of becoming a successful project, were only launched "exactly at midnight."

[Jakovljevic] Several days before 23 December, a new middle rate of exchange for the Croatian dinar was established in the Zagreb Bank, for example, with a parity of 55 dinars for one German mark; this was a special type of devaluation of the (Yugoslav) dinar of 16 percent. Was a permanent rate of exchange for the Croatian dinar fixed in this way or has a new series of its increasing devaluations been announced?

[Cicin-Sain] The financial books in business banks will retain a 100-percent rate of exchange of 13 dinars for one German mark right up to 31 December 1991, and change only on the first business day in January to the new Croatian dinar and its parity to the German mark of a probable 55 dinars. Namely, we decided that, in the last days of December, the banks themselves would certify the cited rate of exchange for the Croatian dinar against all convertible currencies (taken from the parity against the German mark). I assume that we will keep such a rate of exchange up to the beginning of April. If we by some chance had promoted this new rate of exchange on 23 December, quite a number of Croatian banks could have closed their doors. Thus we avoided that calendar and bookkeeping trap, and started the new year with a Croatian dinar without additional mortgages.

[Jakovljevic] Does this mean that nothing is essentially changing for now in the Croatian foreign exchange system?

[Cicin-Sain] Theory teaches us, and world experience points to the fact that in a small country like Croatia, the mechanism of the rate of exchange is not suitable for great maneuvers in economic policy. Thus a system of fixed rates of exchange is recommended for smaller countries, which have a relatively large share of foreign exchange in the gross product. But, such a rate of exchange system can be maintained over a long period by some smaller, but much more developed countries, but not Croatia, which, along with all its economic difficulties in the war, is subjected to Serbian aggression and growing defense costs. Thus we decided on the Croatian dinar as a temporary currency, which will maintain parity with the German mark and, from time to time, be adapted to differences in rates of inflation between the Croatian economy and inflation rates in countries that are the principal foreign trade and financial partners of Croatia.

On a technical level, the National Bank of Croatia will fix the rate of exchange daily according to the German mark (trying for the beginning not to change for at least 100 days), in order for the rates of exchange for all other currencies to be specially fixed in every business bank next, according to supply and demand and intercurrency relationships on world exchanges. The rate of exchange for the Croatian dinar against the Slovene coupons will be kept at a ratio of 1:1, whereby a balance in purchasing

power between Slovene and Croatian citizens, which was destroyed back in October, will again be established.

[Jakovljevic] Will the Croatian dinar be sought in so-called crisis areas in Croatia, in Knin, or Ilok, for example? Will it extend to the broad zone of the former Yugoslav economic territory?

[Cicin-Sain] History attests that the fate of currencies and their spread are often not the consequence of political decisions by individual governments or of legal norms, but of actual economic life, which is more permanent than many governments. To that extent it is happening today that the German mark is ruling the greater part of the markets of the East European countries, as well as on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, although this is not written as a measure or intention on a single paper of the Bundesbank or the National Bank of Croatia.

Thus the Croatian dinar, if it becomes a stable and healthy currency, will cross all political borders on the broader Yugoslav territory, and it is possible that it will soon reach Knin, maybe even before it is liberated from the occupiers and Chetnik terrorists. It is also possible that, with the development of the Slovene-Croatian market, it will be increasingly sought on the Slovene market as well, as it will probably be a well-regarded currency both in Hercegovina and in a number of other areas.

[Jakovljevic] If the Croatian dinar has good chances for lasting success, why isn't it already called the Croatian kruna?

[Cicin-Sain] It is good to remember today that the Croatian Assembly made its political decision on the complete independence of the republic from the Yugoslav federation on 26 June 1991, freezing at the same time the enactment of the Law on the National Bank of Croatia, so that the so-called three-month Brioni moratorium could be applied to all those decisions. But, a day later, on 27 June, the National Bank of Yugoslavia nevertheless expelled both Slovenia and Croatia from the Yugoslav monetary system and foreign exchange market, so Croatia was forced to accelerate work on the process of becoming monetarily independent, resolving many complicated questions and dilemmas in a much shorter time. Therefore, in July I proposed to the president of the Republic, Dr. Tudjman, that he establish a special commission for the preparation of Croatian money, and a group of experts, with Prof. Marijan Hanzekovic at the head, was appointed on 20 August. Under war conditions and with a shortage of time, with a number of other limitations and uncertainties, few opportunities were left to us for the promotion of a strong and stable Croatian currency, so we had to choose some temporary solution. In such cause-and-effect connections, the answer is found to the question: Why a Croatian dinar, and not a Croatian crown?

We said, in the darkest variation, if that temporary currency, that Croatian dinar, because of some circumstances that were still difficult for us to foresee at that time, proves to be too vulnerable, a soft currency, let a compromise be made under the name of the dinar, so that a clear field is left for the kruna!

[Jakovljevic] Will the Croatian dinar nevertheless be a somewhat more stable currency in its first days than the Slovene coupons or the Serbian dinar?

[Cicin-Sain] One circumstance is common to the Slovene coupons and the Croatian and Serbian (or new Yugoslav) dinar: Neither in Ljubljana, nor in Zagreb, nor in Belgrade can citizens buy foreign currencies in banks (at the official rate of exchange); they can only sell them. The exceptions are some "semi-wild" private banks and the black market itself. In the case of Slovene independence, the rate of exchange for the German mark, measured in Yugoslav dinars or in Slovene coupons, rose by almost 70 percent in the first 10 days, and more than 100 percent at the most speculative points.

In the area of Serbia, on the eve of the establishment of the so-called new Yugoslav dinar, one German mark has been worth 90 dinars in recent days. At the same time, one mark is worth 55 Croatian dinars in Croatia, and on the black market, to the extent such information reaches me, exchanges were allegedly made at somewhat more than 30 percent above that rate. This shows that even speculators have faith in the Croatian dinar! Therefore, it remains for the National Bank of Croatia and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia to preserve, with circuitous steps, the stability of the new Croatian currency, so that the route to the Croatian kruna will be as easy as possible, but also—as short as possible.

[Jakovljevic] Will the National Bank of Croatia and its governor, who are institutionally becoming an independent monetary authority, responsible only to Croatian laws and the Croatian Assembly, resist the increasingly numerous demands for printing the Croatian dinar, "ours" from now on, and thereby, for its part, threaten the dinar's very start?

[Cicin-Sain] I wouldn't even think of it! Both the National Bank of Croatia and I, as governor, have the task of doing everything from our side for the Croatian dinar to be not only a temporary but also the most stable possible currency, especially if the war on Croatian soil does not come to an end quickly. Consequently, Croatia will not print money in unlimited amounts, as "the masters from Topcider," for example, are doing. We will no longer loan money to the republic budget, and at the same time we will endeavor to keep the discount rate of the National Bank at a realistic and positive level. Moreover, the principal cause of inflation in Croatia is not "the money printing office on Bourse Square" but war destruction, which reduces the supply of goods, with about the same sums of money in circulation! To this extent Croatian monetary policy in the war will have to

be additionally restrictive in order for it to attempt to promote the Croatian dinar as a stable currency in a short time. In short, inflation in Croatia today is primarily the result of the plundering and destruction of the merchandise reserves of the republic, and the latest defensive successes of Croatian forces are currently providing the greatest support for the success of the process of becoming monetarily independent in the republic!

[Jakovljevic] Until Croatia becomes a member of the IMF, and until it fulfills the conditions for obtaining a stabilizing loan, what else can be the principal, i.e., financial support for the project of the Croatian dinar?

[Cicic-Sain] Indeed, we can't count for some time yet on a greater penetration by Croatian exports and the autonomous strengthening of Croatian foreign exchange reserves, or on a fast-acting membership in the IMF. Therefore, we expect the greatest support for the project of the Croatian dinar from humanitarian and financial assistance from other countries, from our numerous emigres, and from many international charitable establishments, whose assistance in goods and money, valued at an expected 1 billion dollars in 1992, can be the strongest support for Croatia's process of becoming monetarily independent, and not only for the wounded, persecuted, and socially threatened people (who indeed need it the most).

[Box, p 27]

Late Ignition

Milosevic's regime, with the promotion of "Andric's 5,000-er," has most probably lost yet another monetary battle.

Secretly, discreetly, without great pomp, and in Serbia, which is counting on the monetary loyalty or inertia of Montenegro, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia, a new Yugoslav dinar has been promoted in the last few days, about which meager and contradictory information is reaching us. We had the opportunity only to see the largest Serbian banknote in a denomination of 5,000 new Yugoslav dinars, on which there is the former Croat and later renowned Serbian diplomat, and an accomplished master of the literary pen, the Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andric. His face, which indeed has a permanent value in the history of the south Slavic peoples, was imprinted by Milosevic's financiers on the most inflationary banknote in their history, which is 5 times larger than the largest denomination of Croatian dinars, on which Rudjer Boskovic, Serbian on his father's side and Italian on his mother's side and his country of professional work, but Croatian by the cultural circle to which he has given his life's work.

Before the Yugoslav dinar replaced the Croatian one, the Croatian side allegedly paid quite a number of its accounts in Yugoslav dinars and, in this manner, threw the bad money in time over to the side where it belongs. Serbia, although it could have been informed in time of all Croatian moves, reacted with a "maybe tomorrow." The first results are being felt these days on the Serbian black market, where the German mark is the equivalent of 50 percent more dinars than on the black market in Zagreb or Ljubljana. There are already estimates that the beginning parity in 1992 between the Serbian and Croatian dinar, by means of the German mark, could be 3 (Serbian) to 1 (Croatian). But, the market will still be the final judge of all political moves on the cruel Balkan soil.

[Box, p 28]

We Are Dividing Debts, and Property Too

What the Croatian governor, Dr. Ante Cicin Sain, recommended in his "farewell letter" to the federal governor, Dusan Vlatkovic:

Esteemed Mr. Vlatkovic,

I am confirming the receipt of your telefax of 21 November 1991 and the subsequent urgency of that letter. I am also confirming the receipt of a number of reports that we have recently received, and that relate to the problem of serving foreign debts for credits that the former Yugoslav federation or the National Bank of Yugoslavia guaranteed at one time. From these reports we cannot tell whether the installments due on the foreign credits have indeed been paid or not. We also do not know whether all business banks from other parts of the former Yugoslavia have indeed paid their foreign exchange obligations according to fixed and guaranteed obligations, or if they have done so, from whom and how were the necessary foreign exchange funds obtained? As you well know, Croatian and Slovene business banks have not been able to purchase foreign exchange from the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

In contrast to this, it is apparent from your reports that you are trying to create the impression that practically nothing has changed in our mutual relations. This thesis is absolutely unacceptable. We are, unfortunately, witnesses to a terrible, bloody, and difficult war which the National Bank of Yugoslavia has joined, having become this year the sole financier of the army, which is waging this war against Croatia. Under such circumstances, we cannot feel obligated to inform you about acts that we undertake with the aim of self-protection....

The monetary separation of the Republic of Croatia from the former Yugoslav monetary system has begun as a result of the enactment of the politically motivated and legally unfounded "Decision on the Protection of the Interests of the SFRJ in Spheres Relating to the Functioning of a Uniform Monetary and Foreign Exchange System and Policy" (which the Council of Governors passed on 27 June 1991).

Under this decision, the National Bank of Croatia and the business banks on the territory of Croatia were, in fact, excluded from the monetary system existing up to that time. Although the Federal Executive Council again

sought the revocation of that decision, the Council of Governors never wanted to accept this. The Government of the Republic of Croatia reacted to this by passing decisions on the basis of which the National Bank of Croatia obtained the right and opportunity to provide funds for the regular refinancing of banks from the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

Also known to us is the claim that the Council of Governors of the National Bank of Yugoslavia allegedly never (formally-legally) excluded Croatia and Slovenia from the Yugoslav monetary system. It is obvious that this claim is completely untenable because the decision cited had precisely the aim of making impossible the performance of all essential functions of central and business banking. Therefore, it is worth stating that the separation of Croatia from the Yugoslav monetary system, which began in the middle of 1991, was forced upon us....

I want to direct your attention to the fact that such an opinion is represented not only by us, who are directly affected by this decision, but also by all relevant international forums....

Despite everything, I express our readiness to begin finally with serious negotiations about working out appropriate distribution balances for all financial resources and obligations of the central bank of the former Yugoslav federation. With regard to the actual beginning of the factual dissolution of the former joint monetary system of Yugoslavia, and this is permanently tied to the decision already cited, passed on 27 June 1991, we propose that that day be fixed as the day as of which the appropriate distribution balances should be worked out (cut-off date). This relates especially to the division of all foreign exchange claims and foreign exchange debts of the Yugoslav federation at that time. The date 27 June 1991 is also suitable because of the fact that it factually coincides with the end of the second quarter for which there are corresponding balance figures.

We are prepared to accept negotiations about this at some neutral site. I assume that it will be necessary to provide for the presence of appropriate foreign parties from the very beginning. Naturally, I am counting on the participation in these negotiations of representatives of all six republics of the former Yugoslav federation.

Data on Circulation of New Croatian Dinar

92BA0373A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 2 Jan 92 p 7

[Article by Davor Drezga: "Croatian Dinar: 15 Billion Yugodinars Withdrawn From Circulation, 21.7 Billion Croatian Dinars Put Into Circulation"]

[Text] A logical follow-up to the politically constructive moves, Croatia added, at the end of 1991, the introduction of the Croatian dinar [CRD] as a temporary solution to the Croatian kruna. The governor of the National Bank of Croatia, Dr. Ante-Cicin-Sain, noted: "In that moment, midnight between 22 and 23 December 1991, the National Bank of Croatia, by a decree enacted by the Government of the Republic of Croatia on 8 October, became valid, and Croatia got its central bank, a monetary power that can print money."

Leaving the Mono-Currency System

Only a few hours later, the exchange of the old Yugo dinar into the new Croatian currency began. Places for exchange were set up at Public Auditing Service [SDK] offices, banks, and post offices, which opened at 9 AM on 23 December, and Croatia began leaving the mono-currency system and began moving into its own currency sovereignty. This day will go down in history as "the day of the monetary crush all across Croatia," and it continued in much the same manner until 2 PM on 31 December, when the official deadline for the money exchange expired. Thus, during this nine-day period, which included the Christmas holidays, Croatia executed its monetary/currency operation, for which it had long prepared. Through the 29th of December, 15 billion old Yugo dinars were withdrawn from circulation, and 21.7 billion Croatian dinars were placed in the payment system.

Croatian Dinar Facing Exchange-Rate Challenge

Thus Croatia stepped into the new year of 1992 with its own currency, which will face a painstaking road in establishing itself within monetary circles, including those of closer, and those of more distant, economic arenas. The Croatian dinar will have the chance, from the very first day of 1992, to show how it will keep up with the exchange rate, a key factor in its existence. What kind of exchange-rate relationship is it going to have with, for example, the West German mark, the new Yugo dinar, the Slovenian tolar, the Austrian schilling, the Italian lira.... This will have an inevitable effect on its value, on its respect within Croatia, and even outside its borders, and eventually on its fate. Naturally, the Croatian currency will have to bear this burden on its own back in spite of the handicap of a war and the destruction that has left Croatia with a 30-percent loss of its industrial potential, and has destroyed its tourism and transportation, the exact branches of industry that in the past brought the most significant hard currency profit. Yet, the Croatian dinar became a new reality, and its prognosticators say that on the ladder with other currencies, its exchange rate against the Yugo dinar could be established with a more favorable rate than just one-to-one. How it will rate against the West German mark [DM] remains to be seen. But, if judged by some official statements that "...all necessary steps will be undertaken to ensure that the Croatian dinar is not just a temporary currency but an ever more stable one," it can then be expected that its rate against the DM will be respectable.

Rivalry Between the Croatian and Yugo-Dinar

In the meantime, the appearance of the Croatian dinar in the monetary sphere of Croatia did not go by without

reaction. Only two days after the exchange of the old Yugo dinar for the new Croatian dinar began, news came from Belgrade regarding the new Yugo dinar being put into circulation, with new bank notes. Could this be considered as the beginning of a rivalry between the two currencies? On its road to recognition the new Croatian dinar has already encountered one obstacle that was pointed out at the meeting of members of the Commission for Monetary Independence of the Republic of Croatia, held just before the new year. The commission established that "the occupying army in Mokosica does not allow the usage of the new dinar" and "the army usurps the rights" and "it thwarts the functioning of the monetary system in the republic," to which the commission strongly protested. If nothing else, then this incident shows that, at this moment when Croatia is stepping out of the mono-currency system, the army wants to, at the least, spite Croatia.

Results of Popularity Poll of Leaders

92BA0387C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jan 92 pp 12-13

[Unattributed article: "Tudjman or Mesic"]

[Text] New elections for the state Assembly and president of the republic were mentioned more and more frequently in Croatia during the last days of 1991. Speaking first of all to the police forces, and then also to the citizens over television, Dr. Franjo Tudjman promised elections immediately after the conflicts of the war have ended. That announcement was also repeated in the speech that the president of the republic delivered in a session of the Assembly last week. DANAS' research team asked 268 Zagrebers in our usual survey sample their opinions about the way in which the announced elections are being organized and about their outcome.

Should the coming elections be organized according to the majority election system or one based on proportion? Citizens of Zagreb divided into two equal groups: 111 respondents think that the elections should be organized according to laws which allow proportional representation of the voters, while 109 think that the majority election system is better for the Croatian situation. Those who could not answer this question represented 18 percent of the respondents.

If the new elections were held today, which party do you think would win? The Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] would win in the opinion of 45 percent of the respondents. The Croatian People's Party [HNS] would win in the opinion of 16 percent of the Zagrebers, and 5 percent believe that the Croatian Rights Party [HSP] would win. Four percent believe that the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS] would win, 2 percent the Croatian Democratic Party [HDS], and 1 percent of the respondents would "bet" on the SDP [Democratic Reform Party].

The ranking obtained from the answer to this question is identical to the ranking established by an analysis of the question: Which party would you vote for? It is of interest that 27 percent of the people of Zagreb answered that they did not know which party would win in the election.

The Zagrebers were also asked whom they would like to see on the list of candidates for president of the Republic of Croatia. The question was put in such a way that the respondent could freely enter the name of any Croatian politician, and it was suggested that the respondents not write in more than three names. There were 28 names in all, 10 of which received more than 10 votes from the respondents.

Dr. Franjo Tudjman is in first place; 136 respondents (51 percent) would like to see him on the ballot for president of the republic. In second place is Stipe Mesic, the new chairman of the Executive Board of the HDZ, whom 43 percent of the respondents would like to see as a presidential candidate. In third place is Drazen Budisa, whose candidacy was supported by 29 percent of the respondents, and in fourth place Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, nominated by 27 percent of the Zagrebers. The fifth serious candidate is Dr. Zdravko Tomac, who was "nominated" by 53 percent of the respondents (20 percent). Sixth on the list is Dr. Zvonimir Separovic, with 11 percent of the "votes," seventh Dr. Franjo Greguric (23 nominations), and eighth Dobroslav Paraga (22 respondents).

The names of Dr. Vlado Gotovac and Dr. Antun Vujic were each supported by 10 respondents, while the other politicians were mentioned fewer than 10 times: Ivica Racan eight, Dr. Zlatko Kramaric six, Dr. Vladimir Veselica and Dr. Ivan Cesar five, Dr. Marko Veselica four, and Dr. Sime Djodan and Ivan Zvonimir Cicak three times.

The following were mentioned fewer times than that as desired possible candidates: Dr. Slaven Letica, Dr. Zarko Domljan, Kresimir Dzeba, Stjepan Sulimanac, Zeljko Mazar, Miko Tripalo, Antun Kikas, Dr. Zvonko Lerotic, Dr. Andrija Hebrang, Antun Tus, and Dr. Dusan Bilandzic, while one respondent opted for Helmut Kohl.

The respondents were then asked to circle the name of the person whom they had nominated for president of the republic and whom they would vote for in the election.

Most of the respondents again—as in the earlier surveys—decided on Dr. Franjo Tudjman: 29 percent. Stipe Mesic was chosen by 19 percent, and we can assume that the public will be more interested in a possible "collision" in the convention of the HDZ than in the election itself.

Incidentally, that would recall the American party conventions, which, when one of the parties has a large advantage—are the places where the decision is made on the President of the United States. At least according to these figures (but surprises can never be precluded in politics, especially under the circumstances that surround us), the disposition of the electorate at present is

such that the Croatian Democratic Community can feel almost entirely content in Zagreb.

Here again, third place is taken by Drazen Budisa, for whom 11 percent of the respondents voted, which confirms his political rise. In fourth place is Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, president of the Croatian People's Party, whose name was circled by 10 percent of the Zagrebers, and fifth place is taken by Dr. Zdravko Tomac with 3 percent, which is also the percentage of Dobroslav Paraga and Dr. Zvonimir Separovic.

Others mentioned on the list of desirable presidents include Dr. Franjo Greguric, Dr. Zlatko Kramaric, Dr. Antun Vujic, Ivica Racan, Dr. Vlado Gotovac, Dr. Slaven Letica, Dr. Sime Djodan, Zeljko Mazar, Miko Tripalo, and Ivan Zvonomir Cicak. Finally, the respondents were asked: Is there a party for which you would not vote in any case? Only 28 percent of the respondents answered that there is no such party.

The largest number of respondents (36 percent) would in no case vote for the Croatian Rights Party, and 28 percent would not give their vote in any case to the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] either.

There is an interesting paradox here that could probably be explained by broader examination of people's perceptions, in that the Serbian Democratic Party either is not a party at all (because it does not take part in politics in Croatia, but only in military affairs) or it is taken for granted that the SDS does not come under consideration.

That is, in Zagreb that party has had no support from even 1 percent of the respondents for months now.

In third place with respect to "unpopularity" is the Democratic Reform Party, for which 19 percent of the respondents would not vote in any case, and the fourth is the Serbian People's Party, with 9 percent. The HDZ could not obtain the votes of 8 percent of the respondents in any case, the Socialist Party 6 percent, and the Croatian Democratic Party would not be voted for in any case by 5 percent of the Zagrebers. The Croatian Christian Democrat Party would not be voted for in any case by 4 percent of the respondents, and 3 percent would never vote for the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia (a party that is not legalized in Croatia), for the Social Democratic Party of Croatia, the Croatian People's Party, and the Croatian Social Liberal Party. Two percent are absolutely against the Croatian Peasant Party, and the same number of respondents mentioned the Croatian Constitutional Movement.

Montenegro

Need for Referendum on Sovereignty Explored

92BA0407A Titograd POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Slavoljub Scekic: "Disintegration of the Second Yugoslavia: The Day After; East of the Reich/Paradise"]

[Text] There will be more talk about Yugoslavia because of the division of the legacy with the newly created western states, but also because of the reconstruction and possible creation of a new alliance—for a start in the east. Where is Montenegro headed?

What for months some people have been hankering for and others fearing has happened: Yugoslavia is falling apart. To be sure, for the present into three states: Slovenia, Croatia, and the rest/remainder of Yugoslavia. What has actually happened, and was this the only way to overcome the augmented antagonisms among our peoples and among our leaders, who have been engaged in zealous discussion in Tito's villas and villas in the world outside, and how decisive a role was played here by the external factor—the so-called building of the new European order in the image of Germany's domination—these are questions for more serious analysis when everything "settles" a bit. Only then will it be certain whether Croatia has good reason for the most recent hit resounding from the "twirler"—"Danke Deutschland."

A strange game has been played in the European Community, where Mr. Genscher has done it all, shuffled, cut, and dealt the cards, while the rest, to keep peace in Maastricht, pretended not to see that the deck was stacked. Time, however, will show how big a mistake Europe made in sacrificing a sovereign state. But did Europe have any right to defend it if its own peoples did not wish it? It will nevertheless be recorded that that lax Europe has for the present managed to win from aggressive German diplomacy a compromise whereby Yugoslavia retains its status as an international entity. However, unless something is done quickly on this side, that could remain only a mere proclamation, because there are two other republics knocking on the door of the raj(h) [paradise/Reich].

More will certainly be said about Yugoslavia because of the division of the legacy of the 70-year-old common home with the newly created states in the west, but also because of the reconstruction and possible creation of a new alliance—for a start in the east.

The indisputably most important task is certainly to preserve the peace and to make it possible for the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations to come soon so that the world community takes over the guarantees for the security of the Serbian people in the crisis areas. That would be a precondition for seeking a global solution of the crisis in the Balkans, which is what the great powers like the United States and Russia are advocating at this point. Only then is it possible to continue the talks and to seek a way out of the Yugolabyrinth by peaceful means, one of which might be a change of borders if the Serbs in Croatia convey such a desire in a referendum under international supervision.

In the remainder of Yugoslavia, solutions for reconstruction of the present truncated state need to be offered as soon as possible. The attempt "from above" has already been condemned to failure once regardless of the supposed spontaneity (the Convention), and it is therefore obvious that things should be done the other way about: from a referendum of the citizens about whether they desire a new governmental community with the citizens and peoples of other republics also expressing such an interest. In Montenegro, it is obvious that such a step is being prepared, and the dilemmas about whether the people should first vote on republic sovereignty or on future association cannot bring any benefit at this point through the recognizable rivalry of the political parties. On the contrary. It is certain (logical for that matter) that the republics must reach agreement on any kind of association now and that they must enter that agreement as equals, otherwise nothing will come of the alliance. It has been said several times already that Montenegro can give up a part of its statehood only to Yugoslavia, that it can enter into negotiations on reconstitution as a sovereign state or not at all. That resolves the dilemma which immediately arose, and the question in the referendum, whose results should be the compass for the political leadership in continuing its activity, can make everything still clearer. For example: Do you favor Montenegro as a sovereign state, entering into a new alliance, association, joint state, on an equal basis with the other republics and peoples who desire that? We are, of course, only talking about a proposal, but it is certain that the question that is put to the citizens must reflect fully the situation (legal, political, and governmental) in which Montenegro finds itself so that the citizens can easily decide "yes" or "no."

In any case, along with "Danke Deutschland," the Croatian leaders mention as soon as possible the need for an alliance with the Serbs and Serbia. There is no serious chance of that now, because time is needed to forget what has been done. However, those who are rejoicing in the belief that the Yugoslav idea has been buried once and for all are mistaken. It is older than the Yugoslav state and probably will survive even these states in the raj(h) [paradise/Reich]. And those who recently left Yugoslavia have nowhere to go from the Balkans. And in a more rational atmosphere, when peace prevails, the common language, origin, and an infrastructure built over 70 years around the essential idea of a common (if not uniform) legal and economic space, will emerge once again as advantages rather than deficiencies.

So long, then, not farewell.

Start of Public Debate on Referendum Viewed

AU2901201592 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] The public debate has begun in Montenegro on the forthcoming referendum and on defining the status of this republic. Dino Ramovic has a report from Titograd on the first characteristics of the debate:

[Ramovic] The public debate on the referendum in Montenegro and the question that will be answered by the citizens regarding which and what kind of state they want to live in is swinging between two extremes. That is to say, the opposition thinks that the question is too suggestive. On the one hand, the parties of the Serbian blocs think that the sovereignty and independence of Montenegro is being overemphasized, while the parties of the reforming and national bloc think that survival in a federation whose form is not yet known is being advocated.

The People's Party has acquired support in the Serbian bloc. The Serbian Democratic Party for Montenegro has been set. It has the basic aim of defending Serbdom. The Serbian Fatherland Movement advocates a third Yugoslavia in which, they say, those quasi-nations and republics that were conceived by Josip Broz would be eliminated. According to this and similar scenarios, one federation or federal unit would be made up of Serbia with Macedonia, Bosnia, and the Serbian regions in Croatia and a second would be made up of Montenegro with eastern Hercegovina, Konavlje, Cilipi, Dubrovnik, Metohija, and Shkoder which is in Albania.

The Albanian and Muslim national parties which (?are counting on) almost a quarter of the population in the republic see a continuation of [word indistinct] life with Montenegrins only in an independent and sovereign Montenegro.

Eleven parties of the reforming coalition were due to present their view at a great all-Montenegrin meeting that should have been held in Cetinje last Saturday. It was postponed until this Saturday because of bad weather. However, their option is well known: a sovereign, independent, and civilian [gradjanski] Montenegro.

It could be said that the ruling party is holding [word indistinct] between these extremes. However, after a month of public debate and just as long from the scheduling to the holding of the referendum, circumstances could change so completely that the referendum may not even be (?necessary). Those in the know nevertheless think that [words indistinct].

Serbia

Koljevic on 'Mysterious' Meeting With Tudjman

92BA0421A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jan 92 pp 24, 25

[Interview with Nikola Koljevic by "Z.I."; date and place not given: "Koljevic on Meeting With Tudjman: Free Marksman, so to Speak"]

[Text] Mr. Nikola Koljevic agreed to explain to VREME and reveal a few details that are not very well known to the public about his mysterious meeting with Mr. Franjo Tudjman.

[Z.I.] To begin with, could you tell us at whose initiative your meeting with Mr. Tudjman took place?

[Koljevic] The meeting took place at my initiative. After the cease-fire had been in effect for a certain period of time, I noticed for the first time that Mr. Tudjman wanted to establish friendly relations between Serbs and Croats. I saw this as a chance for me, as a free marksman, so to speak, to try to do something, and if it succeeded, then it would be a good thing. I went to Mr. Boras, with whom I had previously discussed Serb-Croat relations on several occasions. He is a man who has Serbs in his family—I think his daughter-in-law is a Serb. Immediately there was a favorable reaction; we went to Graz, and from Graz to Zagreb, and we did not sleep at the Presidential Palace, as you say, but rather at the Intercontinental Hotel, if that even interests you. It is bad and politically detrimental that this meeting has been so vilified in public. The other thing that is bad is the question of why we should meet with Croats from Croatia. I think that Serbs and Croats must be Bosnian ambassadors to Serbia and Croatia. First, because of their certainty that they will not be separated from the homeland, and second, because of the future association that will come to be, God willing. Because the only chance that Serbia and Croatia have to establish ties is precisely Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H]. This is a better position than some sort of B-H isolationism that is currently being pursued. The second thing that I want to say is that it is one thing to have a truce, or rather a cease-fire, and another thing to build peace, which foreigners know quite well. I think that this critical role can and must be played precisely by the Serbs and Croats of B-H, especially in eastern and western Hercegovina. I hope that these talks will continue in some form, and they probably will, so that you are the first to hear about it.

[Z.I.] Was there any talk at the meeting with Tudjman about a partition of Bosnia (there is public speculation about this allegation)?

[Koljevic] There was talk of a transformation of Bosnia, of separating the ethnic corpora, and of special and joint institutions in Bosnia. We have already done this, and thus set up the Serbian Assembly, and I personally advocated this idea and believe that it is a precondition of political life in Bosnia, and that it is important to achieve that quickly. The reason is that the HDZ/SDA [Croatian Democratic Community/Party of Democratic Action] coalition was [illegible word] and the Serbs were forced into a counterplay that led to anarchy. In Bosnia, the price of peace was horrible anarchy, greater than the anarchy in Croatia or Serbia, even though we know how high the price is of preserving government authority in Croatia and Serbia—the very high price of war. But similarly, we preserved peace at the high price of

anarchy, which went something like this: The legal bodies, the Republican Assembly, Presidency, and government, made decisions that are unacceptable to the Serbian nation. The Serbian nation reacted to this, you will recall, from regionalization to the latest (in Banja Luka) nonpayment of duty to the republican funds. Therefore, it was like this—you say one thing, and we do our own thing. And that is anarchy. That anarchy was possible only because of the SDA/HDZ coalition—at the expense of the Serbian nation. I also think that it would not be good or very possible to have a coalition between the HDZ and the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party]. You can imagine what that would mean for the Muslim nation. I continually repeat that it is a mistake by the Muslim leaders to insist on distance first in relations with Serbs, and then in relations with Croats, which has turned into a tightrope act: with Serbs before the war, with Croats during the war, with Serbs after the war, and then with Croats again.... This has resulted in political instability in B-H. If we set up ethnic political institutions up to the point that we need, and unite in common organs in which decision-making by consensus will predominate, then I think that we have a democratic chance and the key to the future and stability of Bosnia.

[Z.I.] Since the idea of the cantonization of Bosnia is dear to you, do you conceive of this cantonization within the framework of an independent Bosnia, or as a federal entity in some sort of future, would-be Federal States of Yugoslavia?

[Koljevic] You know what, I told Alija Izetbegovic one thing based on the Muslim demands. The Muslims want a sovereign Bosnia, the Serbs do not want it, and the Croats have said that they want it. The Muslims want a unified Bosnia, a Bosnia that is not split apart. I think that it is unrealistic to have both. I can understand the Muslim need or fear, if you wish, of Serbian or Croatian domination, and I can see that quite clearly. But you cannot make up for that by placing Serbs in the position of minority, nor can you put Croats in the position of minority. I say to them that it must be decided whether it will be a unified Bosnia that will not be absolutely sovereign, or a sovereign Bosnia that will not be absolutely unified, meaning a Muslim Bosnia. Let a Muslim Bosnia be sovereign. Can Bosnia be both sovereign and unified, integral, at the same time? Hardly.

Milosevic on Peace Prospects, Economic Issues

92BA0399A Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 30 Dec 91 pp 2-4

[Interview with Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, by Rade Brajevic, editor in chief, and Milos Miljkovic, assistant editor in chief, both of VECERNJE NOVOSTI; place and date not given: "Serbia Wants Peace"]

[Text] Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, responded to a request of VECERNJE NOVOSTI and the day before yesterday received Rade Brajevic, editor in chief, and Milos Miljkovic, assistant editor in chief, of VECERNJE NOVOSTI. In a lengthy conversation, President Milosevic answered all 45 questions pertaining to current political, social, economic, and other events and even questions concerning his personal life. We are publishing the text of the interview in its entirety.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] You are Serbia's leader at one of the most crucial moments in its history. You carry a heavy burden of responsibility. How are you bearing up?

[Milosevic] I am trying to do the best I can.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Yugoslavia is falling apart, Slovenia is leaving and then Croatia. Where is Serbia headed?

[Milosevic] Serbia is remaining in Yugoslavia not only because generations have died in two world wars for Yugoslavia and for freedom, and not only nor above all because of the past and history, but because of the future. Yugoslavia did not come about by accident nor by the will of foreign powers, and it will not survive by accident nor by the will of foreign powers.

And the current conflict with those who are leaving Yugoslavia did not arise solely because of their desire to form those little states of their own, nor solely because of the interests of certain powers to snatch them up, but above all because they began to pursue that conception of theirs through violence.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] If Yugoslavia remains within new more narrow borders, how do you see those borders, where would they run, who would define them?

[Milosevic] Those borders will be determined by the peoples that continue to live in Yugoslavia, but also by the peoples that leave it. It would be both logical and fair for all of us to arrive at an agreement with one another peacefully, without violence to any of the Yugoslav peoples.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] On Friday, you talked to the Macedonians. What is your impression? Is it possible that Macedonia will become completely separate and independent, will remain outside Yugoslavia? If it does that, what would the consequences be, and how would Serbia react to that?

[Milosevic] Macedonia may decide to leave Yugoslavia. That is the right of the Macedonian people, just as every other people has the right to decide how it is to live. If you are asking me for my impression, I think that the Macedonians do not want to part with us, nor is it in their interest. They simply have a need to resolve the issue of their own status in the way that they feel best. I do not see that they have either the desire or interest to do us harm, nor do we have any reason to make any moves that would harm Macedonia. On the contrary.

I think, however, that the decision about which you are asking me, should it occur, will not be in the interest of

the Macedonian people. As far as Serbia is concerned, it will respect the decision of the Macedonian people.

Adventurism of the Leaders of the Democratic Action Party

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] What ought to be done so that the Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H], and also in Serbia and Montenegro, are not a factor for instability?

[Milosevic] I think that the Muslims are not a factor for instability although the political adventurism of certain leaders of the Democratic Action Party [SDA] could create that impression of them. But it would be unfair to the Muslims, I believe even to most of the members of the SDA, if we were suspicious of them solely because of the unreasonable actions of certain extremists in their ranks. Everyone has extremists. The Serbs have them as well. If by some chance they were in power in Serbia, Serbia would have been dressed in black long ago. We must take into account that one extremism evokes another extremism, and if they get out of control and grow, then conflicts escalate.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] After Franjo Tudjman's statement about the inevitable division of Bosnia-Hercegovina, one gets the impression that the disposition of the Muslims is changing to the advantage of Yugoslavia's survival. Do you share that impression?

[Milosevic] An equal life together for the Serbian and Muslim peoples in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and that means in Yugoslavia as well, it is my personal conviction, is in the interest of both peoples. I feel that the members of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina have mostly been expressing that attitude. It certainly would be best for their common prospects if the Muslim nationality expressed that same conviction.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] When you come out in favor of seeing that the Serbian people lives in one state, does that imply the same rights for the Croatian people living in B-H and Serbia?

[Milosevic] Certainly. Yugoslavia as a state should afford that to every people. For that matter, that is why Yugoslavia is in the vital interest of all the Yugoslav peoples.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Was the decision of Slovenia and Croatia to secede the result of exclusively domestic political, ethnic, and other aspirations and motives or also of the influence of external factors?

[Milosevic] Many factors were involved in the decisions of Slovenia and Croatia to secede from Yugoslavia. I see that in the press and journalism and in public life generally that the bad relations among the Yugoslav peoples and republics in the past are considered the decisive factor. I personally believe that the processes of disintegration in Yugoslavia are a product of the present, above all a product of the policy conducted in Yugoslavia in recent years. And foreign factors are involved in that policy to a great degree, sometimes even to a decisive degree (in the case of Slovenia and Croatia).

The answer to your question—internal or foreign, then, is this: Both were involved. Except that the foreign factor has the decisive role at this moment, because it is making use of the small militant internal factor, which it is helping to establish a totalitarian and chauvinistic regime at the expense of the Croatian people as a whole. Fear and violence prevail there, censorship and political assassinations. When they have done their dirty work for their masters, they are wiped out because of the crimes they have committed in order to cleanse the reputation with the world, but they will not hesitate to take advantage of the results of their dirty work.

Shameful Divisions in Kosovo

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Under the influence of the aggressive propaganda machinery of Slovenia and Croatia it seems that these two republics are winning over the international public, and it is becoming increasingly likely that they will be recognized. The passivity of Yugoslav diplomacy and federal authorities, especially the government of Ante Markovic, have certainly contributed to this. Is this just a question of passivity or something else, perhaps even commitment?

[Milosevic] It is obvious that Yugoslav diplomacy, with honorable exceptions, and the federal government have not committed themselves to protecting the interests of Yugoslavia, although it was their constitutional duty. There is no question of any passivity here, because these authorities have the whole time shown a very lively attitude toward the factors involved in resolving the problems of Yugoslavia.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] How do you assess Albania's behavior, and have Tirana's appetites toward Kosovo grown?

[Milosevic] I believe that the views and behavior of the government in Tirana have not been contributing to the development of good neighborly relations with our country. It is in our mutual interest to establish harmony between their declarative nonintervention in Yugoslavia's internal affairs and their external behavior in practice. As you know, we want to develop good neighborly relations with everyone. We also expect our neighbors to make an equal contribution to this common interest of ours.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Now that we have mentioned Kosovo, how do you evaluate the activity of the Republic of Serbia in stabilizing the situation in that Serbian province?

[Milosevic] We have done a great deal in Kosovo in these last several years. This is no longer a region outside Serbia in which the Serbian people are exposed to discrimination. Back in 1988, that was the terrible reality for the Serbian people. Now that is the past. But if life in Kosovo is to proceed normally and if Kosovo is

to be able to develop in every respect, it is essential that all who live there join together on an equal footing in that development. Among the Serbs and Montenegrins themselves there are many divisions and disagreements, which is a great shame. And as for the Albanians, for the present most are boycotting that activity, a large number of children are not even going to school. Even if we take into account that the separatist forces in Kosovo and those outside Kosovo who inspire them are behind the boycott, still a large share of the responsibility for the boycott and dissatisfaction of the Albanian people lies both on the policy conducted by the Serbs and Montenegrins in responsible positions in Kosovo and also on their behavior, and accordingly also on the policy which we are conducting in the republic. Just as earlier the Albanians alone could not be allowed to rule Kosovo, so now we cannot allow any citizen of Serbia to be a second-class citizen.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Adoption of the Law on Furnishing Land and Credit to Returnees to Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia has finally undertaken specific solutions. What do you expect from them?

[Milosevic] I expect that they and other moves made by Serbia will contribute to the more rapid and effective development of Kosovo and Metohija.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] How do you interpret the fact that in the world, especially in the United States, they still have a distorted picture of Kosovo and of Serbia's policy in that province?

[Milosevic] It is above all a question of the effects of the strong propaganda that has been aimed in that direction and that was organized, financed, and carried out by the Albanian and Ustasha lobbies in America. Our opposition to this was obviously insufficient. That is why the truth about Serbia and especially about Kosovo is still having hard going in the media of Europe and America. It was a great mistake on our part to have underestimated the media war and to have naively believed that the truth is sufficient unto itself.

Some Are Enjoying Themselves, Others Are Desperate

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] How as president of the republic do you evaluate the one year's experience of the multiparty parliamentary system?

[Milosevic] The way it is now, it has not brought us democratic relations, nor has it taken Serbia forward. Most of the parties do not have a concept for development of society that would as a whole represent an alternative to the present one. That is, most reduce all their activity to criticism, frequently unscrupulous, of the ruling party and to efforts, which sometimes, as on 9 March, are brutal, to seize power. I do not see here any contribution either to democratic or overall social development in Serbia. For that matter, the picture offered by the proceedings of the National Assembly in fact confirms this. I doubt that there is a citizen who is satisfied with the proceedings of the National Assembly. Some are enjoying themselves, others are desperate. The latter, unfortunately, are more numerous, but all have certainly expected more responsible behavior from many deputies and thereby more effective work of the Assembly as a whole. Nevertheless, the experience has not been long enough for an altogether objective judgment. My impression is that in the latter half of this brief one year's experience there have already been significant changes for the better as compared to the first few months.

I think that things will continue to change for the better in this regard.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] What are the weaknesses of the ruling party and what are those of the opposition parties?

[Milosevic] The ruling party behaves always and in all respects like a ruling party. That is, it is not always ready to take on the large burden of responsibility which such a position entails. Although it was clearly the winner in the multiparty elections, I have the impression that from time to time it is almost unhappy that it is the ruling party and in that sense seems to be apologizing to the opposition. But at the same time it is not taking pains to establish a serious dialogue with the opposition parties. And as far as the opposition parties are concerned, in my opinion they are still not acting like true political parties. They operate more like groups of individuals of like mind or of friends rallying around some interest which is more a group interest than a social interest.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] What more could have been done by the government that has been in power up to now?

[Milosevic] War is being waged in our country, the economic situation is very difficult, we are threatened with the danger of economic isolation, ethnic conflicts in regions to which the war has not spread are growing uninterruptedly, social differences are becoming immense....

There is no government which can be altogether successful under such conditions and work to the satisfaction of all citizens. But still, as we see, that is not a reason not to seek a government which will be able even under the present difficult conditions to make it easier for people to live, to contribute to halting the war, to stem the economic decline and stimulate development of the economy, of business, and of culture.

The Socialist Party of Serbia Is Not Carrying Out Its Program

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Criticism of personnel policy is appearing ever more frequently in public. How justified is that criticism? Has Serbia been making proper use of its great human potential?

[Milosevic] In principle, all objections to personnel policy are always well-founded. It is always possible to find some better solution when it comes to personnel. But because we now live in a multiparty system, personnel decisions of the ruling party will always be the subject of criticism and

dissatisfaction of the other parties, which is in fact understandable and inevitable. Except that in other countries those challenges are made with more refinement. In our case, as we see, it usually comes down to ridiculing, humiliating, and insulting people. And there is no democracy without political sophistication. As a citizen, I have always had more confidence in political parties and politicians who do not base their behavior on threats against their political adversaries.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] There is also criticism of your personal conduct of personnel policy. What is your comment on that?

[Milosevic] It is certain that some of the proposals for personnel decisions are mine. But it is equally certain that many personnel decisions are not mine, and some are even contrary to my criteria concerning people and concerning the jobs they do.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Some are not satisfied with the activity of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], in particular with its effort among young people. Are you satisfied? If parliamentary elections were scheduled now, would the SPS get the same number of votes?

[Milosevic] The Socialist Party of Serbia has a certain number of deficiencies. For example, it is not abiding consistently by its program and is not carrying it out. And then it is not resistant enough to the blows that come from the opposition and often displays haughtiness toward them. Again, some of the members are people who do not have a leftwing orientation, but they joined the Socialist Party of Serbia because they believed it would win the election. Because that did in fact happen, they remained in it. But because they have different political beliefs than those contained in the documents of the Socialist Party of Serbia, they are constantly trying to move the party to the right. That also goes against European trends—in the European parliament, the socialist and social-democratic, that is, leftwing parties, have the most representatives.

Personnel are one of the most important deficiencies. Some people are tired, some are unsure, and some of them, for instance, behave bureaucratically. But all of that does not mean that the party as a whole is weak. Especially if it is aware of its shortcomings.

I think that appropriate personnel changes would largely eliminate those and other deficiencies of the Socialist Party of Serbia. As for the elections, I think that even today it would again win the election. As a whole, in this difficult time, it has confirmed its high level of patriotism and its responsible attitude toward the vital interests of Serbia and the Serbian people.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] In opposition circles, there is a great deal of speculation to the effect that the president of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], Dr. Vojislav Seselj, deputy, has done certain jobs for the Socialist Party of Serbia and for the state of Serbia. What do you think about those speculations?

[Milosevic] Seselj did not "do" any jobs for the SPS, at least as far as I know.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] There are demands from opposition circles that a Serbian national army be formed. What would that mean?

[Milosevic] The same as proclamation of the Republic of Serbia to be an independent state—which for that matter Croatia has been proposing to us all along in its abandonment of Yugoslavia. So long as the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] exists, Serbia has no reason to have any "Serbian army" of its own, because Serbia is in Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav People's Army is precisely defending Yugoslavia.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] What is most important for Serbia today?

[Milosevic] The most important thing for Serbia and all its citizens is that there be peace in Yugoslavia, that Yugoslavia survive and continue its development as an independent, free, economically and culturally advanced country—the common state of the nationalities which wish that.

No One Has Rehabilitated Quislings

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] What do you think about the press in Serbia?

[Milosevic] I think that the press in Serbia is under the very strong pressure of conservative, nationalistic, and petit bourgeois influences. All of our newspapers, from daily newspapers to illustrated papers, are dominated by an unjustifiably negative attitude toward the postwar period in Yugoslavia. And then intolerance and hatred is evoked toward the other Yugoslav peoples, and in this way the people are poisoned systematically through the media, which contributes to the isolation of Serbia and the Serbian people. Quite arbitrarily and without any historical judgment, ideas and figures are affirmed from the most distant past, many of whom do not deserve it. At the same time, our press is to the greatest degree completely closed to the future both when it comes to Yugoslavia and when it comes to the contemporary world. Finally, there is no newspaper that has avoided the petit bourgeois dimension in interpreting the changes in our society.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] What do you think about the "flood of literature" about Chetnik leaders and ideologues?

[Milosevic] The way in which they are written about constitutes rehabilitation of the forces defeated in Serbia in World War II. I would say that this attitude toward those figures for the present can be seen only in Yugoslavia. No country which belonged to the antifascist coalition and fought against fascism has so far rehabilitated those forces. Do you think that someone in France is now rehabilitating Petain or the Norwegians Vidkun Quisling?

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] How do you interpret the fact that in Serbia much more is written against socialism

and there are many more accusations of the Communists in the press and in public than, say, in Slovenia and Croatia, which are under German influence? That is, why is there a witch-hunt being conducted in Serbia against the Communists, when there is no such witch-hunt in those two republics, which are said to be oriented toward Germany and with ties to Germany?

[Milosevic] It is true that the writing of the press in Serbia, incomparably more than in Slovenia and Croatia, abounds in hysterically aggressive attacks on everything from the era of socialism. That situation obviously does not exist in the press of the other republics. That is no accident, especially when we bear in mind that it was Serbia that first had a showdown with the bureaucratic method of governing the state, with those who wielded the authority and held the power in that era. Those witch-hunts are calculated at causing a conflict in the Serbian people itself, so that the Serbs again start fighting one another. What more could any enemy of Serbia and the Serbian people want than for virtually half of the people to confront the other half? Even in the other republics there have been and are now both Communists and anti-Communists, but their differing political convictions are not a reason for them to whip up their mutual conflict through the mass media. There is in this a conscious and justified desire to preserve the people from conflicts in their own ranks. The Serbs do not have sufficient consciousness of that kind, and there are external pressures, and they are very well organized, for the Serbs to destroy one another because of these divisions, which have been accentuated after the fact. This is an old scenario which every enemy of Serbia has always used in any critical time. Well-intentioned people in the press ought to know that by constantly whipping up such conflicts they are doing someone else's dirty work against the interests of their people and society. And those whose intentions are not good, who are doing this deliberately, ought not to have any place in the press, at least not in Serbia.

I Am Not Sensitive to Intrigues

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Would you be willing to answer a few personal questions?

[Milosevic] Why not?

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] How well do you take intrigues?

[Milosevic] I am not sensitive to intrigues.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] And what is your comment on the public attacks and insults when, for example, they call you a dictator, a hardliner, a totalitarist, the first bolshevik of the last bolshevik bastion...? And Mesic has even compared you to Hitler.

[Milosevic] I interpret public insults above all as an expression of a low level of political culture and of political, but also ordinary human, ethics, and as an expression of the inability of political opponents to use arguments and the truth. Everyone fights in his own way. Honorable people fight honestly—dishonorable people with lies. According to the formula: "Repeat a lie a hundred times, it will be believed." But I do not know why you took Mesic, when there are examples here, as is well known, that are far below Mesic from the moral standpoint. They are, above all, those who are not satisfied with attacking me, but are so blinded by hatred that even my family has become the target of their attack, my wife just as much as me, and even my children, including even my underage son.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] You are reproached because Dr. Mira Markovic, who is a professor and your wife, engages in politics and does so even in the very top leadership of another party. Is this exclusively the commitment of your wife, and can you have an effect on that? Do you think that a wife must follow her husband in political and public life, especially when the husband is a distinguished politician like you?

[Milosevic] In every marriage, especially when people love one another, they influence one another. But at the same time, I do not feel that because they have the same or similar conceptions one should place himself at the service of the interest of the other and deprive himself of his own activity, especially if that person is an intellectual and also a public figure. In that sense, I consider your question unsuitable—"Is this exclusively the commitment of your wife?" And who else's commitment should it be except hers? She, like any person, like any intellectual, is affected by various influences, but most of all she is under her own influence.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] The story goes that your children are privileged and that your son, for example, did not go into the JNA.

[Milosevic] As everyone knows, the first to go into the JNA by law are those who graduate from high school, and my son is precisely midway through high school, just like his entire age group.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] There is gossip going around that you are getting a divorce, that you are "100-percent divorced," and that your wife has fled to London or America with your daughter, and you have remained with the son in Belgrade.... Is your marital and family life harmonious, is there anything specific in it, are there disagreements, troubles?

[Milosevic] That gossip is generated on the principle in the folk saying: "What the old woman would like, that is what she dreamt."

I suppose there are those who would like us to be divorced, who would like Mira not to live in Yugoslavia, and so on. I must disappoint them—Mira is in Yugoslavia, and we are together. And our daughter is also in Yugoslavia. The four of us—Mira, I, and our children—are very devoted to one another, and that is the principal aspect of our family.

Mira is the one who is attacked most in that gossip. I am convinced that it is started by those who know how devoted I am to her and who are attempting to destabilize me in that way. But because I have "read" the motives that are behind that gossip, it has not had the effect for which it was aiming.

In any case, as far as "harmonious marital life" is concerned, my wife would tell you that she considers such a life petit bourgeois.

My Wife Is Not My Profession

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Why do you not appear in public places and on suitable occasions with your wife, as most politicians do?

[Milosevic] My wife is an independent person and is not my escort. If any of us should be escorting someone, then presumably I ought to be escorting her, not she me. It has been that way all our lives. I have never expected her to stand around beside me on official occasions, because I believe that would be an insult to her. And I would not like to insult her. She is not my wife by profession and in public life, along with me, she should take part only if she herself wants to, and not because anyone, including me, requires it of her.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] In the performance of your duties do you consult with your wife? How much do you help one another?

[Milosevic] We have spent our entire life together, since we were in high school. We are very devoted to one another, and, of course, we help one another whenever we can. Unfortunately, I cannot help my wife either with her lectures to her students or in her writing, but always in our lives I have helped her in what is difficult for her, for example, in making decisions. She can do much more to help me in view of her education and profession. In that sense, she has helped me in the last two years less than earlier.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] It is well known that you do not give spectacular parties and receptions, that you do not have your favorite bar and restaurant or suitable "places for relaxation." Why?

[Milosevic] And why would I give "spectacular parties and receptions"? As president of the republic I do my work in the office and in the contacts which I have in similar workplaces and official places. There is no social interest that is pursued in receptions or in restaurants and bars. In any case, I go to restaurants exclusively with my family, our friends, and at my own expense, just like every other citizen of this country. And the inclination to have one's own restaurant goes with certain professions: writers, poets, actors, and so on. Certain politicians have wanted to be like artists and have succeeded. Unfortunately, only in that one sense.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] How much time do you devote to your family, and what in particular do you do within the family circle?

[Milosevic] The entire time I am not at work I am with my family. And that is quite a bit of time. I know there are people who like to boast that they never go home from morning until the next morning. First, that usually is not true. And second, if it is true, then it is unpleasant. I think that there are complexes that lie behind such statements.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] How do you spend your free time, and with whom do you like to spend time? Who are your friends?

[Milosevic] I spend my free time with my family in Belgrade and in Pozarevac. Recently, we have been unable to travel as we did previously. Our friends are mainly those with whom we became friends before I became involved in politics or with whom we became close in the mid-1980's.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Why did you take your son on your visit to Greece?

[Milosevic] I took him because I wanted him with me.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] The story is that you are seriously ill, that you have "severe diabetes" and that you take insulin every day. How is your health?

[Milosevic] My health really is good. I do not suffer from diabetes or any other disease.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Where do you usually spend the summer, where do you spend your weekends?

[Milosevic] Up to now, we have mainly spent our summers on the Croatian coast. For several years in a row, at Bol on Brac, but since the mid-1980's every year in Kupari. We usually spend the weekends at our house in Pozarevac. We did that earlier, and we do it even now.

[Box, p 2]

The Public

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] One hears criticism that you ought to address the public more frequently.

[Milosevic] Some think that I address the public too infrequently, while others on the other hand think that I am too much in evidence in the press and on television. Because not so long ago we were criticizing this latter extreme, I am inclined in my behavior to be mindful of the criticism in which I myself participated. And accordingly I do not appear so often.

[Box, p 2]

Neither Bolshevik Nor Socialist

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Some people continue to pin the label bolshevism on Serbia and indeed on you

yourself. How do you explain these attempts at discrimination against both Serbia and yourself?

[Milosevic] Serbia was not bolshevist even when it was a socialist republic, and it certainly is not now. The market economy, the multiparty system, the investment of foreign capital...those are the antipodes of bolshevism.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Do certain Serbian opposition parties and their leaders contribute to this representation?

[Milosevic] Those who do this in Serbia do it on orders from outside Serbia and outside Yugoslavia. After all, they themselves know quite well that Serbia is not bolshevist. Nor is it socialist any longer.

[Box, p 3]

Yes-Men

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] They say that you have your people and that obedience is for you the basic criterion in personnel policy, and that accounts for the makeup of the Serbian government to this point and the leadership of the ruling Socialist Party. Are you really surrounded by poltroons?

[Milosevic] I do not have a high opinion either of those who have "their own people" or of those who agree to be someone's people. Nothing good can be expected of either sort. But unfortunately the way in which politics was practiced in Serbia for a very long time did have such features. It is certain that they exist even today, but I am trying to stay away from them. I am doing everything so that that aspect disappears from the Serbian political scene.

[Box, p 4]

The Blue Helmets

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Allow us in conclusion another political question, probably the most important one at this moment: Do you believe that the "blue helmets" will come? Where can they be deployed and where can they not be deployed?

[Milosevic] I believe they will. According to the conception, the Serbian krajinas should be placed entirely under the protection of the UN peacekeeping forces.

In that way, peace and freedom of the Serbian people in the krajinas, who for the third time in this century have been exposed to genocide, would be protected by peace rather than by war. This would stop the war instantaneously, conditions would be created to continue the peaceful negotiations to resolve the Yugoslav crisis, and the people who bear arms today would be able to turn once again to their regular peacetime obligations.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] What would you wish above all and beyond everything else for the citizens of Serbia this New Year's?

[Milosevic] Peace in Yugoslavia.

Possible Personnel Cuts in Serbian Government

92BA0400B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jan 92 p 5

[Article by B. Radivojsa: "Request by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia: Fewer Civil Servants"—first paragraph is POLITIKA introduction]

[Text] At the request of Dr. Radoman Bozovic, the ministries are speeding up their preparation of reports on possible reductions in their number of employees. Cuts of 20 percent were made during the Zelenovic administration.

There will be fewer civil servants in Serbia! Several days ago, the new republican government sent a memorandum to all the ministries calling on them to consider the results of previous restrictions on the administrative apparatus and to propose measures for new reductions.

We have learned unofficially that lately the ministries are working intently on preparing reports on the personnel situation in their services and on possible new economization measures, so that it is expected that the government will decide on restrictions sometime next week, based on the reports.

The initiator of this latest request (designated "urgent") is the prime minister himself, Dr. Radoman Bozovic, who expects from this action a visible reduction in the number of administrators. Restrictions can be expected especially with regard to the new role of opstina governments and the abolition of regional communities, as well as in a number of agencies whose function has been eliminated. Specifically, opstinas enjoy the status of local self-administration under the new constitution, which will probably result in a curtailment of the number of administrative jobs, while some responsibilities will be carried out in the future by district agencies instead of in regions. It remains to be seen how much of an affect these changes in status will have on the number of employees (final passage of a decree on the formation of district branches of the ministries is expected shortly).

Before Bozovic, economization measures were undertaken by Zelenovic's team as well. According to some estimates, the number of employees in republican administrative agencies was reduced by 20 percent during the term of the former prime minister. The majority of these officials are retired or due to retire soon, although we have been informed that there are also some who have gone to the employment bureau. On the other hand, some agencies are supposed to be transformed so that they function and are financed according to different principles.

Nevertheless, the republic's overall administration is very large. There are 67,000 employees in administrative agencies and organizations and in judicial agencies on all levels (from the opstina to the republic). As much as 185 billion dinars, accounting for 37 percent of the republic's total budget outlay, is provided for the work of these

agencies, which beginning in 1992 are entirely financed—including on the provincial level—by the republican budget. Of this sum, it is anticipated that 123.5 billion (one-fourth of the total budget allocation) will be allocated for the salaries of employees and functionaries. For the sake of comparison, almost the same amount—121.5 billion—is provided in the 1992 budget for economic development functions (premiums, bonuses, funds).

The problem is that a large part of this funding applies to the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A total of 47 billion dinars is provided for employee and police salaries, with around 63 billion for the overall work of the Internal Affairs Service.

Because one can hardly expect restrictions in this part of the allocation, this means that cuts are possible in other services, especially within the framework of the classic civil servant structure.

This year, however, Bozovic will have a differently organized and less "jagged" administration, which will be entirely under the wing, and thus the supervision, of the ministries. This applies to the provincial and district agencies as well. They are all financed from the same coffers, which is also one of the important conditions for economization. Aside from this, the new prime minister has insisted in his promotional speeches on the creation of an efficient state apparatus.

[Box, p 5]

20,000 Officials in Opstinas

Of the 67,000 employees in all administrative agencies, administrative organizations, and judicial agencies throughout the entire territory of the republic, a relatively small share are involved in classic state administration (excluding the police, judicial agencies, and others). Specifically, around 3,000 civil servants are employed by republican agencies, around 400 in interopstina agencies, and 1,500 in Belgrade. There are around 20,000 officials employed in opstina administration in the territory of so-called Serbia proper.

Production Possibilities of 'Supertank' Examined

92BA0390B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
10 Jan 92 pp 32-33

[Article by Miroslav Lazanski: "Is the 'Vihor' a Great Discovery?"]

[Text] Yugoslavia, that is Serbia, is soon getting a new model of up-to-date tank, a product of domestic industry. We are referring to the successor to the now-famous M-84A tank, which proved itself under the conditions of the desert war in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, that is, to a new tank that bears the name "Vihor" ["Whirlwind"]. With this tank, the Yugoslav Armed Forces should fill the gap that will occur to the end of the century as the older tank models like the T-54 are retired from operational use, but also make up what has been lost in the skirmishes of the present war. The new tank, the "Vihor," is actually a combat vehicle for the year 2001, a tank for the next century.

In all its characteristics, it belongs to the new generation of tanks: It has a 125-mm cannon, it weighs only 44 tons, its power plant is the 1,200-HP V46-TK1 omnivorous diesel, which gives it a power-to-weight ratio of 27 HP per ton, its silhouette is minimally low, its maximum speed is 72 km/hr, its cruising speed is 50 km/hr, it attains a speed of 32 km/hr in just seven seconds from a state of rest, with its snorkel it crosses water obstacles up to five meters deep, and without the snorkel it fords water obstacles up to 1.8 meters deep; its combat complement of shells in the tank is 42 rounds; in addition to the 125-mm cannon, which uses three types of projectiles, HE, HEAT, and APFSDS, it also possesses a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun and a 12.7-mm machine gun; and it has a crew of only three. The "Vihor" has a modern computer system to open fire, it possesses a sophisticated ABH system of protection, it has antineutron sandwich armor, but also active-reactive armor, modern fire-fighting and smoke exhaustion systems, gyroscopes, systems for firing at night, in the daytime, a laser range finder, as well as a video camera, a video monitor, meteorological sensors.... In short, the "Vihor" could even be the best export item of the Yugoslav or Serbian economy.

The Slovenes Are Continuing the Project

Back some 30 years ago, Yugoslavia made several tanks in domestic factories, which dumbfounded military specialists in the world at the time. But the first real domestic tank was the M-84, which was put into production on the basis of the license for the Soviet T-72 tank. Production of the M-84 tank specifically required significant mastery of about 6,000 new technologies as well as 150 new materials. Refinement of the most modern opticoelectronic systems considerably increased the combat capabilities of the M-84 tank; specifically, fire efficiency was increased 2.5-fold over its base version. Aside from the Military Engineering Institute, participants in the production of the Yugoslav M-84 tank included the following factories: "Djuro Djakovic" of Slavonski Brod, "Famos" and "Iskra" with their work organizations, "Slovene Steel Mills" of Ravne na Koroskem, "Zrak" of Sarajevo, "Prva Petoletka" of Trstenik, "21 Maj" of Rakovica, "Bratstvo" of Travnik, "Tito Metal Plants" of Skoplje, "11 Oktomvri" of Prilep, "Ruen" of Kocani, "Rudi Cajevec" of Banja Luka, "Sever" of Subotica, "Jugoturbina" of Karlovac, "Aluminum Combine" and also the "Radoje Dakic" Factory of Titograd, the "Bearings Industry" of Kotor.... As a matter of fact, in the direct production of parts, assemblies, and units of the M-84 tank there were 240 work organizations directly involved, and about 1,000 organizations of associated labor all over Yugoslavia were involved indirectly.

The war in our country brought serious difficulties for production of the M-84 tank, and also for the export transaction of selling 210 such tanks to Kuwait. The "Djuro Djakovic" Factory in Slavonski Brod, which is the end producer in the production process, is for political reasons not delivering the finished tanks to the foreign customer, the state of Kuwait, although the greatest loss from this is to the workers of that factory, because Kuwait is not making the payments of foreign exchange to them until the tanks set off for the south. In recent days, 15 finished M-84A tanks, painted with desert camouflage, reached the port of Rijeka from Slavonski Brod, but Kuwait does not want to pay for those tanks until they reach the port of Bar, because there are no guarantees whatsoever that those tanks will really reach Kuwait instead of Zadar, Sibenik, or Split. Right at the beginning of the war in Croatia, finished M-84A tanks were driven away by force from the "Djuro Djakovic" Factory, and the Croatian armed forces have been using them in combat against the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army].

It has been calculated that the share of the Republic of Croatia and its industry in manufacturing the Yugoslav M-84 tank is about 25 percent, and now that "Djuro Djakovic," "Jugoturbina," and certain other smaller cooperators are refusing to continue even the export work, the economies of the other Yugoslav republics are getting their chance. As for the Slovene enterprises, above all, the "Slovene Steel Mills" of Ravne na Koroskem, "Iskra," and certain other firms, they are ready to continue working for the Yugoslav defense industry, and in recent days the directors of those Slovene firms have been in Belgrade for talks. The Slovenes are behaving, then, as though nothing happened and as though they did not proclaim secession, at least when it comes to military affairs and the production of weapons.

Economic logic and the law of supply and demand are, of course, the decisionmaking criterion of those involved in giving out business in the defense industry, so that if the Slovene offers in production of weapons and industrial cooperation are economically acceptable, there is no reason to be surprised if their enterprises continue production for the Yugoslav defense industry. As for the most recent tank, the "Vihor," its end producer will probably be the "14 Oktobar" Factory in Krusevac, but important work and orders will go to the Montenegrin and Bosnian economies, above all, "Radoje Dakic," and also "Bratstvo" of Travnik, and "Famos" and the "Koran" Factory, "Rudi Cajevec" of Banja Luka.... According to certain estimates, the first test series of "Vihor" tanks could emerge even by this fall, and the "zero" model, that is, the prototype of the "Vihor," is for the present in one of the buildings of the "Djuro Djakovic" Factory in Slavonski Brod....

Serbia's Export Opportunity

"A tank whose appearance provokes a commander to carry out an assault with it" is an idea frequently repeated by many tank specialists in the world, from Fuller, Liddel Hart, de Gaulle, von Bauhich, and Guderian to Tukhachevskiy and Patton. The tank, which appeared as World War I was winding down as a "deus ex machina," given the weakness of military thought at that time, which preferred positional warfare of the trench type, was at that time only one large distinct prospect which later would bring about a revolutionary change of direction in the conduct of war operations. Over the 70 or so years of its development, it has been refined through improvement of its performances, although it has not lost its elementary shape: running gear in the form of tracks, an armored body, and a turret with a cannon. From the outset the tank has constituted a unity of firepower, armored protection, and mobility on the battlefield. Those three characteristics have undergone change over the years, sometimes to the detriment of the first, second, or third, or their combination, but never was any of them completely eliminated, because then the tank would not be what it is. In the manner in which they are combined, that is, in which compromises are made among those three contradictory requirements, it has been possible over the years to recognize the conceptual differences in tank construction in the East and the West.

The parameters that today essentially characterize the new generation of tanks in the modern armies come down to an increase in range and accuracy of firepower, smaller silhouettes, and reinforcement of the sharp angles of the main armored surfaces on the tank, an increase in roadability over difficult terrain, a 50-percent higher muzzle velocity of shells fired, and an increase in the caliber of the tank cannon from 100 mm to 125 mm. The new tanks also possess special multilayer antineutron armor, but also the new active-reactive armor. One particular innovation is certainly the special shells, actually projectiles with fins, which spread after the shell leaves the barrel of the gun and afford high accuracy. The Yugoslav M-84A tank uses this kind, and the new "Vihor" tank will have still better ammunition.

A modern tank is a very expensive "toy" consisting of about 20,000 different parts. The production of one medium tank requires about 50 tons of the highest-quality steel and about 80,000 work-hours. Usually as many as 9,000 organizations cooperate in manufacturing the parts, and about 3,000 firms figure as the main contractors. Those are, of course, the standards that apply in the world, but our own industry was also mindful of them when it undertook the program for production of the M-84 tank. The experience of that project is also valuable for the program of the new "Vihor" supertank. Does all of this pay off? Does Yugoslavia, however "truncated" or diminished or somehow different it might be, or does Serbia have an economic incentive to enter into such an ambitious program?

Between 1976 and 1982, the price of the tank has increased 210 percent. A modern tank today costs even several million dollars on the world market. Specifically, the American M-1 "Abrams" costs about $4 million, but Saudi Arabia paid

still more for it. The Yugoslav M-84A tank, by contrast, was sold to Kuwait at a price of $1.6 million.

When we take into account that new tanks are not added to armament in small series, then it is clear that when we manufacture our own tanks the domestic tank industry is helping the country's balance of payments with foreign exchange, especially because our tank is cheaper than similar vehicles being manufactured in other countries. By mastering the production of tanks, we have eliminated the necessity of imports, which is a strategic matter in moments of crisis in the world, but also within the country, we have raised the general technological level of Yugoslav industry, we have employed new manpower, and the dinar paid for a new weapon remains within the borders of our country. What is more, we have also become important exporters of tanks; in addition to Kuwait, a great interest in the M-84A tank has also been shown by Pakistan, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and certain other countries as well. The exporting of the new "Vihor" tanks is actually an important opportunity even for those enterprises in Serbia which are in a crisis at the moment.

Regardless of the process of disarmament in the world, the disappearance of a large military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, and the supremacy of the United States, the arms trade is continuing to flourish. And in that context tanks continue to be one of the weapons sold most profitably. By all appearances, the tank will remain the principal striking power in a battle of maneuver, and the modern new tanks are also being given the role they once had in the not so remote past. The new Yugoslav supertank, the "Vihor," has a chance to give a new thrust, new technologies, new jobs, and new income to both the Yugoslav and Serbian economy.

Text of Indictment of Vuk Draskovic Published

92BA0391A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 92 p 20

[Indictment of Vuk Draskovic filed by Nebojsa Stojiljkovic, deputy public prosecutor: "'Called for Resistance' and 'Was One of the Group'"]

[Text] On the basis of Article 5, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 3, and Article 261 of the Law on Criminal Procedure, I hereby file before this court the following

Indictment

Against: Vuk Draskovic, journalist residing at No. 1 Sreten Mladenovic-Mika Street, fifth floor, in Belgrade, born 29 November 1946 in the village Medja, Secanj Opstina Assembly, to father Vidak and mother Stoja nee Nikitovic, Serb, citizen of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, married without children, law school graduate, never convicted, held in custody from 9 March 1991 at 2200 hours to 12 March 1991 at 1900 hours, that he:

On 8 and 9 March 1991 in Belgrade, as the ringleader of a group called upon others to resist and disobey measures of government agencies and officers in performing their official duties, so that the measures of the government agencies were not carried out, and that as president of the political party SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement], contrary to a ban—under Decision No. 212-14/91-072, dated 7 March 1991 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Belgrade Secretariat, against holding a rally on Republic Square and in front of the building of Belgrade Television at No. 10 Takovska Street, although he knew of this ban; on 8 March 1991, he held a press conference in the presence of several members of various opposition parties to the effect that they not respect the decisions of government agencies concerning the place for holding the meeting, but on 9 March 1991 come to Republic Square at 1200 hours, saying: "...I implore you, before tomorrow, dispel the fear in our people, do not let them be frightened by this ban...tomorrow it should be made evident how little we fear them and how much stronger we are than they are," while on 9 March 1991 at about 1040 hours, on the corner of Djordj Vasington and 29 Novembar Streets, leading a large group of demonstrators, when he encountered police officers blocking the passage to Republic Square, he turned to those present and said through the megaphone: "Police, get out of the way...if the police hit anyone, you have a free hand," and, incited by these appeals, with physical force and the use of various objects, they attacked the policemen and broke the police cordon, and then reached Republic Square, where from the terrace of the National Theater he spoke as follows: "We have all broken through the cordons, we have shown that there is no encirclement that we will not break today, and I congratulate you, heroes...I have decided, I will lead you to the Television building, I am prepared to die," and then a bit later, at the same place he spoke as follows over a sound system: "People, take away the weapons and tear gas and lift the barricades, there is no retreat, blood has already been shed, they wanted war, and we have war, let us win, do not attack anyone first, the police who are among us are among their brothers and in safe hands, I implore them to join us, assault, assault," which incited the demonstrators present, some of whom were armed with firearms and cold steel, clubs, and other articles, to oppose police authorities to a greater extent and to set off on a rampage, after which, as the ringleader of several tens of thousands of people, he took part in the group through whose concerted acts serious violence was committed, and that after calling for resistance and assault, he set off with the demonstrators from Republic Square toward the Assembly and TV Belgrade, and along the way they continued to break shop windows, from which they looted various articles, they overturned, damaged, and set fire to automobiles, and they destroyed municipal property, and they attacked law enforcement agencies, resulting in two deaths, that of the policeman Nedjo Kosovic and the schoolboy Branivoje Milinovic, while six people were seriously injured: Dragoljub Knezevic, Vladimir Sucevic, Sasa Lucic, Ljubisa Tomovic, Dragan Popovic, and Petar Ilic, as well as 23 persons with minor

injuries, and an extensive amount of property damage in the total amount of 15,343,994 dinars, 1,747,958.90 dinars of this to vehicles and equipment of the Serbian MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], 6,367,898.42 dinars to business establishments, 2,736,730 dinars to the transportation sector, 4,254,872 dinars to municipal utilities, and 236,535 dinars to vehicles and other property of individuals, whereby he committed the crime of calling for resistance under Article 216, Paragraph 2, in connection with Paragraph 1 of the Serbian Criminal Code, in combination with the crime of being part of the group which committed violence under Article 230, Paragraph 2, in connection with Paragraph 1 of the Serbian Criminal Code.

Wherefore, I recommend that a trial be held before the court to which the following are to be summoned:

1. The public prosecutor,

2. The defendant Vuk Draskovic residing at No. 1 Sreten Mladenovic-Mika Street, fifth floor, in Belgrade,

3. Representatives of the families of the deceased: Nedjo Kosovic of No. 13 Vojvoda Vuk Street in Belgrade and Branivoje Milinovic of No. 4 II Prokopacko Sokace Street in Belgrade,

4. The forensic expert Dr. Milovan Petrusic,

5. A representative of the Serbian MUP, a representative of the Municipal Secretariat for the Economy, a representative of the Municipal Secretariat for Transportation, a representative of the Municipal Secretariat for Services, Utilities, and Construction, and a representative of the "Dunav" Insurance Company, a joint stock company, located at No. 4 Makedonska Street in Belgrade.

That the following be read out in the trial: the notice for demonstrations of the SPO on 25 February 1991, the conclusion of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the City of Belgrade designating the place for holding public political meetings dated 25 September [sic] 1991, decision of the Serbian MUP, Belgrade Secretariat, No. 212-14/91-072, dated 7 March 1991, the press release of the defendant Vuk Draskovic, the transcript of the taped statement of Vuk Draskovic in the press conference on 8 March 1991, the report of the Serbian MUP, secretariats in Valjevo, Smederevo, Svetozarevo, Kragujevac, and Aleksinac, on the confiscation of firearms and cold steel dated 9 March 1991, transcript of the taped speeches of the defendant Vuk Draskovic on videotape on 9 March 1991 at 1040 hours at No. 9 Djordj Vasington Street and at 1300 hours on Republic Square, that the videotape of the Serbian MUP be shown of the demonstration on 9 March 1991, that photographs be shown on the damage to vehicles and equipment of the Serbian MUP, that the report of the "Dunav" Insurance Company be read on the damage done to privately owned vehicles, that the records be examined of the emergency medical center in Belgrade concerning persons injured in the demonstration on 9 March 1991, that the autopsy report be examined on the deceased Nedjo Kosovic and Branivoje Milinovic, that the report of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the City of Belgrade be examined on damage done to business facilities, transportation, and municipal utilities, as well as the report on the defendant from the KE [Criminal Records Department].

Substantiation

The state of the facts described in the indictment's statement of the offenses is established by the attached evidence.

With the notice for demonstrations filed with the Serbian MUP, Belgrade Secretariat, and the posters displayed in all visible places in Belgrade, the Serbian Renewal Movement scheduled demonstrations for 9 March 1991 on Republic Square to begin at 1200 hours. It is evident from the decision of the Serbian MUP, Belgrade Secretariat, No. 212-14/91-072, dated 7 March 1991, that after consideration the competent authority decided to ban the holding of demonstrations on Republic Square and in front of the building of Belgrade Television.

After that, the president of the SPO, the defendant Vuk Draskovic, declared in a public statement that he rejected with indignation this police decision, and it is evident from the transcript of the statement the defendant made in the press conference on 8 March 1991 that in the presence of several members of various opposition parties he issued an appeal not to comply with the decision of the government agency on the place for holding the meeting, but rather that all need to come at the appointed time to Republic Square, at the same time appealing to them to dispel the people's fear of this ban.

After viewing the videotape and examining the transcript of the speech delivered by the defendant Vuk Draskovic on 9 March 1991, it is evident that he was leading the demonstrators and continued to call for resistance and disobedience to the measures of government agencies and officials in performing their official duties, and on the corner of Djordj Vasington and 29 Novembar Streets he said that if "the police" strike any of the demonstrators, they have a free hand, and on that occasion he himself took part in breaking through the cordon.

After the speech delivered on the terrace of the National Theater in Republic Square, when the police attempted to break up the meeting, the defendant Vuk Draskovic, calling for an assault, upsetting of the barricades, and the taking of weapons from the police, incited the gathered demonstrators to go on a rampage. Serious violence was committed in this activity of the demonstrators resulting in the death of two, six were seriously injured, 93 received minor injuries, and there was extensive property damage in the total amount of 15,345,994 dinars, all of which can be ascertained from the report of the emergency medical center in Belgrade and the report of the Executive Council of the Belgrade City Assembly.

During the interrogation by the investigating judge of the First Opstina Court in Belgrade, the defendant did not wish to answer any question of the investigating judge, and at the same time he appended his written statement, which represents only a personal assessment of these criminal proceedings.

In view of the above and the evidence submitted, I feel that the actions of the defendant contain all the essential elements of the crime of calling for resistance under Article 216, Paragraph 2, in connection with Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, in combination with the crime of taking part in a group that committed violence under Article 230, Paragraph 2, in connection with Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia.

Slovenia

Rupel Comments on German Minority Rights

92P20124A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
22 Jan 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Rupel on German Minority in Slovenia"]

[Text] Referring to the Austrian reaction to a statement on the Austrian State Treaty, Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel said exclusively for the newspaper DELO: "Slovenia is vitally interested in the question of respecting the constitutional protection of the Slovene minority abroad. How we are going to protect the minority is another question. Until now, the Slovene minority in Austria has been protected by Article 7 of the Austrian State Treaty. If an even better protection is possible then we are, of course, for it. With the cooperation of the already Slovene minority, we are prepared to negotiate about its interests, taking into account the CSCE principles, especially the Copenhagen Document. The rights and obligations inherited by Slovenia from the SFRY is another matter."

Answering a question about the possible protection of the German-speaking minority in Slovenia, Minister Rupel said that during the talks in Ljubljana Austrian Foreign Minister Mock handed him a special note regarding this, and that Austria will certainly continue to insist on this issue. Rupel continued: "It is a fact that after the war people of German descent were the first to be struck and that their property was often illegally and unjustifiably nationalized or confiscated. However, this is primarily an issue of denationalization, i.e., rather a problem of property than a matter of protection of the German speaking people as an ethnic minority."

Two Candidates for Prime Minister Profiled

92BA0409A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
11 Jan 92 p 21

[Article by Janko Lorenci: "Tactician Against Tactician"]

[Text] Igor Bavcar and Dr. Janez Drnovsek are now serious candidates for Peterle's successor. Both are politically only half-known quantities, and can thus have surprises in store, both pleasant and unpleasant, as prime minister. Certain characteristics link them, and others distinguish them.

The Economy

Drnovsek is an economist, and even a doctor. Bavcar does not have any very profound knowledge of the economy. Although 1992 will the the year of the economy for Slovenia, Bavcar can compensate for this specific advantage of Drnovsek's—if he appoints Dr. Mencinger as the government's chief economist (he is reported to have already recruited him as a colleague). There is probably no better economic strategist in Slovenia, and furthermore, Mencinger, to some extent, has already become a "homo politicus" as well during his first term. As far as the most important political and economic action of this year—privatization—is concerned, the product of Bavcar's (Mencinger's) government will probably be considerably different from the product of Drnovsek's team. Drnovsek (like Sachs) advocates a broad distribution of shares to workers, whereas Mencinger is very reserved about this.

Foreign Policy

Drnovsek has more good international acquaintances than Bavcar. This is a favorable advantage, which, however, will lose some significance after recognition, and which has also been exaggerated to some extent, thanks to Drnovsek's adept political marketing. If Drnovsek were to become prime minister, the story of Peterle and Rupel could be repeated. Drnovsek, as an extremely international person, would probably be considerably involved with foreign policy, but Rupel (whom Drnovsek probably should leave in his position), of course, would want to continue to handle it himself.

Collective and Team Work

Bavcar headed his Committee, he was the official and sometimes unofficial coordinator in the present government, and he has headed such a sensitive and unique body as the police without any external upheavals. He consequently has proven qualities in this area. Drnovsek is described by all those who are familiar with his work as a pronounced individualist. As prime minister, he would consequently have to change his style.

Effectiveness, Decisionmaking

In this regard the rivals are similar in several respects. It is true of both that they are cold-blooded calculators, who carefully weigh a situation and different possibilities, do not make decisions impulsively and emotionally, and know how to adapt to altered circumstances. Both are nonideological and pragmatic politicians. Their emphatic caution may at some point turn into long-term and harmful tactical maneuvering. Drnovsek, for example, for a very long time supported one form or

another of preserving Yugoslavia, and his psychological make-up probably does not make him the kind of person to make breakthroughs. Recently Bavcar, in spite of a different majority opinion in the leadership of his party, opposed democratically overthrowing Peterle, and the party therefore lost the initiative and allowed Drnovsek, whom no one was even thinking about yet 14 days ago, even to become a candidate for prime minister. On the other hand, Bavcar can also make sudden decisions at critical moments (the Slovene war, the split in the SDZ [Slovene Democratic Alliance]). Effectiveness and political-managerial capabilities are a proven distinction of his. In this regard Drnovsek is an unknown, and sometimes gives a somewhat "dead" impression.

Party (Non)membership

Drnovsek does not belong to any party, and has played a somewhat risky game by going his own way like this. On one hand, his political independence has increased his popularity, but on the other hand he could thus be left out of all combinations. Nevertheless, this risk has succeeded for him and he will win a possible prime minister position as a nonparty member. In principle, this ought to increase his maneuvering room in putting together a team and give him freer hands in creating government policy. On the other hand, he does not have a solid base and support anywhere, and upon the first difficulties all the government parties could leave him in the lurch. As a nonparty member without a party base and corrective, he could essentially individualize the office of prime minister to a high degree—in both good and bad respects. In this regard, Igor Bavcar is thus also a better known and more predictable figure on the Slovene political scene.

Popularity

Both are popular politicians (Drnovsek more so), while Drnovsek's persistent popularity is a phenomenon in itself. Whereas Bavcar has proven wartime services, some obvious leadership qualities, and the reputation of a capable business and political "man of action" (which does not necessarily benefit him in the elections), Drnovsek does not radiate any obvious charisma and cannot boast of any individual definite and tangible political accomplishment (an exception is his role in the army's withdrawal from Slovenia, in which his real services are not yet quite clear; President Kucan, in his "1991 Diary" in DELO, recently hinted quite strongly that in this regard Drnovsek was taking credit for things that were done by a "collective"). People are obviously not bothered by the fact that Drnovsek, in spite of his otherwise restrained approach, sometimes boasts quite emphatically and pushes himself into the foreground. The secret of his popularity must lie in the fact that he appeals to people and seems to them to be the prototype of a circumspect, moderate, and independent politician, who is involved in this activity professionally, to be sure, but by no means contributes to the fact that "politics is a whore"—on the contrary (Milan Kucan is also succeeding in something similar). Since Drnovsek does not have a party behind him, popularity is his greatest trump card, and it is very understandable that he carefully nurtures it. Popularity means confidence, and that confidence could make the work of a government under Drnovsek's possible leadership much easier. On the other hand, Drnovsek's great popularity could turn out to be a two-edged sword. If he tried to continue nurturing it even as the prime minister of a government that will also have to take hard and painful steps, such a government could not do anything useful and sensible. In short, Peterle's legacy is now bringing only a temporary and not very popular term as prime minister. Will cautious Drnovsek accept this risk?

Predicting how a politician will behave in a new leadership position is above all a matter for fortunetellers. We can already state something now with a clear conscience, however: in the first place, Drnovsek is more of an unknown than Bavcar; in the second place, both of them would be a possible step forward after Peterle. In spite of all this, however, we could even be left with Peterle, in view of the catastrophic petty politics among all the government and opposition parties.

Excerpts From Peterle's Budget Proposal

92BA0297B Ljubljana NEODVISNI DNEVNIK in Slovene 19 Dec 91 p 4

["Excerpts" from Slovene Prime Minister Peterle's introductory speech at 18 December Assembly session: "Lightning Rod for Unrealistic Demands"]

[Text] It is objectively impossible to prepare a budget that will satisfy everyone. The government has been charged with preparing it, but the government is also a lightning rod for all the opposing interests and demands for budgetary funds, demands that are unrealistic in view of the material base that we are to have in 1992 as a result of the social product achieved. As a basis for the possible framework for budgetary expenditures for 1992, we have used a scenario according to which the real social product in Slovenia is to decline by 6.5 percent next year.

If I may use the finance minister's words, the budget in 1992 will "weigh" 109 million tolars, in round figures.

We in the government are situated at the very center of differing and not infrequently conflicting interests, and that is why, in preparing the draft, we have tried consistently to take into account the following:

—The guidelines and tasks resulting from the program for structural adjustment and economic policy in 1992, the policies for individual economic sectors, an assessment of economic trends and relationships in Slovenia in 1991, initial predictions regarding Slovenia's possibilities for development in 1992, and possible scenarios, as well as the implementation of the budget in 1991.

—In 1992, the total volume of the funds allocated for financing budgetary tasks (minus the funds that will have to be allocated for servicing the state debt) is to retain its originally predicted share of the social product, as was stipulated when the Republic of Slovenia's 1991 budget was adopted.

—Conducting a balanced budget policy, without incurring debt at the Bank of Slovenia.

—We are to ensure regular repayment of the obligations abroad assumed by the Republic of Slovenia.

—Tax burdens will be kept within the framework of the rates specified in the applicable laws (together with the proposed changes), and the proposed sales tax law.

—In accordance with market regulation and facilitation of the transition to a market economy, the budget is to be used to finance the most necessary interventions and subsidies in the economy.

—Budgetary funds are to be used to finance or cofinance the most necessary investments, and especially to complete the ones already started.

—Implementation of the social program that has been adopted should be continued.

—The unhindered functioning of social services should be ensured.

Along with the above-mentioned starting points, we also had to take into account the financing of the most necessary tasks and investments for establishing the functions of the independent state of Slovenia.

For the first time in its history, Slovenia is establishing its own diplomatic service, which is already, as it is emerging, facing the demanding task of consolidating our international position and protecting Slovene interests abroad. Slovenia's situation, and especially the circumstances in which its statehood is being formed, make the prospects for Slovenia and its development highly dependent upon its international position. Operation abroad will constitute the biggest financial burden for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has a share of more than 70 percent of its budget. Because of the republic budget's limited possibilities, the Slovene network of representations abroad will be economical and efficient, although it will strive to cover all of the vital political, economic, and other interests of the Republic of Slovenia, and the areas abroad where Slovenes reside.

The scope and complexity of the tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been increasing constantly with Slovenia's independence. In addition to the regular tasks in the past, this Ministry has taken over the control of a border extending for 1,234 kilometers on land and 26 kilometers at sea. During Slovenia's inclusion in practice in European flows, assessing the quality of the control at its borders will be extremely important. There have been 34 new border crossings established on the border with the Republic of Croatia. The entire personnel structure and the infrastructure at these crossings are temporary. Policemen and others are working in very difficult conditions, and consequently next year it will be necessary to ensure the conditions in effect at all the other border crossings.

In 1992, the Republic of Slovenia also has to establish the most necessary system of self-defense in order to protect its scarcely won independence. It is therefore necessary to introduce the systemic solutions that were adopted before the declaration of independence, such as fulfilling military obligations, reorganizing territorial defense, establishing part of the peacetime structure of territorial defense for performing combat tasks, and also supplementing and modernizing the most necessary material and technical equipment. Sixty percent of the funds for defense will be allocated for the regular training of about 7,000 soldiers, although part of last year's generation would also have to be sent for training. Altogether, we now have almost three years of recruits that have to be trained. Because of the high permanent costs of the defense system, which constitute 30 percent of all the money needed for defense, it will not be possible to improve territorial defense's technical equipment. This particularly applies to antiaircraft defense. The supply of weapons and military equipment for territorial defense will also remain mostly at the present level.

Improvements in Slovene Economy Noted

92BA0409B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
13 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Silva Ceh: "Some Signs of Revival, but the Causes of the Recession Remain Unchanged"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] In the "Economic Trends" EIPF [Law School Economic Institute], experts note a slight slowing in the decline in production; exports in January will no longer be competitive, but may be saved by the decline in the value of the tolar.

Ljubljana, 17 Jan—The causes of the recession in the Slovene economy remain unchanged. It is true that production is declining at a slower rate. Demand, however, has still not revived, the competitiveness of exports is declining, and as early as January it may already be critical. Producers have forced up prices more than retail prices could increase. The state, which did not make economic stabilization possible through public sector spending, also contributed to this. In spite of this, the EIPF experts, in December's "Economic Trends," do not recommend raising the dark (i.e., the government's) economic scenarios, which would only increase economic pessimism even more.

Of course, one cannot overlook the fact that industrial production is declining. Nevertheless, last November, when it was already declining for the 12th month in a row, its decline was still somewhat slowed in comparison with the other months. Specifically, whereas it declined

at a monthly rate of 0.98 percent last November, in previous months it had declined by 1.02 percent. The causes from which the economy has suffered most were similar throughout all of last year, but undoubtedly reduced demand is the leading one. This was due to the collapse of Yugoslavia, the bankruptcy of East Europe, and, of course, the drop in the standard of living in Slovenia.

The EIPF analysts nevertheless feel that with the announced social pact, the imminent beginning of the financial rehabilitation of Slovene banks, the expected sterilization of foreign exchange surpluses, the maintenance of the tolar's exchange rate at the same purchasing power parity as in the middle of 1988, and an increase in public outlays for health care instead of imports for state needs, we can promise a halt to the decline in production—and this is in spite of a restrictive monetary policy. This is precisely why they advise against predicting dark scenarios, which foresee a decline in the social product, since economic pessimism and hyperinflationary expectations are associated with them.

They consequently assess the conclusion of the social pact as an extremely important agreement, through which the partners in the agreement—the state, enterprises, and workers (with no exception, i.e., economic and noneconomic activities, including agriculture) would commit themselves not to increase their incomes, both taxes, and profits and wages. Restrictive monetary policy is essential, but the EIPF experts recommend establishing the social pact with sufficiently high exchange rate incentives for exports. Of course, it is also the case that the incomes of the state, enterprises, and workers are only to be increased through a growth in productivity. The "prescription" for economic growth and prosperity is the largest possible exports.

The recession is intensifying. This is confirmed by the data on sales in retail trade. Thus, last November 77 percent of the enterprises asked were having difficulties with sales in the domestic market, and 20 percent already viewed their sales as critical. Slight optimism is aroused by the answers according to which not even half ("only" 48 percent) of the enterprises asked responded that they had difficulties with export orders and only 8 percent viewed their situation as critical.

Among equipment producers—whose production declined the least in recent months, in any case (at 1.02 percent monthly in November)—the worst deterioration last November was in the position of the machinery industry, while neither the electrical industry nor vehicle production is doing essentially any better.

With a 1.05 percent decline in production in November, producers of semimanufactures achieved the largest drop in production since last March. Energy producers, especially the production of oil derivatives, coped best with compensating for purchases in other republics of the former Yugoslavia. On the whole, however, semimanufacture production is not using its improved position in the Slovene market for increasing sales, but rather, as befitting monopolists, for absolutely excessive price increases.

Last November the production of basic necessities declined at a monthly rate of 1.34 percent. Export-oriented furniture producers, clothing manufacturers, and the footwear industry improved to some extent in November. The EIPF experts do not rule out the appearance of monopolies, but they still advise the only real way out—exports, with an appropriate active exchange rate policy, of course.

By the end of last October, exports were 4.9 percent lower and imports were 8.7 percent lower than in 1990. These percentages do not take into account transactions involving additional processing. In spite of the relatively satisfactory data on trade, there remains a need for an economic policy that will include Slovenia in world trade while it is still alive. The purchase of expensive automobiles for ministers does not fit into that policy.

At any rate, it is becoming clear that December's high growth in domestic prices has already noticeably reduced the competitiveness of exports. That will already be critical this month, i.e., in January. In fact, taking into account the official exchange rate of the tolar, in December the competitiveness of exports had already declined below competitiveness in December 1989. The tolar's exchange rate—41.5 tolars per German mark—is for the time being still 7.5 percent above the real exchange rate in December 1989, but this will already be destroyed by inflation in January. It will therefore be necessary to reconcile ourselves to a lowered exchange rate for the tolar. This, of course, will accelerate inflation, especially since individual policies have not been coordinated.

In fact, in the Institute's opinion the firmness of the tolar can be attributed to mistakes in the housing law. Specifically, a better planned privatization of housing would not only have influenced the establishment of sufficiently high foreign exchange reserves and a more uniform influx of foreign exchange funds, but would also have made it possible to solve one of the most complicated economic problems—citizens' frozen foreign exchange deposits. Citizens have not made much use of the opportunity to withdraw their frozen foreign exchange deposits in tolars. The EIPF experts are convinced that it is not possible to regain their confidence with a law on public debt, as the government has proposed. In this regard, they emphasize that those who withdrew the frozen foreign exchange after the introduction of the tolar really have already gained more than they gave for it at the time of Markovic's stabilization program.

Inflation is undoubtedly severe. At the same time, however, one should not overlook the warnings from "Economic Trends": "The Slovene economy will only be in

more predictable and more manageable waters when the monthly growth of prices is reduced below 8-10 percent." In November, the prices of services only increased by 11 percent, but the prices of agricultural products showed a jump of almost 30 percent (29.7 percent). Among the prices of industrial products, those in the lead are food products, especially canned meat (from 29 to 35 percent), and among agricultural products, fresh vegetables (40.6 percent).

During the entire year, i.e., from November 1990 to November 1991, retail prices increased by 208 percent; among living costs, the largest increases were in the prices of lighting and heat, transportation, and food. In November producer prices grew faster than retail prices, by an average of 250 percent. It is interesting, however, that during the entire year, the electrical industry's producer prices lagged behind the most.

What about wages? In November, they increased by only 6.9 percent, and 5.2 percent in the economy. In public services, they showed a 9.8 percent increase, and in sociopolitical communities, a 19.6 percent increase. During the entire year, the state increased its income by 30 percent more than the economy.

The "Economic Trends" analysts attribute the increase in public sector revenues—in October they grew by 60.8 percent—to an extremely large increase in customs duties. Public sector revenues increased in one year by a full 150 percent, which means that the state has still not adjusted the fiscal burden on the economy to the latter's success. Comparisons of final expenditure for the entire year indicate that the state's material expenditure has lagged behind the least. In real terms, it was 9.4 percent lower than in October 1990, but the population's real expenditure was 21 percent lower.

Opposition Leaders View Demos Dissolution

92BA0372B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
3 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Vinko Vasle: "Opposition Leaders Still Do Not Believe in the End of the Present Ruling Coalition"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] Representatives of the opposition parties emphasize that elections are a matter of a joint agreement; the SDP [Party of Democratic Renewal] is in favor of a temporary expert government; the Socialists suspect that Demos's time has actually already run out.

Ljubljana, 2 Jan—The collapse of Demos, which its leaders declared on 30 December, apparently did not surprise anyone—neither Demos's parties, nor the opposition. In spite of everything, everyone is already forming his own opinion of that event.

Mile Setinc (Liberal Democratic Party [LDS]) commented on the end of Demos as follows: "Thank God that the coalition has collapsed, since it was already high time for it. Nevertheless, even in that action Demos proved that it still had the old habits and behavior: It arbitrarily set the date for early elections, and prejudiced something on which it could have consulted with the opposition. In any case, Demos is obviously not aware that it is not possible to prepare anything overnight for the elections announced for April, not just because of the electoral law—it probably is not even possible to prepare the electoral registers of the new citizens of Slovenia in such a short time." Setinc says that because of all this, it could happen that we will live for a while longer with a completely incompetent government, even for as much as a year, which is very irresponsible of Demos.

Zmago Jelincic (the Slovene National Party) says that what happened is what, in his opinion, should have happened as early as the spring, when Demos proved through several "actions" that it had completed its mission. "The splits within Demos are the coalition's business, but unfortunately, because of its 'special features,' they have led Slovenes and Slovenia into a terribly weak economic and every other kind of position. Demos has also proven its sterility and impotence by passing a citizenship law that is genocidal for Slovenes," says Jelincic, who thinks that Demos is clinically dead, but is precisely the kind of sick person on his deathbed who usually surprises the 'grieving survivors' once more.

Jasa Zlobec (LDS) emphasizes that Demos's dissolution was the coalition's first reasonable action in its 2-year history. "It seems that its leaders have realized that it is not just Peterle's government that is unproductive, but the Assembly is too, where Demos's majority has been acting like a rhinoceros for some time now. The best proof of this is the fact that Demos's deputies, i.e., the government's majority, have blocked the government's law on insurance for retirees and invalids."

Dr. Ciril Ribicic (SDP) says that the decision to have elections as soon as possible is a decision that allows Demos an honorable retreat from the Slovene political scene. The Slovene SDP has thoroughly supported elections as soon as possible, because it is the only way to get a more competent government. Demos should not have adopted the agreement on the elections itself, however. It should have been a joint agreement among all the parliamentary parties, after consultations with the parties outside of parliament as well.

"Regardless of the interparty games in the 'collapsed Demos,' the fundamental question for Slovenia in 1992 is how to ensure the state's stability, development, and social justice! We are against the present incompetent government's undermining Slovenia's economic fate through the adoption of the budget and other economic policy measures," Ribicic stated, and continued by saying that the SDP was firmly opposed to the government, with its present competition, extending its mandate until the elections. That is why the party is demanding the formation of a temporary expert government that will not include any party leaders. During the next few months, the latter will be dealing only with the

elections, instead of the extremely necessary attempts to settle the economic crisis and the social jeopardy that people are in.

The Socialist Party thinks that it can only assess Demos's collapse on the basis of the official statement that was distributed in advance, which is ambiguous and tricky enough that it does not permit any final assessments.

"In spite of that, we think that Demos's dissolution took place under the slogan, 'The more things change, the more they remain the same.' The collapse of that coalition has been necessary—to the extent that it even is a political coalition—from the very beginning. It seems, however, that the 'event' indicates that some different extension of the coalition is prevailing—an alliance with the authorities. The coalition is thus remaining as an agreement among 'friendly parties.'"

Darja Lavtizar-Bebler, Braco Roter, and Borut Suklje consequently think that this second extension has been reinforced by the megalomania that has already been present for some time, and which is reflected in considering the coalition equivalent in value to the Assembly, or even as superior to the parliament. "Since a government crisis is still not a parliamentary crisis in any parliamentary system, we do not see any reasons for early elections, but we do see enough of them for the replacement of the government. The offer to hold early elections actually means that the government will stay on for some time, and is using the promise of a limited time, until 1 April, as bait."

Demos's appeal to all the parliamentary parties to cooperate, in the socialists' opinion, can be understood to mean that the parties should assume part of the responsibility for the government's unpopular and technically dubious measures (e.g., the budget), but not the credit for implementing an item in the so-called "Demos preelection program," even though all the state-building acts were adopted by a large consensus. It is an attempt to avoid a vote of confidence in Peterle's cabinet. Demos is obviously starting its after-death life, the Socialist Party thinks.

[Box, p 2]

A special statement from the Ljubljana City Committee of the Slovene Christian Democrats says, among other things, that the opposition parties, as the heirs of the former LC [League of Communists] and the public media linked to it (DELO, DNEVNIK, VECER, and RTV) "ever since the democratic elections, have been conducting a violent campaign against the first Slovene democratic government, and especially against the party of the Slovene Christian Democrats and against its president." This campaign, according to the special statement, has recently grown into a real Bolshevist agitation, in which no means are spared. Various scandals have been fabricated—for example, the scandal linking Peterle to SDP leader Ribicic, the forcing of a government crisis through attacks in the newspaper and on RTV, and the continuous production of public opinion polls in which the public is supposed to have rated Peterle most negatively, while a former LC leader is supposed to have been rated positively.

Demos Leaders Support Early Elections

92BA0372C Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
4 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with Demos leaders Dr. Joze Pucnik, Dr. Dusan Plut, and Spomenka Hribar by Marko Pecauer and Slava Partlic; place and date not given: "Demos Has Become a Coalition for a Government With Limited Powers"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] What some participants in Demos's dissolution say; Joze Pucnik is surprised that the opposition is grumbling again; Dusan Plut: A vote of no confidence if the elections are delayed.

Ljubljana, 3 Jan—The dissolution of Demos and the decisions by its council that were adopted in Dolsko have met with various commentaries, analyses, and assessments. Yesterday some of the opposition party leaders had the floor on this, and today we are giving it to the participants in the Dolsko event.

[Pucnik] It seems that nothing that Demos does is right; our colleagues in the opposition see some big background and sinister purposes behind everything. In Dolsko, we canceled the coalition agreement. We agreed that as soon as possible we would adopt new electoral legislation that would allow early elections in April. Why are all the parties protesting now? Perhaps it does not suit them that Demos has collapsed.... They should help us to hold early elections as soon as possible; this has also been advocated by representatives of the opposition parties in their own statements. If the opposition is also interested in holding elections as soon as possible, then this idea should by no means be characterized as unworkable. I also do not understand why there is so much bad blood because Demos has decided to propose early elections. Making these kinds of proposals is still the right of deputies from all the parties, including the Demos parties. Certainly, there will be different opinions about what the electoral law should be like—not only between the opposition and the parties that were in Demos, but also within the Demos parties. We did not talk about this any more specifically in Demos. We are proposing that this should be agreed upon in coordination among all the parties represented in the Assembly, i.e., in the coordination that Dr. Plut has already cited at the initiative of our party (the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia [SDSS]) and the Party of Democratic Renewal [SDP]. If there is a willingness for new elections, we will certainly reach agreement soon on the disputed issues.

[Plut] Demos no longer exists. The Demos council has been dissolved, and there is no longer a Demos president. Until the early elections, it is a government coalition that supports the government, but not without reservations. If you ask me whether our party (the Greens) will vote for a vote of no confidence in the

government, I have to say no. We think that there is no sense in changing the government for a short period of three months. Experience shows that at least six months are needed for things to get going after the arrival of new ministers. The most necessary changes in the government will be made—we agreed on that. Our condition for a vote of confidence in the government, of course, is a prior agreement that early elections really will be held in April or in May at the latest. If they want to drag it out until the fall, then we will support a vote of no confidence. The parties' behavior in deciding on the early elections will show the extent to which the individual parties are serious. If their statements show that they are serious, then there should not be any great obstacle to early elections in April.

We also asked Dr. Pucnik and Dr. Plut what they would now call the group of parties that were united in Demos until the end of last year. We have found ourselves, in fact, in a bit of a terminological quandary about what to call Demos if it no longer exists. Unfortunately, their suggestions will not help us much.

[Pucnik] You just said that they are the parties that were formerly in Demos. You could also call them the parties represented in parliament.

[Plut] The parties that support a government with limited powers.

Spomenka Hribar is not too satisfied with the decisions by the Demos council in Dolsko. She does not believe that elections can be held by April, since in that case the electoral legislation would already have to be passed by the end of February. Above all, she wonders whether we can and should allow an election campaign now, when the economy is facing collapse. She herself thinks that what we need now is primarily a competent government, not campaign struggles. Finally, Jansa proposed the replacement of the president of the Executive Council back in June, and she now says that we are giving the prime minister a blank check, so to speak, until the end of April, without justifying this extension already until December.

[Pecauer] You have probably warned your colleagues about all this.

[Hribar] Yes, to the extent that I was able to. Unfortunately, the Kranj liberals who have generally headed Demos policy until now have cut me off. Clearly, I asked whether our economy (and everything else: education, culture, and social welfare!) could stand the preelection upheaval—instead of careful and extremely precise planning and implementation of measures or laws that would provide some more normal course for the economy and our lives, and provide hope for the near future.

[Pecauer] Demos is supposed to have collapsed, but it still exists, as a sort of "government coalition" that is supposed to endure until the elections.... What does this actually mean?

[Hribar] It means that Demos formally no longer exists, the Demos council no longer exists, and the Demos deputies' club no longer exists. Only the individual parties exist. It is true that there is a sort of paradox: Instead of the (Demos) parties' controlling the government—as least as much as in the past—from now on the prime minister will "consult" with the party leaders who are ministers in the government.... In my opinion, this is a somewhat backwards view, since the prime minister will consequently also perform Pucnik's function from now on.

[Pecauer] You therefore think that it was primarily the prime minister who gained through the decisions in Dolsko?

[Hribar] Yes. Mr. Peterle has at any rate gained time, and in that sense he also "won." In the statement that he is backing off from his demands for the replacement of the foreign minister, he forgot to say that he did not even get support for that demand of his from the opposition. He is now portraying his inability to replace Minister Rupel as his own good will, out of some goodness or willingness to "compromise."

[Pecauer] What do you most criticize Peterle and his government for?

[Hribar] The government's work is not coordinated and planned; every ministry is working on its own, one better and the other worse, but the government is not working as a government, in a coordinated manner, and with a clear strategy for (primarily economic) development. Mr. Peterle simply is not capable of performing that role; this is not any "sin," one person is capable of something and another person is capable of something else. In my opinion—perhaps I am mistaken—this government will fall apart by itself.

[Pecauer] Are the decisions in Dolsko a mistake, then?

[Hribar] No. It is a positive thing that Demos has been eliminated, and also that it did it with a certain dignity, and that we ended its "epoch," if I can put it that way, in a dignified way, without squabbling and washing dirty laundry.... It is also a positive thing that the parties of the former Demos will be set free: now the search for and formation of new party coalitions will be normal (and not morally "questionable"!). It is also a positive thing that we tied our support for the government to the condition of early elections by the end of April. Early elections are essential! If it turns out that it will not be possible to pass the electoral law in time, we will also be released from our support for the government. Furthermore, it will be possible to determine very quickly whether anyone may be obstructing the adoption of electoral legislation, and who it is; I am afraid that certain parties in the former ruling coalition will not be in too much of a hurry for elections now. In that case as well, we will be completely released from the decisions made in Dolsko even before the end of April. Consequently, the whole business stands or falls with the possibility (or impossibility) of early elections!

[Pecauer] Why does the elimination of Demos seem so positive to you?

[Hribar] Because Demos became its own obstacle, because with its single-mindedness and inability to agree it kept creating more obstacles to the achievement of the goals of its own program.

[Pecauer] Didn't Demos's self-blockade start with the split in the Slovene Democratic Alliance [SDZ]?

[Hribar] That is true, but it was precisely through this agreement that the Democratic Party showed that it was not the destroyer of Demos: at the meeting in Dolsko, all the parties agreed that Demos had come to an end, and thus we Democrats stayed in it until the end. Like the others, we deputies of the Democratic Party were also elected on the Demos coalition's ballots, and through the decisions in Dolsko we consequently proved that we had not betrayed our voters—at the same time that we opposed the growing ideological exclusivism in the former SDZ, and also in Demos in general. That (both things!) gives us a sort of moral dignity, which seems very important to me.

[Pecauer] What do you expect after Dolsko?

[Hribar] I am afraid of, and I expect, continued agony for the government, parliament, and thus society as a whole. A preelection "race" is probably something quite normal and interesting in a normal democratic society—but ours is not one yet. We are still fragmented and divided. (Even) Demos succeeded in fragmenting first the parliament, and then almost all of society. Our misfortune is continuing, or is at least abating too slowly. That is why I think that the parties, on the basis of their own specific programs, should seek primarily a national consensus, and not—sometimes foolishly—emphasize their differences, and especially the differences among us, which are otherwise, of course, legitimate. But they should not be accentuated to the point of hostility! We need relaxed, civil, rational conduct, without a fundamentalist pursuit of prestige.

Italian Minority Proposes Tripartite Agreement

92BA0383A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
7 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Boris Suligoj: "Minority Offers Agreement"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] The Union of Italians has prepared the text of a trilateral agreement on which Slovenia, Croatia, and Italy are to agree this very week in Zagreb.

Koper, 6 Jan—Special rights, equalization of the position of the minority in Slovenia and in Croatia, dual citizenship, freedom of movement and employment in the "historical territory of the Italian minority"—these are several of the concrete starting points that the Italian minority from the former Yugoslavia wants to support and establish in a special trilateral agreement among Slovenia, Croatia, and Italy. The Executive Committee of the Union of Italians, together with the chairmen of the permanent commissions of that Union's Assembly, has already formulated the text of a memorandum several pages long, on which representatives of the three republics and the Italian ethnic minority are to reach an agreement as early as the end of this week in Zagreb.

The proposed text of the memorandum provides that the signatories to the agreement will recognize the ethnic minority as a constituent member of the states in which the minority lives, and its ethnic unity, i.e., the unity of its sole representative body (the Union of Italians). The three states are to guarantee uniform treatment of all minority issues, proceeding from the highest level of rights already achieved, and from the supplemented rights that would additionally be provided by this same trilateral agreement. The rights are to be guaranteed regardless of the size of the minority. The state would leave specified functions in the area of realizing the minority's interests to the autonomous organizations of the ethnic community, and in any case the minority is to be appropriately represented in decisionmaking by state bodies. All laws, regulations, and standards that would affect the exercise of the minority's rights and its position could be adopted only with the consensus of the ethnic minority's legitimate representatives. The right to reacquire Italian citizenship, while keeping Slovene or Croatian citizenship, should be recognized for members of the Italian ethnic minority and for those whose origin is Italian culture and whose mother tongue is Italian. The state or the opstinas should provide for the functioning of the minority's establishments and institutions, and finance them, and above all, those establishments and institutions should function throughout the entire "historical area of the Italian minority" (Istria, Kvarner, Dalmatia, up to and including Zadar, and Plostin). The ethnic minority should acquire the right to a completely specific pedagogical and educational system. Throughout the entire aforementioned area, Italian is to be an official language (in addition to Slovene or Croatia), and likewise bilingual regional names are to be promoted and the teaching of the Italian language and historical features associated with the Italian ethnic minority is to be introduced in all schools. The trilateral agreement is to make it possible for the Italian minority to participate jointly in the property reform (which is under way in Slovenia and in Croatia), and ensure that it has an opportunity to acquire ownership of real estate, or state property known to have been associated with the existence or creativity of the Italian minority. The states are to ensure the freedom of movement and employment in Istria, so that the residents of that area will have equal rights. One of the provisions says that the Italian minority is to participate in all the preparations for this trilateral agreement, and that its text can only be adopted with the consensus of the Union of Italians. All of these rights and agreements are to go into effect six months after the signing of the agreement, and in one year a plan

is to be prepared for investments to support the minority's development and thus strengthen the "Italian component" of the population.

The minority's representatives will sent the text of the proposed memorandum to the governments of the above-mentioned three republics. Alfonz Nabreznik, the head of the section for neighboring states in the Slovene Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to our question about the trilateral agreement, said that there were probably many disagreements during the formulation of the text of the memorandum on the part of the Italian minority. According to him, the three states are only to conduct trilateral consultations and agree in principle on how they will try to solve all of these specific problems through several bilateral agreements. Only the bilateral agreements are to include several of the provisions that the minority's representatives took into account in their text.

In regard to all of this, the question also arises of what connection this trilateral agreement is to have with the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thinks that the minority's position in Slovenia and Croatia is already being assessed by an EC arbitration commission, and it is convinced that the Italian minority in Slovenia already enjoys several of the rights stipulated by the European standard. The sudden haste in all of this is incomprehensible, since the Italian ethnic minority is trying to have the trilateral agreement signed even before 15 January.

Slovene Minority Demands Equal Rights

92BA0383B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
9 Jan 92 p 5

[Article by Lojze Kante: "Slovenes Want Equal Rights for Everyone"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] The Slovenes in Italy should not have fewer rights than Italy is demanding for its countrymen who live in Slovenia and Croatia; memorandum from a joint delegation of Slovenes in Italy before the Zagreb meeting.

Trieste, 8 Jan—A joint delegation of Slovenes in Italy has issued a special memorandum before the announced Zagreb meeting of representatives of Slovenia, Croatia, and Italy in connection with the rights of Italians in both of the former Yugoslav republics, and of Slovenes in Italy. Today it was handed in Trieste to the Slovene government's minister for Slovenes throughout the world, Janez Dular, and will also be provided to the Italian government.

When the delegation met with Minister Dular and representatives of the Slovene Foreign Ministry at noon, it warned that the memorandum was an expression of the united views of all the forces that unite Slovenes in the Friuli-Giulia province. Klavdij Palcic, the president of the Slovene Cultural and Economic Union, recalled in this regard that Slovenes had already been trying to bring about the adoption of protective regulations for many decades, and that they had already prepared appropriate documentation on this, which they attached to the memorandum. Senator Stojan Spetic also emphasized that Slovenes in Italy were aware of the complexity of the current political situation, at a time when conditions were being prepared for the international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and that they felt that in the negotiation processes, the Italian side would try to demonstrate "its superior strength, even with arrogance." In his opinion, it is a question of coexistence between a majority and a minority on both sides of the border, a coexistence that should be intensified and developed even regardless of current political interests. For this reason, the Slovenes want to be active in all phases of the negotiations. They will not allow Italy to deny them the same rights that it is demanding for the Italians in Slovenia and Croatia.

The memorandum's preface notes that the preparations for the international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia "are being accompanied by attempts to use international guarantees to ensure that the international minorities in this region have possibilities for their development to be encouraged by new ties of friendship and cooperation." That is why the Slovene minority wants to be active in the negotiations, and demands that "Italy commit itself not to adopt provisions in connection with the position of the Slovene minority without its consent."

In demanding recognition of the existence of the minority in the Videm [Udine], Gorica [Gorizia], and Trieste provinces, from Kanalska Dolina [Val Canale] to Milski Grici in Rezija [Resia], in Venetian Slovenia, and also in the cities of Cedad [Cividale], Gorica, Trieste, Milje [Muggia], Krmin [Cormons], and Trbiz [Tarvisio], the representation from the Slovenes in Italy notes that Slovenes live indigenously in 36 municipalities, whereas they settled later in 24 municipalities.

Above all, this has to do with legal recognition of the dignity of the Slovene language and of the right to its public use in signs and advertisements, and also in the functioning of representative bodies. The Slovene language should be acknowledged as having the role of a second official language in the above-mentioned areas.

We demand that the consequences of a century-long denationalization policy that has affected the entire Slovene minority in Italy be eliminated.

Also, the Slovenes in Kanalska Dolina, Venice, and Rezija should be granted the right to public education in their mother tongue. The means of exercising this right should be determined by the minority itself. Minority education should be independent, and should be appropriate to the historical and cultural characteristics of the Slovene language. Slovene cultural institutions, the press, radio, and television must be guaranteed independence and unhindered development, with appropriate financial resources. The Slovene minority should be guaranteed joint participation in determining the course of the development of the area in which it lives. It should

therefore have guaranteed Slovene representation in elected bodies that have legislative and administrative authority. Special forms of protection should also be guaranteed outside of the historically settled area, in those closer municipalities of the Friuli-Giulia province where the minority is visibly present. At the end of the memorandum it is emphasized that the Slovene minority must participate jointly in a body that will watch over the realization of the agreed-upon rights in the broader area of the neighboring states, and that Italy has to commit itself in the international agreement to a specific period within which it will adopt and implement protective regulations, by agreement with the Slovene minority.